Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 9478-5-I

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Writing for the Court: SWANSON; ANDERSEN, C. J., and RINGOLD
• Citation: 32 Wn.App. 722,649 P.2d 181
• Parties: Joan PARKER, Appellant, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. 9478-5-I,9478-5-I
• Decision Date: 04 August 1982

Page 722

32 Wn.App. 722 649 P.2d 181 Joan PARKER, Appellant,
v.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Respondent. No. 9478-5-I. Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1. Aug. 4, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1982.

Page 723

[649 P.2d 182] Jon Rosen, Seattle, for appellant.

Shannon Sperry, Seattle, for respondent.

SWANSON, Judge.

Joan Parker sued United Airlines alleging she was illegally discharged from her job. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of United Airlines. Parker appeals the superior court judgment.

Parker was employed by United for 12 years. The last position she held at United was receptionist at the Red Carpet Room. United investigated charges that Parker had retained payments intended for United and had misused her travel pass privileges. ¹ After a protracted grievance procedure held by United, she was discharged. She disagreed with the discharge and unsuccessfully appealed twice using United's internal grievance procedure. ² She

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then filed a breach of employment contract action in superior court. United's motion for summary judgment was granted. Parker claims summary judgment was inappropriate because there are issues of material fact. She also claims that her constitutional right to a hearing was abridged because the trial judge wrote his decision to grant summary judgment prior to oral argument.

The key question concerned whether Parker was an employee terminable at will or whether she was terminable only for just cause. Parker did not produce a written employment agreement indicating her employment could be terminated only for just cause; instead, she argued that she had such an implied agreement with United.

Parker claims the implied agreement arose out of a series of statements made to her by United. The first event of significance was Parker's completion of employment forms which included a promise that she would assign any invention to United she might make during her employment and that she would indemnify United against any losses it might sustain because of Parker's acts, and a statement that "any misrepresentation or concealment of information will be sufficient reason for dismissal." United completed a form which stated

regular employment is contingent upon satisfactory completion of the probationary period as indicated in company regulations.... The length of your probationary period is six months.

(Emphasis added.)

Parker asserts that statements made at employee orientation sessions also implied a just cause dismissal clause. According to Parker,

(a)t those sessions, personnel representatives explained the various rights that employees had. Amongst those rights was the right, once the probationary period passed,

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to determination that there was cause for termination. We were informed[649 P.2d 183] that if we believed there was no cause for a disciplinary action we might grieve the action by appealing to higher officials within the company.

Adding to Parker's belief she could be fired only for just cause was a statement by United's president that "You will be treated fairly on your job with United without a union to represent you."

Parker also draws our attention to United's employee manual which makes no reference to termination at will and states an employee may be discharged for cause, furloughed for economic reasons, or resign.

In general an employment contract, indefinite as to duration, is terminable-at-will by either the employer or employee. Webster v. Schauble, 65 Wash.2d 849, 400 P.2d 292 (1965); accord, Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furn. Co., 46 Wash.2d 408, 281 P.2d 832 (1955). But such a contract for "permanent" or "steady" employment is terminable by the employer only for just cause if: (1) there is an implied agreement to that effect, or (2) the employee gives consideration in addition to the contemplated services. Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).

In determining whether Parker had an implied employment agreement that was not terminable at United's will, we note the rule that such an agreement cannot be established solely by an employee's subjective understanding or expectations as to his employment. Lasser v. Grunbaum, supra. Even...