Parker v. State, 68SC125
Decision Date | 14 August 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 68SC125,68SC125 |
Citation | 2 N.C.App. 27,162 S.E.2d 526 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Charles Lee PARKER v. STATE of North Carolina. |
T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen., and James F. Bullock, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.
Norman B. Smith, Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, Greensboro, for the petitioner.
At his post-conviction hearing petitioner introduced evidence tending to show a statistical disparity between the racial composition of the adult population of Halifax County as compared with the racial composition of the grand juries of the county at the time of his indictment and for a substantial period prior thereto. He contends that this evidence made a Prima facie case that members of his race had been systematically excluded from the grand jury which had indicted him, that the State had introduced no competent evidence to rebut such Prima facie case, and that the court's finding of fact to the effect that there had been no systematic exclusion of Negroes from such jury was not supported by competent evidence. In support of his contention petitioner cites: Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773, 84 S.Ct. 1032, 12 L.Ed.2d 77; State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870; State v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 137 S.E.2d 109.
Under the criminal procedure of this State, however, objection to the grand jury is deemed waived unless raised in apt time by motion to quash the indictment. State v. Rorie, 258 N.C. 162, 128 S.E.2d 229. Such a motion may be made as a matter of right up to the time defendant is arraigned and enters his plea. The presiding judge as a matter of grace has discretionary power to permit the accused to make the motion to quash the indictment after his plea is entered and until the petit jury is sworn and impaneled to try the case on the merits. Thereafter the presiding judge has no power at all to entertain a motion to quash the indictment. Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513. If the objection is raised in apt time, by making the motion to quash before entering a plea, a subsequent plea of guilty does not waive the objection. State v. Covington, 258 N.C. 501, 128 S.E.2d 827.
In the present case petitioner did not raise the objection prior to entering his plea of guilty. He raised it for the first time in the post-conviction proceedings commenced approximately three years after entry of his plea of guilty and the judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment. Under the established criminal procedure of this State, petitioner's objection comes too late. G.S. § 9--26.
It may be granted that petitioner, as many other defendants in criminal cases, was not familiar with the rules of criminal procedure. Nevertheless, such rules are necessary for an orderly administration of justice. It is precisely for the reason that defendants in criminal cases may not be familiar with all of their rights and the means of protecting them that we require they be represented by counsel. Petitioner here was represented by experienced and competent trial counsel employed by his family for that purpose.
In conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, we hold that petitioner, acting through his employed attorney, waived any objection to the grand jury by his failure to move in apt time to quash the indictment. Petitioner cites, contra, McNeill v. State of North Carolina, 368 F.2d 313, a decision of the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In his order denying petitioner relief the superior court judge found as a fact that petitioner had 'freely, voluntarily, without threat, coercion or duress entered a plea of guilty to the offense of first-degree burglary' at the August, 1964 Term of Halifax Superior Court. Petitioner excepts to this finding as not being supported by sufficient evidence. In his brief petitioner's counsel argues that 'logic compels that the petitioner's guilty plea be considered a product of his involuntary confession, and that therefore it must be determined that the petitioner's guilty plea was coerced and the Court was without jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner.' This argument is valid only if the evidence at the post-conviction hearing would as a matter of law compel the finding of two things: first, that absent the confession the guilty plea would not have been entered; and second, that the confession was in fact involuntary. In our opinion, the evidence does not as a matter of law compel such a finding as to either. As to the first, there may well have been strong evidence to establish defendant's guilt available to the State had the plea of guilty not been entered, and it may have been that petitioner and his trial counsel were aware of such evidence. The record clearly discloses that petitioner, in the presence of his mother, freely acknowledged his guilt to his trial attorney. We cannot say as a matter of law that 'logic compels' that petitioner's guilty plea was the product of his prior confession to the police. Nor does a careful examination of the entire record, with particular attention being given to petitioner's own testimony,...
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