Parker v. United States, s. 12-CF-1434

• Citation: 249 A.3d 388
• Case Date: April 22, 2021
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

249 A.3d 388

Jacques PARKER & Jonathan Jenkins, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Nos. 12-CF-1434
12-CF-1503 & 18-CO-993

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 13, 2018
Decided April 22, 2021

Fleming Terrell, Public Defender Service, with whom Chris Kemmitt, James Klein, Samia Fam, Shilpa S. Satoskar, and Emily Voshell, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant Jacques Parker.

Benjamin Brooks for appellant Jonathan Jenkins.

Lauren R. Bates, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney at the time the briefs were filed, Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, Ronald C. Machen Jr., John P. Mannarino, and Patricia Riley, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, Washington, Senior Judge, and Okun, Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.^*

Washington, Senior Judge:

249 A.3d 394

Appellants Jacques Parker and Jonathan Jenkins were convicted of committing robbery and felony assault on May 10, 2012. On appeal, both appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and they also raise various evidentiary concerns. In addition, appellant Jenkins appeals the denial of his motion for relief under D.C. Code § 23-110 based on ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the robbery convictions of both appellants, reverse and remand appellant Jenkins’ felony assault conviction with instructions to enter a judgment for simple assault, and affirm the trial court's judgment denying Jenkins’ § 23-110 motion for a new trial without a hearing.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The complaining witness, Antonio Walls, testified that on January 13, 2012, appellant Jenkins was one of three people who knocked him to the ground and bruised his eye before his shoes, cellphone, money, and paystubs were stolen.

Mr. Walls further testified that three days later, on January 16, 2012, he was injured and subsequently robbed when he was attacked by approximately fifteen people, including appellants Jenkins and Parker. Specifically, Mr. Walls testified that he encountered appellant Jenkins in the hallway of his apartment building and that, after Mr. Walls turned down appellant Jenkins’ request for a cigarette, he was immediately struck in the face by appellant Jenkins. Mr. Walls then ran outside his building and was immediately attacked by approximately fifteen people who knocked him to the ground and continuously kicked and struck him. Mr. Walls testified that some of his assailants wore masks but that appellants had their masks rolled up, and Mr. Walls could see their faces. He also testified that while he was on the ground, he felt people going through his pockets. Finally, Mr. Walls testified that he was able to get up and run away from the group, but that, as he tried to run to a convenience store to call the police, some of his assailants caught him and took his jacket, keys, and cellphone.

As a result of his attack, Mr. Walls suffered bruising, "sore and [ ] hurt" legs, a busted lip, and a loose tooth that he "had to push[ ] ... back in place." When Officer Pulaski arrived at the scene, she observed Mr. Walls with "some sort of paper towel or gauze held up to his mouth," "blood around his mouth," and a "gash" to his left leg that "wasn't bleeding." Mr. Walls was taken to the hospital by ambulance where he was given medicine for his pain, a brace, and crutches for a "messed up" leg, and may have had X-rays taken before being released that day. Medical records indicated that Mr. Walls complained of left

249 A.3d 395

knee and left forearm pain, but that he remembered the "entire incident," and had no neck, chest, abdominal, pelvic, or lower back pain, and "[n]o broken teeth."

On April 4, 2012, appellant Jenkins was charged with two counts of robbery and one count of felony assault, while appellant Parker was charged with one count each of robbery and felony assault. A pre-trial hearing on appellants’ motion to sever took place on April 23, 2012. The trial court subsequently denied the motion. At the same hearing, the trial court also considered and denied appellants’ motion to admit expert witness testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. Trial in this case began on May 1, 2012; appellants were convicted of all charges on May 10 and timely appealed. On appeal, both appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of robbery and felony assault, the trial court's response to a jury note, its exclusion of appellants’ expert testimony, the admission of certain evidence, and the trial court's denial of the severance motion. Subsequently, appellant Jenkins filed a motion for a new trial under D.C. Code § 23-110 alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for agreeing to stipulate to Jenkins’ prior incarceration during the trial.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the [fact finder] to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence." In re T.M. , 155 A.3d 400, 403 (D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We deem the evidence sufficient if "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Smith v. United States , 175 A.3d 623, 627 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Rivas v. United States , 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)) (emphasis in original); see also In re T.M. , 155 A.3d at 403 ("The evidence is insufficient when the government produces no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") (internal quotations omitted).

A. Felony Assault

Appellant Jenkins contends that his conviction for felony assault stemming from the January 16, 2012, assault and robbery must be reversed because the government presented insufficient evidence that Mr. Walls sustained significant bodily injury within the meaning of D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(2) (2020 Supp.). He asserts that though Mr. Walls went to the hospital and undoubtedly suffered "upsetting and painful" injuries, there was no evidence that he suffered significant bodily injury or severe pain. We agree that the government produced insufficient evidence of Mr. Walls’ injuries to sustain a felony assault conviction.

Felony assault is committed when a person "unlawfully assaults, or threatens another in a menacing manner, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes significant bodily injury to another ...." D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(2). The statute defines "significant bodily injury" as "an injury that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention." Id. But whether "an injured party immediately goes to a hospital or seeks other medical attention is not, in itself, determinative ...." Quintanilla v. United States , 62 A.3d 1261, 1264 (D.C. 2013). Nor is the statutory standard satisfied by evidence of "everyday remedies such as ice packs,

249 A.3d 396

bandages, and self-administered over-the-counter medications ... whether administered by a medical professional or with self-help." Id. at 1265. The professional medical attention required by the statute must be aimed at one of two ends: "preventing long-term physical damage and other potentially permanent injuries" or "abating pain that is severe" rather than "lesser, short-term hurts." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether "immediate medical attention or hospitalization" occurred, but rather "whether medical treatment beyond what one can administer himself is immediately required to prevent long-term physical damage, possible disability, disfigurement, or severe pain." In re D.P. , 122 A.3d 903, 912 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).

Applying these standards, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not have found that Mr. Walls’ injuries were "significant." Though the attack on Mr. Walls was undoubtedly violent and traumatic, the evidence fails to show that immediate medical attention was required to prevent long-term physical damage or other potentially permanent injuries. While Mr. Walls received medicine for his pain, a brace, and crutches after going to the hospital, the government failed to elicit any testimony from Mr. Walls about his need for prompt medical attention, and did not call either the paramedics who arrived on the scene or his treating physician to fill that gap in his testimony. Further, nowhere does the record "suggest that [his] injuries demanded treatment of a higher order, requiring true medical expertise, rather than everyday remedies such as ice packs, bandages, and self-administrated over-the-counter medications." Wilson v. United States , 140 A.3d 1212, 1218 (D.C. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).

Although Mr. Walls testified that he thought X-rays may have been taken at the hospital, no...