Parker v. State, 414

• Decision Date: 06 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 414,414
• Citation: 7 Md.App. 167,254 A.2d 381
• Parties: Jackie C. PARKER v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 167

7 Md.App. 167

254 A.2d 381

Jackie C. PARKER v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 414.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 6, 1969.

L. Edgar Brown, Denton, and D. William Simpson, Salisbury, for appellant.

Donald Needle, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and William B. Yates, II, State's Atty. for Dorchester County, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON and ORTH, JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

The appellant was convicted on 16 May 1967 by a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County of first degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and to a twenty year term on the robbery conviction, to run consecutively with the life sentence. The appellant's principal defense at that trial was that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, the test of criminal responsibility then prevailing being the M'Naghten-Spencer test. On appeal we reversed the judgments and remanded the case for a new trial because the lower court had erroneously charged the jury that the burden of proof was upon the defendant 'to establish insanity by a preponderance of the evidence; but then the burden then shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane.' Parker v. State, 4 Md.App. 62, 241 A.2d 185. By order of the Circuit Court for Wicomico County of 26 June 1968 the case was removed for trial to Caroline County upon suggestion of the appellant. The appellant went to trial on 21 August 1968 before a jury on pleas

of not guilty and that he was insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes. The verdicts of the jury were that he was sane at the time of the commission of the crimes, that he was guilty of murder in the first degree without capital punishment and that he was guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon. The sentences of the court were that on the murder conviction he be committed to the jurisdiction of the Maryland Department of Correction for confinement for the balance of his natural life and on the robbery conviction that he restore the property taken or pay the full value thereof to the owner and be committed to the jurisdiction of said Department for confinement for 20 years to run consecutively with the life sentence.

VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND INSANITY

At the time of the appellant's trial on remand, the responsibility for his criminal conduct, raised by his special pleas, was no longer to be determined by the M'Naghten-Spencer test, but by the test prescribed by Chapter 709, Acts 1967, codified as Md. Code, Art. 59-s 9(a). We discussed this new test and the procedure to be followed when it is invoked, in Strawderman v. State, 4 Md.App. 689, 244 A.2d 888. The lower court correctly followed the procedure and properly permitted the issue of the appellant's sanity to go to the jury. The appellant contends, however, that the court erred in instructing the jury with regard to the issue.

In its advisory capacity the lower court read the jury Art. 59, § 9(a) and explained it, thoroughtly and correctly. Part of the appellant's defense was that he was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crimes. The court said:

'In respect to the contention of the accused that he was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crimes charged, which condition he alleges contributed materially to his insanity, the jury are advised that you should inquire The court continued, and it is this part of the charge which the appellant challenges on appeal and preserved for review by timely exception below:

whether the accused lacked completely the mental ability and willpower to abstain from taking the first drink on December 30, 1966. If you find that he did lack such ability and willpower and further find that after taking the first drink he further lacked the mental ability and willpower to abstain from continued drinking until to reached a state of intoxication, then under those circumstances, his ultimate intoxication would be deemed involuntary and therefore should be considered together with all other evidence in determining his sanity or insanity under the test provided by law.'

'On the other hand, if the jury find either that the accused had sufficient mental ability and willpower to abstain from taking the first drink on December 30th, or that after taking the first drink he possessed the mental ability and willpower to abstain from continued drinking to the point of intoxication, then in the event of either of these conditions, his ultimate intoxication would be considered voluntary under the law, and therefore, could not of itself or even when considered together with existing mental conditions, which were in and of themselves insufficient to produce a lack of substantial capacity, constitute a grounds for finding that the accused lacked substantial capacity at the time of the alleged crimes so as to make him insane under the law. The State contends, however, that the accused was not intoxicated at the time of the alleged crimes, and if you find this contention to be true, then of course, you need not concern yourselves with the effect of his intoxication upon his sanity.'

The appellant argues that 'the effect of this instruction was that (he) could not be found insane if voluntary intoxication caused or contributed to a mental disease or defect which in turn caused (him) to lack the substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. In other words, the jury was instructed that even though they found that the appellant was insane as defined by Art. 59, § 9(a) * * * they must find him legally sane if his insane condition was caused or contributed to by voluntary intoxication.' He urges: 'Since insanity relates to a person's capacity to commit a crime, it is immaterial what caused the insanity. The only issue should be whether or not (he) was insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime under the applicable legal test of insanity. If he was, he was incapable of committing a crime and why he was incapable is not material. Although voluntary intoxication is not normally a defense to crime, if insanity results from the voluntary intoxication, the insanity is a complete defense, the same as insanity produced by any other cause.'

The State counters this argument by asserting that voluntary drunkenness resulting in insanity excuses criminal conduct only when the insanity is permanent, that is a settled or fixed insanity, as distinguished from a temporary insanity. It claims that by the weight of authority temporary insanity from the voluntary use of intoxicants is rejected as a defense for the commission of a crime.

There was expert testimony, as characterized in the appellant's brief, that the appellant had a chronic brain syndrome or organic brain damage and character behavior disorder (classified by one expert as a mental defect). However, these, in themselves, did not cause the appellant to lack 'substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' But the ingestion of alcohol on the day of the offense produced an acute brain syndrome and this mental defect, so produced, rendered the appellant insane at the time of the commission of the offenses We note at the outset that Md.Code, Art. 59, § 9(a) does not expressly relate to the cause of insanity as therein defined except in negative terms: 'The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.' We note further that there is no statute in Maryland pertaining to intoxication as affecting criminal responsibility. However, it is the established rule of law in this State that voluntary drunkenness is not a defense to crime, although whenever the actual existence of any particular motive, purpose or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the trier of fact may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act. Michael v. State, 1 Md.App. 243, 229 A.2d 145.

as defined by the statute. Since the appellant would have been sane at the time of the commission of the crimes, although suffering from a mental disease or defect, and became insane only by reason of his drinking, the question is squarely put-whether, upon a finding by the jury that the drinking by the appellant on the day of the crime was voluntary, it could not consider such drinking, 'of itself' or with the pre-existing mental disease or defect, in its determination of the issue of his insanity?

The great wright of authority is in accord with the rule as stated in 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 44, p. 128:

'It is well settled that temporary insanity which arises from present voluntary intoxication is no defense. This is true even though the defendant's temporary state of mind may meet the requirements of legal insanity contained in the M'Naghten rule, or whatever test of criminal responsibility is applied in the particular jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the accused was suffering from a settled or fixed insanity Weihofen in Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, p. 124, states:

even though caused by long- continued alcoholic indulgence, the rule is the same as in the case of insanity arising from any other cause. If the test of criminal responsibility locally applied is met, a settled or fixed insanity is a defense, even though it may have had its origin in long-continued voluntary intoxication, and regardless of whether defendant was under the influence of liquor at the time of the particular act.'

'The courts have drawn a distinction between intoxication, the immediate effect of indulgence in alcoholic spirits, and insanity, resulting from long continued...