Parker v. United States

Decision Date16 March 1942
Docket NumberNo. 3695,3706.,3695
Citation126 F.2d 370
PartiesPARKER v. UNITED STATES et al. (two cases).
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

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Richard Wait, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.

Charles C. Pearce, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., and John M. Durbin, Sr. Atty., Department of Agriculture, of Washington, D. C. (John S. L. Yost and Margaret H. Brass, both of Washington, D. C., and Edmund J. Brandon, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellees.

Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.

MAGRUDER, Circuit Judge.

The appeal in No. 3695 is from an order of the district court, dated January 27, 1941, adjudging Howard B. Parker in civil contempt and committing him to jail until the Green Valley Creamery, Inc. (a corporation of which he is treasurer and sole stockholder), effects compliance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C.A. § 671 et seq., and with a mandatory injunction theretofore issued against the said corporation. In No. 3706 the appeal is from an order of the district court, dated May 19, 1941, denying a petition by Howard B. Parker for discharge from commitment following the adjudication of Green Valley Creamery, Inc., as a bankrupt upon its voluntary petition. Pending appeal, it was ordered by the court below that Parker enter into a recognizance with sufficient surety in the sum of $6,000.

On October 1, 1937, the United States of America and the Secretary of Agriculture filed a bill in equity in the court below against the Green Valley Creamery, Inc., seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to comply with the provisions of Order No. 4, as amended, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246. The main terms of this Order, which regulates the marketing of milk in the Greater Boston Marketing Area, are summarized in our opinion in Green Valley Creamery, Inc., v. United States, 1 Cir., 1939, 108 F.2d 342, 343, 344.

A temporary injunction was issued by the district court on November 30, 1937. In that decree the defendant was specifically commanded to pay to the market administrator all sums then due or thereafter to become due under the provisions of Order No. 4, as amended, during the pendency of the suit; and further, in more general language, the defendant, its officers, agents, employees, successors, and assigns were enjoined from violating any of the provisions of Order No. 4, as amended, and were affirmatively commanded to comply with all provisions of the said Order, during the pendency of this suit or until further order of the court.

Upon appeal from the interlocutory decree this court issued a supersedeas staying in part the operation of the mandatory injunction, upon condition, however, that the amounts then due or to become due thereafter should, until final determination on appeal of the case on its merits, be paid into the registry of the district court. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., et al., v. United States, 1 Cir., 1938, 97 F.2d 677. The moneys were not so paid into the registry, the condition was unfulfilled, and as a result the interlocutory decree remained in effect, and the defendant, its officers and agents, became subject to contempt proceedings for noncompliance with such decree.

The case went back to the district court for trial on the merits, and that court, on March 15, 1939, after confirming the report of a special master, issued its final decree, providing in part as follows:

"4. That the defendant, its agents, officers, employees, successors and assigns, be and they hereby are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating any of the provisions of Order No. 4 as amended by the amendments issued on July 28, 1937, regulating the handling of milk in the Greater Boston Marketing Area.

"5. That the defendant, its agents, officers, employees, successors and assigns, be and they hereby are commanded and directed to comply with all the provisions of Order No. 4 as amended by the amendments issued on July 28, 1937.

"6. That the defendant is hereby commanded and directed to pay within ten (10) days after the entry of this decree any and all amounts heretofore billed to defendant by the marketing administrator under Order No. 4 as amended July 28, 1937, for each delivery period between August 1, 1937, and January 15, 1939, and such further amounts which have not heretofore been paid into the registry of this court but which are now due and owing under the provisions of Order No. 4 as amended by the amendments issued on July 28, 1937, to the market administrator appointed under Order No. 4 as amended, for him to hold and to distribute in accordance with the following paragraphs of this decree."

