Parks v. Bourbeau

• Decision Date: 29 May 1984
• Citation: 477 A.2d 636,193 Conn. 270
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Ralph W. PARKS v. David BOURBEAU et al.

Page 636

477 A.2d 636

193 Conn. 270

Ralph W. PARKS v. David BOURBEAU et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 7, 1984.

Decided May 29, 1984.

Andrew S. Liskov, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (plaintiff).

Richard F. Jacobson, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., for appellees (defendants).

Before PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and GRILLO, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from the dismissal of the plaintiff's application for a writ of habeas corpus attacking his detention under an extradition warrant ¹ pursuant to which he is being held for extradition to authorities of the state of Florida.

The application for the writ alleges that the plaintiff, Ralph Parks, was arrested by the defendant, David Bourbeau, a Connecticut state trooper, on a rendition warrant issued by the governor of Connecticut under date of October 10, 1980, that his extradition is sought by the state of Florida for the alleged crime of "Burglary into a Structure," and that he was arraigned on the rendition warrant on August 4, 1981, at which time he was advised of his rights to challenge this arrest pursuant to General Statutes § 54-166 and granted a continuance date ² by which to file a habeas application. He alleged that his detention in Connecticut was illegal because of a number of claimed statutory and constitutional violations.

On October 12, 1979, Parks was arrested in Florida and charged with burglary of a structure. ³ Thereafter, he was released on his own recognizance but subsequently failed to appear. On July 14, 1980, the governor of Florida issued his requisition warrant accompanied by other documents for Parks' extradition. On October 2, 1980, Parks escaped from the Bridgeport Correctional Center where he was serving a sentence as a parole violator. On October 10, 1980, while Parks was still an escapee, the governor of Connecticut issued her rendition warrant and ordered his return to Florida. Her warrant was mailed together with her letter to Lieutenant Patrick Hedge of the Connecticut state police, who turned over the letter and the governor's warrant to Bourbeau. On January 13, 1981, Parks was arrested on the escape charge and returned to the Bridgeport Correctional Center. From his return there on January 13, 1981, to March 19, 1981, Parks was in custody at the correctional center in lieu of bond on the October 10, 1980, escape charge as well as serving time on another escape charge. On March 18, 1981, he was sentenced to a term of one year on the October, 1980, escape charge to be served consecutively to the term he was then serving. Bourbeau was aware from about January 13 or 14, 1981, that Parks was at the Bridgeport Correctional Center and he was also aware of Parks' sentencing on March 18, 1981.

On April 3, 1981, Parks was given department of correction form CN1041 entitled "Notification of Warrant/Detainer" which informed him that a warrant and/or detainer, issued on October 10, 1980, had been filed against him. ⁴ That notification listed Florida as the jurisdiction making the charge of "Burglary of a Structure." On August 4, 1981, his sentence expired, and he was to be discharged at that time. Bourbeau arrested him on that date pursuant to the governor's rendition warrant of October 10, 1980.

On appeal, Parks claims error in that: (1) he was not substantially charged with a crime in Florida as required by Connecticut General Statutes § 54-159 because the finding of probable cause made in Florida and appearing on the face of the supporting documents is "palpably illegal and insufficient"; (2) he is not a fugitive from justice because his Connecticut arrest, based on the Florida "Affidavit of Probable Cause" was illegal and voided the arrest; (3) he was substantially deprived of his fourteenth amendment due process rights when he was not arrested under the Connecticut rendition warrant until ten months after its issuance because the arresting authorities knew he was in custody and deliberately withheld serving the warrant; and (4) he was similarly deprived of his fourteenth amendment due process rights because, although required by General Statutes § 54-82c, he was not given prompt notice of the rendition warrant and was not advised of his right to request disposition of that warrant. We find no error.

