Parks Cab Co. v. Annunzio

• Decision Date: 17 September 1952
• Docket Number: No. 32113,32113
• Citation: 412 Ill. 549,107 N.E.2d 853
• Parties: PARKS CAB CO. v. ANNUNZIO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 853

107 N.E.2d 853

412 Ill. 549

PARKS CAB CO. v. ANNUNZIO et al.

No. 32113.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 17, 1952.

Walker, Atwood, Zukowski & McFarland, of Chicago (Peter B. Atwood and Edwin F. Zukowski, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and A. Zola Groves, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The question presented is whether, under the unique circumstances of this case, certain taxicab drivers are employees of the Parks Cab Company under the Unemployment Compensation Act. A referee found them to be employees, and the Board of Review of the Department of Labor affirmed the finding. A judgment of the superior court of Cook County in an administrative review proceeding confirmed the decision of the Board of Review. The cab company appeals.

The question as to the status of the drivers as employees arose when a former file clerk and a former driver sought unemployment compensation. If the drivers are employees, the company has six or more employees; if the drivers are not employees, the company has less than six employees and is not within the coverage of the act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 48, par. 218.

Under the taxicab ordinance of the city of Chicago, Parks Cab Company holds thirteen licenses. It owns no cabs. By written contracts the company leases its licenses to persons who own cabs, for a rental of $60 per week. By their terms, the contracts are to operate as assignments, from week to week, of the company's licenses.

The company agrees to carry insurance on the cabs. Each lessee agrees to be responsible for property damage; to report all accidents to the company; to bear the cost of repairs and operating expenses; to conform to all laws and ordinances, and to transfer title to his vehicle to the company as 'security and indemnity for the Company.' The contracts also provide that nothing therein shall constitute the lessee an employee of the company; that the relationship is that of lessor-lessee, and that the lessee is an independent contractor. It is agreed that the lessee shall not be subject to any control, direction or influence by the company, and that the company will not exert, urge, or exercise any control or interference in the operation of the taxicab pursuant to the lease.

The company manager testified that the company owns thirteen licenses but no cabs; that these licenses are leased under written agreements to drivers who own their own vehicles; that the only consideration passing between the parties is the payment of $60 per week by each driver to the company; that there is no other arrangement between them; that the company carries the insurance on the vehicles and that title to them is transferred into the company's name; that the company maintains a garage for the convenience of the drivers on a purely voluntary basis, but has no gasoline station and drivers can buy their gasoline and other supplies and have repairs made wherever they wish; that the cabs are not painted a uniform color, nor do they carry a uniform device or decorative scheme; that the drivers hire other drivers to run the cabs for them if they wish; that the company does not maintain a call box, takes no calls for customers, never inspects the meters and does not know how much money any of the drivers make; that the drivers operate on the meter or on the 'jitney system' as they wish, and that the company had paid social security taxes on amounts furnished to it by the drivers as their weekly earnings, but that these payments had subsequently been refunded.

We start with the proposition, frequently reiterated, that the definitions contained in the statute are controlling and that common-law concepts of master and servant and independent contractor do not govern the administration of the act. Wallace v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 172, 103 N.E.2d 467; Concrete Materials Corp. v. Gordon, 395 Ill. 203, 69 N.E.2d 841; Van Ogden, Inc. v. Murphy, 390 Ill. 133, 60 N.E.2d 877; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Murphy, 388 Ill. 316, 58 N.E.2d 182; Smith v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 34, 50 N.E.2d 844. Section 2(f)(1), defining 'employment,' provides: 'Subject to the other provisions of this subsection, 'employment' means any service * * * performed by an individual for an employing unit, * * *.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 48, par. 218.) From this broad definition which includes relationships not ordinarily considered to constitute employment, various exceptions are carved out, the one most frequently encountered in litigation being the conjunctive test of section 2(f) (5) which resembles, although it is not identical with, the common-law independent contractor.

The Board of Review made findings that the drivers performed services for the company; that the company was an 'employing unit' as to the drivers; that the services were performed by the drivers subject to the company's control; that services were performed in the usual course of the company's business; that the drivers were not independently established in their business, and that the net remuneration received by the drivers constituted 'wages' within the act. All of these issues are argued in this court, but as we view the case it is necessary to pass upon only one of them. For unless the drivers are performing services for the company, employment does not exist under the statutory definition.

The actual situation here...