Parkes v. Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. of America, No. 34392

• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
• Writing for the Court: GIBSON; O'NEAL
• Citation: 207 Okla. 91,249 P.2d 462
• Parties: PARKES et al. v. NATURAL GAS PIPE LINE CO. OF AMERICA.
• Docket Number: No. 34392
• Decision Date: 08 April 1952

Page 462

249 P.2d 462 207 Okla. 91 PARKES et al.
v.
NATURAL GAS PIPE LINE CO. OF AMERICA. No. 34392. Supreme Court of Oklahoma. April 8, 1952.

Page 463

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Sec. 717f(h) of the Natural Gas Act of the Congress of the United States, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-717w granting to the holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, issued by the Federal Power Commission, the right to acquire a necessary right of way for the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, in the manner therein prescribed, is constitutional.

2. It is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking of private property is for public use and the agency or corporation authorized to do the taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority.

3. The power of the United States to authorize the exercise of eminent domain within the limits of the several states is not limited to the taking of property by the government itself for its own proper uses, but includes the right to delegate the power of eminent domain to corporations and other agencies for the purpose of carrying out any public use within the sphere of government control.

4. It is not necessary for a corporation, engaged exclusively in the interstate transportation of natural gas, and holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued pursuant to the Federal Natural Gas Act, to comply with the provisions of Tit. 52 O.S.1951 §§ 21-45, as a condition precedent to the exercise of its Federal right of eminent domain granted under the Act of Congress. Tit. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h).

Richardson, Shartel & Cochran, R. C. Jopling, Jr., Oklahoma City, and Vincent Dale, Guymon, for plaintiffs in error.

Rizley, Tryon & Sweet, Guymon, S. A. L. Morgan, Charles C. McDugald, Chicago, Ill., Monnet, Hayes & Bullis, Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

GIBSON, Justice.

We shall designate the parties as they appeared in the trial court. Plaintiffs in error were defendants.

Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, commenced this action in the District Court of Texas County seeking to condemn a part of defendants' land for construction of a 26-inch natural gas pipe line to extend from the Texas Panhandle across Texas County, Oklahoma, to various points in the states of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana, and that portion of the line across defendants' land is to be a part of plaintiff's interstate gas transportation system. The gas in the pipe line is not to be sold in Oklahoma but will be sold to utilities for resale in numerous communities in the other named states, including the Chicago area.

Plaintiff purchases natural gas from only one producer within the State of Oklahoma, the Panoma Corporation, and is not a common carrier or common purchaser within Oklahoma.

[207 Okla. 92] In this case we are concerned with the jurisdiction of the trial court and with plaintiff's right to prosecute the action under the record before us. Plaintiff says that it is a natural gas company within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-717w, and engaged exclusively in interstate transportation and sale of natural gas and that it is subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. It claims no right of eminent domain under the Constitution or statutes of Oklahoma but relies solely upon the powers delegated to it the United States under provisions of Sec. 717f(g) of the Natural Gas Act.

Plaintiff was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity by the Federal Power Commission.

Defendants filed a general denial, admitted ownership of the property and alleged that plaintiff was not entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain.

The trial court appointed three commissioners, who in due time filed their report assessing defendants' damage at $750. Defendants

Page 464

filed an amended answer and demand for a jury trial. They denied jurisdiction of the court and alleged plaintiff had not complied with the laws of Oklahoma and especially Tit. 52 O.S.1941. They further alleged that the amendment to the Natural Gas Act, Tit. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h) relied upon by plaintiff was unconstitutional and in violation of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, and in violation of Sec. 23, Art. II, Oklahoma Constitution.

On the trial date the parties entered into certain stipulations and defendants thereupon objected to the introduction of evidence by plaintiff for the reason that the petition of plaintiff did not state a cause of action and that the court was without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed. The court held that the Natural Gas Act was constitutional and that plaintiff was operating under Federal law and under a permit from the Federal Power Commission and it was not necessary that plaintiff comply with the laws of Oklahoma. Upon this adverse ruling the defendants gave notice of appeal and announced that they were not ready for trial on the question of damages. The court ruled that no legal ground for continuance had been shown and ordered the case to trial. Thereupon defendants withdrew the demand for jury trial without prejudice to further proceedings in their behalf.

Judgment was rendered for plaintiff for $750, and defendants appeal.

For reversal defendants say that in order to avail itself of the privilege of exercising the right of eminent domain within the State of Oklahoma the plaintiff must plead and prove compliance with the Constitution and laws of Oklahoma, and particularly compliance with the Production and Transportation Act of 1913, Tit. 52 O.S.1951, §§ 21 to 45, and having failed to plead such compliance plaintiff stated no cause of action, and defendants' objection to the introduction of evidence should have been sustained and the case dismissed. They further contend that if Tit. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h) authorizes the taking of private property by a private corporation for a private use it is unconstitutional and void under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sec. 2, Art. II, Oklahoma Constitution.

Primarily the two following statutes are before us for consideration:

Tit. 52 O.S.1951 § 26, provides:

'Before any corporation, joint stock company, limited copartnership, partnership or other persons shall have, possess, enjoy or exercise the right of eminent domain, right-of-way, right to locate, maintain or operate pipe lines, fixtures or equipment thereunto belonging, or used in connection therewith, as authorized by the provisions of this act, or shall have, possess, enjoy or exercise any right (the word 'right' in this connection being used in its most [207 Okla. 93] comprehensive legal sense) conferred by...