Parker v. State, 89-2662

Decision Date27 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-2662,89-2662
Citation570 So.2d 1048
Parties15 Fla. L. Weekly D2873 James Robert PARKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Harry R. Barksdale, Milton, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Carolyn J. Mosley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

WOLF, Judge.

James Robert Parker appeals from his conviction and sentence for second degree felony murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The issues raised are as follows: 1) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for second degree felony murder; 2) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of police negligence as an intervening cause in the death of the victim; 3) whether there was sufficient evidence that the appellant was the perpetrator of the robbery and kidnapping; 4) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of kidnapping because the crime was never completed; 5) whether the trial court erred in imposing a three-year mandatory-minimum sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a robbery; and 6) whether the split sentence imposed on the appellant violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We find issue 3 to be without merit and affirm without discussion. As to the other issues, we affirm for the reasons addressed herein.

On December 3, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Ralph Stewart was driving along Interstate 10 in Santa Rosa County when he experienced engine trouble. Mr. Stewart pulled into a rest area to determine the source of the problem. Two men approached him and asked him if he needed any help. Stewart refused the offer. The appellant's codefendant (the appellant's brother) then pulled out a pistol and held it to the side of the victim's head. The appellant took a number of items from the victim's pockets, including some cash and a change purse. While the robbery was going on, the appellant then jammed an object into the victim's back, but the victim was unable to determine what it was. The robbers then shoved the victim into the trunk of his car. They attempted to close and lock the trunk lid; however, Stewart was able to block the latching mechanism with his coat, thus, preventing the trunk from locking.

Stewart stayed in his trunk, holding the latch down until he heard the men leave. He then got out of the trunk and spent approximately five minutes searching for his glasses and his extra set of car keys.

Mr. Stewart got into his car and went to a nearby convenience store. At the store, Mr. Stewart saw one of the men who robbed him filling his car with gas. Mr. Stewart went inside and saw the other man who had robbed him. This man was holding Stewart's change purse which had been taken during the course of the robbery. Stewart approached the man and grabbed the purse out of his hand and told him that it was his. At that point, the man ran outside and told his partner that they had to leave quickly. The other perpetrator threw the gas hose on the ground and got in the truck without putting the gas cap on the tank. They drove out of the gas station at a high rate of speed, almost hitting a pickup truck.

A bystander observed the robbers leave the gas station and followed them. The robbers traveled up and down several streets. The bystander stopped at another convenience store and called the police. While he was talking on the phone, one of the robbers came into the store and asked directions to the interstate highway going toward Pensacola. 1 The bystander gave the police the license tag number. Sheriff deputies from Santa Rosa County began to follow the suspects in the westbound lane of I-10. When the deputies turned on their blue light, the suspects fled at a high rate of speed. During the chase, the vehicles were going as fast as 100 to 110 m.p.h. The deputies chased the suspects into Escambia County. During the chase, the suspects swerved at least twice in an attempt to run two of the Santa Rosa County deputies off the road. A one-car roadblock was set up in Escambia County by Deputy Sheriff Don Cook. Deputy Matroni of the Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Office saw the roadblock and attempted to cut off the suspects' avenue of escape by driving into the median. Deputy Matroni's vehicle struck Deputy Cook, who had left his vehicle and walked onto the median. Deputy Cook was killed by the impact from Deputy Matroni's vehicle. The chase continued on the interstate, and ultimately ended when the robbers collided with a police vehicle. The driver, appellant's brother, stuck his left arm out and tossed an automatic pistol onto the roof of the car. The appellant, who was the passenger, attempted to flee. He had a revolver in his right hand as he ran away. He turned and attempted to fire at a deputy sheriff. The deputy fired his weapon three times, hitting the appellant. When apprehended, appellant was in possession of 30 rounds of ammunition as well as the revolver. The entire incident from robbery to apprehension took no more than an hour.

The appellant and his brother, Johnny Walter Parker, were tried on one count of armed robbery, one count of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of second degree felony murder as a result of the death of Deputy Don Cook. The underlying felony which supported the second degree murder and kidnapping charge was the robbery of Ralph Stewart. The trial court granted a motion in limine filed by the state which prohibited the defense from introducing evidence, commenting on or arguing the negligence, if any, of Officer Larry Matroni, and the contributory negligence of Deputy Don Cook in the manner in which he set up the roadblock. The counts of aggravated assault against the appellant were dismissed. The appellant was found guilty of all other charges.

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment

of acquittal on the second degree

felony murder charge.

The appellant argues that the robbery of Ralph Stewart was completed prior to the time of the death of Deputy Don Cook and, thus, the robbery could not be utilized to support his conviction for second degree felony murder. The second degree felony murder statute in pertinent part reads: "When a person is killed in the perpetration of ... [any] robbery ... by a person other than the person engaged in the perpetration of ... such felony, the person perpetrating ... such felony is guilty of murder in the second degree." § 782.04(3), F.S. (1989) (emphasis added).

The term "in the perpetration of" includes the period of time when a robber is attempting to escape from the scene of the crime. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So.2d 876 (Fla.1955). In determining when flight has terminated, it is useful to consider the purpose of the felony murder statute. That purpose is to protect the public from inherently dangerous situations caused by the commission of the felony. State v. Hacker, 510 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Therefore, "[i]n the absence of some definitive break in the chain of circumstances beginning with the felony and ending with the killing, the felony, although technically complete, is said to continue to the time of the killing." Mills v. State, 407 So.2d 218, 221 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981).

Factors to be considered in determining whether there has been a break in the chain of circumstances include the relationship between the underlying felony and the homicide in point of time, place and causal relationship. One commentator suggests that in the case of flight, a most important consideration is whether the fleeing felon has reached a "place of temporary safety." LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.5 (1986).

In the instant case, the application of these factors demonstrates that the robbery was not completed at the time of the death of Deputy Sheriff Cook. The time from the robbery to the killing was no longer than an hour, the killing occurred no more than several miles from the robbery, and the only stops that the robbers made were to get gas and ask directions--all to accomplish their goal of fleeing from the scene of the crime to a place of safety, their motel room.

Further, it is apparent that there is a clear causal relationship between the robbery and the death of Deputy Sheriff Cook. The death was a result of the high-speed chase necessitated by the robbers' attempt to flee the scene of the crime. This was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of second degree felony murder. State v. Hacker, supra.

II. Whether the trial court erred in excluding proffered...

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    ...to confuse the jury. Moreover, Stephens claims he is entitled to the special instructions based upon the holdings in Parker v. State, 570 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and Mills v. State, 407 So.2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, the statements upon which the special instructions are bas......
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