Parker v. United States, 16-264C

Decision Date31 January 2017
Docket NumberNo. 16-264C,16-264C
PartiesCARL PARKER, Individual and Administrator for the Estate of Gary L. Parker, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
CourtCourt of Federal Claims

ORIGINAL

RCFC 12(b)(1); RCFC 12(b)(6); Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted; Pigford Litigation; Section 741; Consent Decree; Equal Credit Opportunity Act; Contractual Takings; Unenacted Legislation; 2008 Farm Bill

Carl Parker, Ashburn, GA, pro se.

Daniel S. Herzfeld, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY, Judge

In this case, plaintiff Carl Parker, individually and as administrator for the estate of Gary L. Parker, seeks damages related to (1) the purported failure of the Farm Service Agency ("FSA") of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") to abide by the consent decree in the Pigford class-action discrimination litigation and (2) ongoing discrimination by the USDA. Defendant United States moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim upon which this court can grant relief. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss and denies Carl Parker's motion for summary judgment as moot.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Pigford I Litigation

On August 28, 1997, three African-American farmers filed a putative class action against the USDA to obtain redress for a long pattern of discrimination against African-American farmers in its credit and benefit programs.1 Pigford v. Glickman ("Pigford I"), 185 F.R.D. 82, 86-89 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Although the USDA had aprocess in place for resolving discrimination complaints, the system had been effectively nonexistent for over a decade prior to initiation of the lawsuit, leaving many wronged farmers without relief. Id. at 88. This systemic discrimination, which violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2012), led to a significant decline in the number of African-American farmers throughout the United States. Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 87. An initial class was certified on October 9, 1998. Id. at 90.

Prior to 2010, the statute of limitations on alleged ECOA violations was two years. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (2006); see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1085(7), 124 Stat. 2083, 2085 (2010) (increasing the statute of limitations on ECOA claims from two years to five years). On October 21, 1998, Congress enacted the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. A, sec, 101(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681 to 2681-50 (1998). Section 741 of that Act ("Section 741") waived the statute of limitations for actions filed within two years of its passage—i.e., until October 21, 2000—if a complaint had been filed with the USDA before July 1, 1997, alleging nonemployment discrimination between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996. Id. § 741, 112 Stat. at 2681-30 to -31. Section 741 also permitted aggrieved farmers to obtain an administrative hearing on the record in lieu of pursuing a judicial remedy. Id.

On January 5, 1999, a newly certified class in Pigford I was defined as:

All African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application.

185 F.R.D. at 92. Following settlement negotiations, id. at 89-92, a consent decree was approved as "fair, adequate, and reasonable" on April 14, 1999, id. at 86.2 Its purpose was to ensure that "in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons." Def.'s App. A2. The estimated value of the settlement at the time was $2.25 billion, constituting the "largest civil rights settlement in the history of this country." Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 95.

Under the terms of the consent decree, class members could opt out of class treatment within 120 days of entry of the consent decree. Def.'s App. A5. Otherwise, class members were generally required to submit a claim package within 180 days of entry of the consent decree—i.e, by October 12, 1999—demonstrating class membership and electing to proceed under one of two tracks. Id. at A8-10. Class members missing this deadline who could demonstrate that their late filing was due to "extraordinary circumstances beyond [their] control" were allowed to file late petitions. In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litig. ("Pigford II"), 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed sub nom. Latham v. Vilsack, Nos. 11-5326, 11-5334, 12-5019, 2012 WL 10236550 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2012). Such relief was extremely limited and did not extend to those who "had only recently learned" of the consent decree; out of the 61,252 would-be class members who sought to file late claims, only 2,585 were allowed to do so.3 Id. Including both timely submitted claims and late claims, over 22,700 claim packages were submitted by "individuals eligible to pursue relief under the terms of the consent decree." Id.

The choice between the two tracks carried "enormous significance. Under Track A, the class member [had] a fairly low burden of proof but his recovery [was] limited. Under Track B, there [was] a higher burden of proof but the recovery [was] unlimited."4 Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 96. Once made, the choice of which track to pursue was binding; in other words, dissatisfied Track B claimants could not then proceed under Track A. Id. at 107.

Farmers proceeding under Track A were required to show racial discrimination under a "substantial evidence" standard. Def.'s App. A13; see also id. at A4 (defining "substantial evidence"). Relief available to farmers choosing to proceed under Track A was limited to (1) aone-time $50,000 cash payment, (2) discharge of all outstanding debts to the USDA that were the "subject of the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator," (3) an additional tax offset payment made directly to the Internal Revenue Service of twenty-five percent of the sums expended for the one-time payout and debt relief, (4) termination of foreclosure proceedings against real property "in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator," and (5) injunctive relief including one-time priority loan consideration and technical assistance. Id. at A14, A19-20; accord Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97. An adjudicator's decision under Track A was not subject to "review in any court or before any tribunal . . . with respect to any claim that [was], or could have been decided by the adjudicator." Def.'s App. A16; accord Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97.

Farmers electing to proceed under Track B were provided a full-day evidentiary hearing before an arbitrator, who would determine whether there had been racial discrimination under a higher "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Def.'s App. A18; accord Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97; see also Def.'s App. A4 (defining "preponderance of the evidence"). The same injunctive relief that was available under Track A was also available under Track B, but under Track B, the monetary damages were unlimited, encompassing debt relief, "actual damages" available under the ECOA, and the additional tax offset payment. Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97; Def.'s App. A18. Like an adjudicator's decision for Track A claimants, an arbitrator's decision for Track B claimants was not subject to "review in any court or before any tribunal . . . with respect to any claim that [was], or could have been decided, by the arbitrator." Def.'s App. A19; accord Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97.

Generally speaking, debts incurred between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996, that were "affected" by discrimination could be discharged under the consent decree. Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97; Def.'s App. A14, A18; Compl. Ex. A at 2. The date of discrimination and the type of loan were important findings. Compl. Ex. A at 2. Loans issued under the same program—such as the farm operating loan program or the farm ownership loan program—are considered the same type.5 Id. When a particular loan was found to have been affected by discrimination, additional debt of the same type as the affected loan was also eligible for discharge if (1) it was incurred at the same time as or later than the affected loan and (2) the original application for the additional debt had been filed by December 31, 1996. Id. at 2-3. Later rescheduling of a particular loan would not alter its inception date. Id. at 3; see also Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-12 (D.D.C. 2008) (interpreting "incur" as the loan origination date irrespective of any later rescheduling).

A dissatisfied claimant under either Track A or Track B could ask the court-appointed monitor to direct the adjudicator or arbitrator to "reexamine a claim where the Monitor determines that a clear and manifest error has occurred in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of the claim . . . ." Def.'s App. A21; accord Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97, 107-08. No other appeals were available to claimants. Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 97, 107-08; Def.'s App. A16,A19. Additionally, the USDA had no right to appeal decisions of either adjudicators or arbitrators. Pigford I, 185 F.R.D. at 108. The court-appointed monitor was also available to provide assistance in...

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