Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga.

• Decision Date: 14 January 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 92-146-3-MAC (WDO).
• Citation: 841 F. Supp. 1205
• Parties: Brenda A. PARKS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WARNER ROBINS, GA., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

841 F. Supp. 1205

Brenda A. PARKS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WARNER ROBINS, GA., et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 92-146-3-MAC (WDO).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division.

January 14, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Linwood Robert Lovett, J. Douglas Cowart, Macon, GA, for plaintiff.

J. Lewis Sapp, Jean M. Powers, Stanford Glenn Wilson, Atlanta, GA, for City of Warner Robins, GA., defendants.

ORDER

OWENS, Chief Judge.

Before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the court issues the following order.

FACTS

On August 27, 1984, plaintiff Brenda Parks began work as a police officer for the City of Warner Robins Police Department. Subsequent to plaintiff beginning work as a police officer, the mayor and city council of Warner Robins introduced a measure to amend the city's anti-nepotism policy. Section 18-38 of the Warner Robins City Code provides:

This article may be repealed or amended by the mayor and council by passage of an appropriate amending or repealing ordinance. The amending or repealing ordinance may not be adopted until the following procedure has been followed:

A proposed repealer or amendment shall be read in a regular council meeting at least two (2) weeks before action can be taken. Only after this procedure has been completed, may the mayor and council adopt the proposed amending or repealing ordinance.

Warner Robins, Ga., Code § 18-38 (1977). In accordance with this section, the proposed ordinance was first read on February 19, 1985. Approximately a month later, on March 18, 1985, the mayor and city council officially adopted the proposed anti-nepotism policy as a city ordinance.¹

In October of 1989, plaintiff, who by this time had been promoted to sergeant in the Criminal Investigations Division, received a proposal of marriage from A.J. Mathern, a captain in the Special Investigations Unit of the Warner Robins Police Department. Both plaintiff and Mathern hold supervisory positions with the police department. After the marriage proposal, Mathern met with Chief of Police George, Johnson to discuss the effect the anti-nepotism policy would have on the employment status of plaintiff and Mathern. Chief Johnson informed Mathern that under the terms of the policy, if plaintiff and Mathern were married while in their current employment situations, plaintiff's employment would be terminated as the least senior employee. As a result of this discussion, plaintiff and Mathern postponed their plans to marry. On March 31, 1992, plaintiff filed suit against the City of Warner Robins, the city council², and the mayor, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Plaintiff contends that the anti-nepotism policy of the City of Warner Robins violates her right of association as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, on the issues of absolute and qualified immunity, and on all of plaintiff's constitutional claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Statute of Limitations

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides, in part:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). The Declaratory Judgement Act is not an independent basis for federal court jurisdiction. See Wendy's Intern., Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 868 F.2d 433, 435 (11th Cir.1989); Jones v. Alexander, 609 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir.1980). Before declaratory relief is available pursuant to § 2201(a), an independent basis for federal jurisdiction must be established. Wendy's Intern., Inc., 868 F.2d at 435; Jones, 609 F.2d at 781; Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Gutherie, & Co., 577 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir.1978). Defendants contend that because the statute of limitations has run on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action, this court has no other independent basis for federal jurisdiction and, therefore, may not grant declaratory relief.

Because federal law does not provide a statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal courts are required to borrow a period of limitation from state law. It is well established that a § 1983 action brought within Georgia is subject to a two-year statute of limitations adopted from O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 715-16 (11th Cir.1987). Although state law determines the applicable period of limitation, federal law determines when the § 1983 cause of action accrues. Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716.

Plaintiff is faced with a situation in which she has been expressly informed by defendants that if she marries, her employment with the City will be terminated. To suggest that her cause of action accrued in 1987 and expired in 1989, would effectively bar plaintiff from seeking relief from this court while allowing the threat of termination to remain. The threat exists so long as plaintiff harbors a desire to marry. Accordingly, the court holds that plaintiff's cause of action continues to accrue so long as the threat of immediate application of the policy exists. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations is DENIED.

II. Absolute Immunity

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants also assert that the mayor and city council members sued in their individual capacities are entitled to absolute immunity for the performance of their legislative functions. "Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for actions taken in furtherance of their official duties." Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1505 (11th Cir.1989). "No immunity, however exists for actions outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir.1982). Section 2-203 of the Warner Robins City Charter provides that the mayor and city council have the authority to "adopt ordinances establishing any personnel policies it deems necessary for an adequate and systematic handling of personnel affairs...." Warner Robins, Ga., Charter § 2-203. Clearly, the actions of the mayor and the city council in enacting this ordinance were taken in furtherance of their official duties as set forth in the city charter. The mayor and the city council, therefore, are entitled to absolute immunity from any liability that may arise as a result of the passage of this ordinance. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of absolute immunity for the mayor and city council in their individual capacities is GRANTED.³

III. Qualified Immunity

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted an objective-reasonableness test for determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. See Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991); Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1988). "The objective-reasonableness test provides qualified immunity protection to `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Courson, 939 F.2d at 1487. "Eligibility for this immunity is determined on an objective basis and not on the basis of the officer's subjective beliefs." Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir.1985).

The objective reasonableness test involves a two-step process. First, the defendant must show that "`he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.'" Courson, 939 F.2d at 1487. If the defendant is able to meet this burden of production, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's actions violated clearly established constitutional law. Id. The second prong of the test is further divided into two subparts. First, the court must determine if the applicable law was clearly established at the time the action occurred. Id. at 1487-88. Second, if the law was clearly established, the court must determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether defendant violated this law. Id. at 1488. Under this analysis, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if either (1) the law was not clearly established, or (2) the law was clearly established but the defendant did not violate the law. Id. n. 14.

A. Scope of Discretionary Authority

A government official proves that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority by showing "`objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.'" Id. at 1487 (quoting Rich, 841 F.2d at 1564). As previously discussed, section 2-203 of the Warner Robins City Charter provides that the mayor and city council have the authority to "adopt ordinances establishing any personnel policies it deems necessary for an adequate and systematic handling of personnel affairs ...." Warner Robins, Ga., Charter § 2-203. Clearly, the actions of the mayor and city council in adopting an anti-nepotism policy were well within the scope of their discretionary authority.

B. Clearly Established Law

Plaintiff asserts that it is a well established principle of law that anti-nepotism policies infringe on rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This contention, however, is without merit. The law regarding the constitutionality of...