I

In support of his claim that he is not substantially charged with a crime ⁵ in Florida, the plaintiff urges us to hold that the requirement of "substantially charged" is not equivalent to a finding of probable cause. In doing so, he recognizes that the United States Supreme Court set down the general rule of Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 290, 99 S.Ct. 530, 536, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), that "when a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists, the courts of the asylum state are without power to review the determination." Yet, at the same time, he argues that this general rule has definite limitations which permit the asylum state, in a proper case, to review whether a plaintiff has been "substantially charged." Further, he maintains that if the asylum state itself determines that he is not "substantially charged," then the "traditional presumption of regularity"; Michigan v. Doran, supra; that attends the demanding state's judicial determination of reasonable grounds or probable cause has been rebutted and the illegality of the plaintiff's arrest in the demanding state established. This, in turn, he asserts, invalidates his Connecticut arrest under its governor's rendition warrant. He claims that because the extradition proceedings in Connecticut are thus barred, he cannot be a "fugitive" as required under the extradition statute. General Statutes § 54-159; Barrila v. Blake, 190 Conn. 631, 634, 461 A.2d 1375 (1983).

On the other hand, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is really attacking Florida's judicial finding of probable cause. The defendant maintains that the plaintiff, in claiming he is not "substantially charged," is actually saying that the presumption of regularity traditionally accorded the proceedings of the demanding state has been overcome when he claims that Florida's finding of probable cause is "palpably illegal."

"The Uniform Extradition Act implements the mandate of the extradition clause of the constitution of the United States, article four, § 2, clause 2, which provides: 'A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.' " Barrila v. Blake, supra. An extradition hearing in the asylum state " 'is limited to four questions, namely, (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order, (b) whether the plaintiff has been charged with a crime in the charging state, (c) whether the plaintiff is the person named in the request for extradition and (d) whether the plaintiff is a fugitive. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 703 [709 n. 11], 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530 , 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978).' Narel v. Liburdi, [185 Conn. 562, 565, 441 A.2d 177 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1974, 72 L.Ed.2d 443 (1982) ]; see Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 401, 311 A.2d 86 (1972); Reynolds v. Conway, 161 Conn. 329, 336, 288 A.2d 77 (1971)." Wentworth v. Bourbeau, 188 Conn. 364, 368, 449 A.2d 1015 (1982). In Michigan v. Doran, supra, the court said that "[u]nder Art. IV, § 2 [of the United States constitution], the courts of the asylum state are bound to accept the demanding state's judicial determination since the proceedings of the demanding state are clothed with the traditional presumption of regularity. In short, when a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists, the courts of the asylum state are without power to review the determination. Section 2, cl. 2, of Art. IV, its companion clause in § 1 and established principles of comity merge to support this conclusion." Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U.S. 290, 99 S.Ct. 536. Recently, we have said that the requisite that one must be "substantially charged" requires that the charge be based upon "probable cause." Wentworth v. Bourbeau, supra; see Michigan v. Doran, supra, 296, 99 S.Ct. 539 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Hill v. Blake, 186 Conn. 404, 410-11, 441 A.2d 841 (1982). The question of whether the plaintiff was substantially charged with a crime in the state of Florida is one of law. Wentworth v. Bourbeau, supra; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 372, 25 S.Ct. 282, 283, 49 L.Ed. 515 (1905); Smith v. Idaho, 373 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir.1967).

The documents from Florida include not only an information charging the plaintiff with the crime of burglary of structure ⁶ and a bench warrant, but also an "Affidavit of Probable Cause" together with a judicial finding of probable cause that the plaintiff had committed that crime. The plaintiff argues that the "traditional presumption of regularity" is facially rebutted by a reading of the affidavit of probable cause. The language of Michigan v. Doran, supra, which speaks to the "traditional presumption of regularity" must not be read in isolation but in context and particularly with the language immediately following it which is clearly to the effect that once a neutral judicial officer in Florida has determined that probable cause exists, the courts in Connecticut "are without power to review the determination." Michigan v. Doran, supra, 439 U.S. 290, 99 S.Ct. 536. Thus, given the limitation of inquiry imposed by Michigan v. Doran; see Wentworth v. Bourbeau, supra, 188 Conn. 368, 449 A.2d 1015; the courts of this state will not review the finding of probable cause by the demanding state of Florida. ...