Parker v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Writing for the Court: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge
• Citation: Parker v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 404 F.Supp.3d 31 (D. D.C. 2019)
• Decision Date: 11 September 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17-2834 (PLF)
• Parties: Carl PARKER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Defendant.

404 F.Supp.3d 31

Carl PARKER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-2834 (PLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 11, 2019

Eddie Slaughter, Buena Vista, GA, pro se.

Lucious Abrams, Keysville, GA, pro se.

R. C. Abrams, Keysville, GA, pro se.

Cecil Brewington, Willard, NC, pro se.

Denise M. Clark, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court in this action is the government's motion to dismiss the complaint [Dkt. No. 12]. In addition, and perhaps in response to the government's motion, pro se plaintiffs Carl Parker, the estate of Gary Parker (represented by Carl Parker as administrator), Eddie Slaughter, Lucious Abrams, R.C. Abrams, and Cecil Brewington have filed a motion [Dkt. No. 13], framed as a "re-petition for mandamus," to compel a formal hearing, to remove a lien on a farm, and otherwise seek review of the Monitor's decision denying a formal hearing on the merits pursuant to the Pigford settlement agreement.¹ Upon careful consideration of the parties' papers and the Court's prior rulings in the Pigford litigation, the Court will grant the government's motion to dismiss and deny the plaintiffs' motion.²

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Pigford Litigation

The plaintiffs currently before the Court have brought claims related to their status as Pigford class members. The long and complicated history of the Pigford class action litigation has been discussed by this Court many times. Nonetheless, the Court will summarize the most relevant details for context to the instant petition.

On October 9, 1998, the Court certified a class comprised of African American farmers who alleged that the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") discriminated against them on the basis of race in distributing the benefits of various federal agricultural programs. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C. 1999). Those Pigford class members asserted that (1) the USDA denied and delayed African American farmers' applications for loans and other benefits on account of their race, and (2) the USDA ignored and failed to investigate complaints of discrimination filed by those farmers. See id.

In response to the Pigford I litigation and the scope of the civil rights violations at the USDA, Congress passed the 1999 Supplemental Appropriations Act ("Act"). See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e. Section 741 of the Act changed the statute of limitations on Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") claims against the USDA, allowing complaints to be brought within two years of Congress' enactment of the legislation. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). To bring a claim under Section 741, the alleged ECOA violation had to have occurred between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, and the complaints must have been previously reported to the USDA before July 1, 1997. See id. § 741(e).

Section 741 provided affected farmers with two choices regarding the resolution of their claims. The D.C. Circuit clarified those choices in Benoit v. USDA. See Benoit v. USDA, 608 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The Court in Benoit explained that "Sections 741(a) and (b) each gave affected farmers a distinct option: Either file the claim (a) directly in federal district court or (b) with the USDA, and if the USDA denies the claim, then seek review of the agency decision in district court." Id. Any farmer, "who chooses option (a) ‘forego[es]’ option (b)." Id. (quoting Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ).

For those who sought relief under Section 741(a), class counsel and the USDA reached a settlement agreement, referred to as the Pigford Consent Decree, which was approved by this Court in April 1999. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 95, 113. The Consent Decree established a non-judicial mechanism for deciding class members' individual claims, whereby each claimant elected to pursue his or her claim along one of two distinct tracks. See id. "Track A" claims were evaluated by a third-party neutral, known as the Adjudicator; claimants succeeded on their Track A claims by establishing "substantial evidence" of discrimination. See id. at 96. Claimants who were able to meet the minimal burden of proof under Track A were entitled to liquidated damages not to exceed $50,000 in addition to loan forgiveness of certain debts owed to the USDA. See id. at 97. Those who elected to pursue "Track B" had their claims reviewed by the Arbitrator, another third-party neutral, during a one day evidentiary "mini-trial." See id.³ Track B claimants did not face a cap on damages but were required to prove their claims by a more rigorous preponderance of the evidence standard. See id. Class members who did not wish to utilize the claim resolution mechanism set out in the Consent Decree were offered the opportunity to opt out of the class within 120 days of the entry of the Consent Decree. See id. at 95.

