Parkhurst v. Wilson-Coker, 82 Conn. App. 877 (CT 5/11/2004)

• Decision Date: 11 May 2004
• Docket Number: (AC 24117).
• Citation: Parkhurst v. Wilson-Coker, 82 Conn. App. 877 (CT 5/11/2004), 82 Conn. App. 877, 848 A.2d 515 (Conn. 2004)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MARJORIE PARKHURST, CONSERVATRIX (ESTATE OF MATTHEW SQUINOBAL) <I>v.</I> PATRICIA A. WILSON-COKER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES.

Page 877

82 Conn. App. 877

MARJORIE PARKHURST, CONSERVATRIX (ESTATE OF MATTHEW SQUINOBAL)

v. PATRICIA A. WILSON-COKER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES.

(AC 24117).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 25, 2004.

Officially released May 11, 2004.

Syllabus

The plaintiff conservatrix of the estate of her disabled son, who had established a special needs trust for her son's benefit from certain proceeds he had received in a settlement related to an automobile accident, appealed to the trial court challenging the decision of the department of social services that the assets in the special needs trust made her son ineligible for state supplemental income assistance. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that the department properly had interpreted the applicable federal and state statutes and regulations governing optional state funded supplemental assistance for disabled persons. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that pursuant to the statute (§ 17b-600) that requires a state supplement income assistance benefits program to be "consistent with the requirements of Title XVI of the Social Security Act pertaining to programs of optional state supplementation," it was mandatory for the department to follow comparable federal law, which disregards special needs funds in the calculation of federal benefit eligibility. Held:

1. The trial court properly determined that the special needs trust established by the plaintiff for the benefit of her son was an asset that the department could take into account in determining the son's eligibility for state supplemental assistance benefits; contrary to the plaintiff's claims, the department's eligibility rules were "consistent with" federal law, which permits an optional state funded and state administered benefits program to adopt eligibility criteria that are more stringent than those that govern the parallel federal program.

2. The trial court properly concluded that the use of settlement funds from a third party tortfeasor to establish a special needs trust for the plaintiff's son was a transfer of his assets that made him ineligible for continued state supplemental assistance benefits, the plaintiff having failed to establish that the transfer complied in any respect with the department regulation that exempts certain transfers from causing eligibility disqualification.

3. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that her son was entitled to the reinstatement of his benefits as a result of certain procedural defects in the department's adjudication of her administrative appeal, the alleged procedural defects not having invalidated the decision of the hearing officer or the judgment of the trial court; the trial court properly concluded that the failure to hold an administrative hearing within the time period specified by statute (§ 17b-60) did not deprive the hearing officer of jurisdiction to hear the matter, the plaintiff's claim concerning the hearing officer's failure to issue her decision within the time specified by statute (§ 17b-61 [a]), which the trial court deemed abandoned and did not address, was not reviewable, the plaintiff having failed to suggest that the trial court committed plain error in finding the claim to have been abandoned, and her claim that she received inadequate notice of the discontinuation of her son's benefits was inadequately briefed and incorrectly assumed that the benefits in question had been discontinued prior to the hearing.

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision by the defendant to discontinue certain supplemental assistance payments, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Murray, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Matthew J. LeFevre, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eileen Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Robert J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Lavery, C. J., and DiPentima and Peters, Js.

Opinion

PETERS, J.

Special needs trusts are trusts designed to supplement the benefits that persons with a disability are entitled to receive under various federal and state statutes. Congress has decided that the assets in a special needs trust do not affect a needy person's eligibility for supplemental security income under the federal Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b (c) (1) (C) (ii) (IV) and (e) (5), and 1396p (d) (4) (A). The principal issue in this case, a question of first impression, is whether our legislature, in enacting General Statutes § 17b-600, which establishes an optional state funded program of supplemental income assistance, intended our program to follow the federal model with respect to special needs trusts.

Section 17b-600 requires the department of social services (department) to adopt regulations "consistent with the requirements of Title XVI of the Social Security Act pertaining to programs of optional state supplementation. . . ." General Statutes § 17b-600.¹ We must decide whether this provision forbids the department from departing from federal law by counting the assets in a special needs trust in determining eligibility for our state funded program. The trial court concluded that our stricter state eligibility requirements are enforceable. We agree and affirm its judgment.²

The plaintiff, Marjorie Parkhurst, is the conservatrix for her son, Matthew John Squinobal, who is disabled because of mental retardation. The plaintiff is also the trustee of a special needs trust for the benefit of her son. The defendant is the commissioner of social services (commissioner).

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from a decision by a hearing officer of the department that the establishment of a special needs trust made her son ineligible to continue receiving state supplemental income assistance for a significant number of years. The commissioner defended the validity of the regulations promulgated by the department that impliedly authorized discontinuation of state benefits under these circumstances.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal. It concluded that the department properly had interpreted the applicable federal and state statutes and regulations to limit her son's eligibility for state supplemental income benefits in light of the funds in the special needs trust. It further concluded that a delay in the issuance of a decision by the department's hearing officer did not require approval of the plaintiff's petition for reinstatement of benefits. We agree.

In the plaintiff's appeal from this adverse judgment, she raises three issues. She maintains that the trial court improperly (1) interpreted § 17b-600 to authorize state supplemental assistance eligibility rules that conflict with federal supplemental security income eligibility rules, (2) applied § 17b-600 and § 3025.05 of the department's Uniform Policy Manual to hold that the creation of a special needs trust by means of a transfer of funds owned by her son affected his continued eligibility for state supplemental income assistance and (3) upheld a decision by a hearing officer despite noncompliance with statutory and regulatory time limits. Because each of these issues raises a question of law, we have plenary authority to review the merits of the judgment of the trial court. See Del Core v. Mohican Historic Housing Associates, 81 Conn. App. 120, 121-22, 837 A.2d 902 (2004).

I ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

In her principal argument on appeal, the plaintiff disputes the validity of the department's interpretation and application of the state statute and regulations that govern optional state funded supplemental assistance for disabled persons like her son. She maintains that the establishment of a special needs trust on her son's behalf was irrelevant to his right to continue to receive financial assistance from the department. In her view, § 17b-600, which provides in relevant part that this state program "shall be consistent with the requirements of Title XVI of the Social Security Act pertaining to programs of optional state supplementation," makes it mandatory for the department to follow comparable federal law in every respect. Federal law disregards special needs funds in the calculation of federal benefits. Like the trial court, we disagree with the plaintiff.

A The Facts of this Case

The facts underlying the present controversy are undisputed. Since 1997, the plaintiff's disabled son has received both federal supplemental security income benefits and optional state funded supplemental assistance benefits.³ Together, these two income streams permit him to live in a residential group home.

In 1998, an automobile accident caused the son to suffer severe injuries. As a result, the son received $115,377.56 in settlement proceeds. In 2001, with the approval of the Torrington Probate Court, these settlement proceeds were placed into the Matthew John Squinobal Trust Indenture (trust indenture), and the plaintiff was named the trustee of the trust.

The trust is irrevocable. During the son's lifetime, he is its sole beneficiary. The trust expresses the intent that its funds not displace federal, state or private entitlement or assistance programs.

The trust indenture confers on the plaintiff, as trustee, unlimited discretion to ascertain the special needs of her son and then to use or not use the income or the principal for him in his best interests. That discretion might be, but need not be, exercised to provide additional support, such as therapy sessions, to help her son cope with his disability. It equally well might be exercised to enhance the quality of his life by paying for expensive vacations and entertainment.

We do not mean to suggest that this plaintiff would behave irresponsibly, or, indeed,...