Appellant Parker lays great stress upon the point that paragraph 6 of the final decree, which is the only part of the decree specifically commanding the payment of money, namely, the sums then due to the market administrator under Order No. 4 as amended, is directed solely to the defendant Green Valley Creamery, Inc. This seems to us of no significance, for "A command to the corporation is in effect a command to those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs." Wilson v. United States, 1911, 221 U.S. 361, 376, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771, Ann. Cas.1912D, 558. Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the final decree, which is directed to the corporation, its agents, officers, etc., in more general terms commands them to comply with all the provisions of Order No. 4 as amended. This necessarily includes those provisions of the Order calling for payments to the market administrator then due or to become due in the future, and therefore overlaps somewhat the command in paragraph 6 of the decree.

On the day after handing down its final decree the district court issued a supersedeas staying in part the operation of the final decree, pending appeal to this court, upon condition that the amounts then due and those becoming due thereafter from the defendant to the market administrator under the provisions of the Order should be paid into the registry of the district court to be held pending final determination of the case on appeal. Again, this condition was not fulfilled either in whole or in part, and as a result, the defendant, its officers and agents, became subject to contempt proceedings for non-compliance with the final decree from the date of its issue. On July 21, 1939, this court, before hearing and deciding the appeal, directed that the said supersedeas issued by the district court be vacated. Green Valley Creamery, Inc., v. United States, 1 Cir., 105 F.2d 754.

On December 15, 1939, this court affirmed the final decree of the district court. Green Valley Creamery, Inc., v. United States, 1 Cir., 108 F.2d 342.

A petition for attachment for contempt was filed by the United States on December 19, 1939, against Green Valley Creamery, Inc., Otis H. Parker and Howard B. Parker for disobedience of and failure to comply with the final decree of the district court. The petition recites that the sum of $22,849.53 is due by the corporate defendant to the market administrator for the period from August 1, 1937, through January 15, 1939, "but the said defendant Green Valley Creamery, Inc., and the said Otis H. Parker and Howard B. Parker, in contempt of this court, have not paid or caused to be paid such amount either to the market administrator or to the registry of this court." On the face of the petition, it seemed to present the usual situation where the responsible officers of a corporate defendant are sought to be held in civil contempt for failing to take appropriate action within their power to bring about compliance by the corporation with the court decree. However, by agreement of the parties, the contempt petition was referred to a master, on somewhat broader issues. The order appointing the master, May 14, 1940, was as follows:

"This cause came on to be heard, and upon consideration thereof, the court being satisfied that reference to a master is necessary, and by agreement of parties, it is

"Ordered, that this cause be referred to the Honorable Thomas F. Quinn as master to hear the parties and their witnesses, to examine their books, vouchers and evidence, and to report to the court his findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon, the facts found by the said master shall be final when supported by adequate evidence.

"Issues to Be Submitted to Master.

"1. With respect to each of the pay periods as defined in the applicable milk marketing order —

"(a) The amount due the market administrator from Green Valley Creamery, Inc., on its producer settlement account;

"(b) The amount due to the market administrator from Green Valley Creamery, Inc., for marketing service;

"(c) The amount due the market administrator from Green Valley Creamery, Inc., on account of administration expense.

"2. The extent to which Green Valley Creamery, Inc., failed to comply with the following orders of the court:

"(a) The temporary injunction entered November 30, 1937; and

"(b) The final decree entered March 15, 1939.

"3. The ability of Green Valley Creamery, Inc., to have complied with the injunction of November 30, 1937, and the final decree of March 15, 1939.

"4. The extent to which the inability of Green Valley Creamery, Inc., to comply with said temporary injunction and decree was caused by acts of any person or corporation, the particular acts or conduct of each such person or corporation which caused such inability and the extent to which the acts and conduct of each such persons or corporation caused all or any part of such inability.

"5. The legal liability, if any, of Stuart Milk Company to Green Valley Creamery, Inc., arising out of the sale of milk by Green Valley Creamery, Inc., to Stuart Milk Company and the extent of such liability.

"6. ...

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