After the Court approved the Consent Decree, the parties entered into a stipulation to clarify the nature and scope of the debt relief available to successful claimants. See Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2008). The Stipulation established that the loan forgiveness relief for prevailing Track A and Track B claimants – as provided for under paragraphs 9(a)(iii)(A) and 10(g)(ii) of the Consent Decree – applied to "all debts which were identified by the Adjudicator or the Arbitrator as having been affected by the discrimination." See Pigford v. Glickman, No. 97-1978 (PLF), February 7, 2001 Stipulation and Order ("2001 Stipulation") [Dkt. No. 400] ¶ 2. The corresponding debt relief was limited:

Such relief included all debts incurred at the time of, or after, the first event upon which a finding of discrimination is based, except that such relief shall not include: (a) debts that were incurred under FSA programs other than those as to which a specific finding of discrimination was made by the Adjudicator or Arbitrator with respect to the class member ... (b) debts that were incurred by the class member prior to the date of the first event upon which the Adjudicator's or Arbitrator's finding is based, or (c) debts that were the subject of litigation separate from this action in which there was a final judgment as to which all appeals have been forgone or completed.

Id. (emphasis added).

Under the terms of the Consent Decree, the decisions of both the Adjudicator (for Track A claims) and the Arbitrator (for Track B claims) were final, except for review by the Monitor. See Pigford v. Glickman, No. 97-1978 (PLF), Consent Decree ("Consent Decree") [Dkt. No. 167] ¶¶ 9(v), 10(i). Track A and Track B claimants who were denied relief by their respective third-party neutrals could petition the Monitor for review within 120 days of the issuance of that decision. See Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii). Upon review, the Monitor could direct reexamination of the claim by the third-party neutral if "a clear and manifest error had occurred" that was "likely to result in a miscarriage of justice." Id. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree through contempt proceedings, but the Consent Decree did not allow the Court to review the decisions of the third-party neutrals – their decisions were final. See id. ¶¶ 13, 21; see also Pigford v. Vilsack, 777 F.3d 509, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In fact, the "parties consent[ed] ‘to forever waive their right to seek review in any court’ of ‘any claim that is, or could have been[,] decided by’ the adjudicator or arbitrator." See Pigford v. Vilsack, 777 F.3d at 511-12 (quoting Consent Decree ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 10(i)).

The Consent Decree required all Pigford claim packages to have been postmarked on or before October 12, 1999. See Consent Decree ¶ 5(c). Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree provided limited relief for late-filing claimants. See id. ¶ 5(g). The Court entered a Stipulation and Order on July 14, 2000, extending the time period to submit 5(g) late file petitions to the Facilitator to September 15, 2000. See Pigford v. Glickman, No. 97-1978 (PLF), Stipulation and Order ("2000 Stipulation and Order") [Dkt. No. 303] at ¶ 2.

By the expiration of the allotted time period for late-filing petitions, it became evident that the number of individuals seeking to submit late claims was overwhelming. As of September 15, 2000 – the court-ordered deadline for late-filing petition requests to the Facilitator under Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree – more than 61,000 individuals had requested permission to late-file. See In Re Black Farmers Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2011) ; 2000 Stipulation and Order ¶2. Only about four percent were found to have satisfied the high standard – extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner's control – and therefore were permitted to late file claims. See id. In response to the large number of late-filed petitions remaining, Congress passed a statute – the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ("FCEA") – permitting claimants whose 5(g) late-filing requests had been denied to resurrect their claims by filing new lawsuits. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, §§ 14011-14012, 122 Stat. 1651. The relief provided for those eligible under the FCEA is similar, but not identical, to the original relief granted by the Consent Decree. See Pub. L. 110-246, § 14012. Congress provided that the right to file a complaint to resurrect a claim under Section 14012 of the FCEA would expire on June 18, 2010, two years after the statute's enactment. See id. § 14012.⁴

The Court entered a Wind-down Stipulation and Order in the Pigford I case on November 2, 2015, terminating the provisions of the Consent Decree, subject to a few limited exceptions, including continued loan forgiveness for prevailing claimants. See Pigford v. Glickman, No. 97-1978 (PLF),...