Parks v. Mills

• Citation: 75 S.C. 560,56 S.E. 234
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Decision Date: 04 January 1907
• Parties: PARKS. v. LAURENS COTTON MILLS.

75 S.C. 560

56 S.E. 234

PARKS.

v.LAURENS COTTON MILLS.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 4, 1907.

1. Statutes—Title of Act.

Act 1894 (21 St at Large, p. 793), requiring cotton buyers to number each bale of cotton bought with same number that is put on the bills and books, sufficiently expresses the subject of the act in the title.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Statutes, § 145.]

2. Same—Incorporation in Code.

When an act is incorporated in the Code in accordance with Const art. 6. § 5, it becomes statutory law, without reference to its title as originally enacted, and the objection that the subject of the act does not correspond with its title cannot be raised.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Die. vol. 44, Statutes, § 215.]

S. Searches and Seizures—Constitutional Law.

Act 1894 (21 St. at Large, p. 793), providing that books of cotton buyers shall be open to public inspection, is not unconstitutional as permitting unreasonable searches and seizures.

4. Damages—Evidence.

In an action to recover damages for refusing to allow an inspection of cotton books authorized by Act 1894 (21 St. at Large, p. 793), refusal of a cotton buyer, under advice of counsel, to permit such inspection by a sheriff under a warrant to seize the cotton after notice of claim under lien, is a matter from which the jury may infer actual and punitive damages.

5. Trial—Instructions—Objections.

Errors in stating issues by the court should be called to its attention at the time.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 680.]

6. Damages—Evidence.

Where defendant cotton buyer knew that there was a statute requiring it to allow its books to be inspected, and yet refused to allow such inspection, the motive which prompted the refusal was a question for the jury, on trial for the damages. Woods, J., and Gary, A. J., dissenting.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Laurens County; Memminger, Judge.

Action by John W. Parks against the Laurens Cotton Mills. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The following are the exceptions of defendant:

"(1) Because it is respectfully submitted, that his honor, Judge Aldrich, erred in refusing to strike out, as irrelevant, so much of paragraph 4 of plaintiffs complaint as follows after the word 'refusal, ' on page 2 of the said complaint—that is, all of paragraph 4 which alleges what was done by Magistrate John M. Hudgins and his agent or constable, and what the defendant did with reference thereto—also so much of paragraph 5 as relates to the refusal of defendant to allow sheriff to inspect its books; it being respectfully submitted that the refusal of the defendant to allow the sheriff, or his agent, to inspect the books, could not be an element of damage to the plaintiff, and was, therefore, irrelevant matter, which was prejudicial to the defendant.

"(2) Because the circuit judge erred In refusing to hold that the act of 1894, now embodied in section 1546 of the Civil Code of 1902 and section 352 of the Criminal Code of 1902, under which this action was brought, was unconstitutional, null and void, and in not directing a verdict for the defendant upon said grounds, for the following reasons: First. Because the title of the said act does not express the subject thereof, in so far as the second section of the act is concerned, the title of the said act being 'An act to require cotton buyers to number each bale of cotton bought with the same number that is put upon cotton bills and books'; whereas, section 2 of the said act requires that 'such books of all cotton buyers shall be open to public inspection—thereby making said section repugnant to article 2, § 20, of the Constitution of 1868. Second. Because the title of the said act refers to 'cotton buyers'; whereas, the body of the act only refers to cotton buyers 'buying from the initial seller, ' thereby unjustly discriminating against a particular class of cotton buyers. Third. Because the said act is repugnant to article 2, § 20, of the Constitution of 1868, for the reason that the title relates to the number that is put upon 'cotton bills and books'; whereas, the act provides for the keeping of a book, and requires that the said books shall be open to public inspection, and provides a penalty for the violation thereof. Fourth. Because the said act is repugnant to article 1, § 22, of the Constitution of 1868, and article 1, § 17, of the Constitution of 1895, in so far as it requires that the books of private persons shall be. open to public inspection, and provides a penalty for noncompliance therewith, for the reasons: (a) That it permits 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' (b) That it in effect requires a person to testify against himself, and is therefore obnoxious to article 1, $ 17, of the Constitution.

"(3) Because the circuit judge erred in charging the jury that the said act was constitutional and a valid exercise of the police power, when it is respectfully submitted that he should have held that the said act was unconstitutional, null and void for the reasons above set out.

"(4) Because the judge erred in charging the jury that the Supreme Court had decided that, if the plaintiff proved what he alleged, he was entitled to recover damage's; the error being: (a) In ignoring the defendant's position that the act of 1904 was unconstitutional, on the several grounds above; it being respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court did not pass upon the question as to the constitutionality of the said act. (b) In virtually taking away from the jury the right to say whether or not the plaintiff had sustained any damage, and in effect forcing the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for some amount

"(5) In charging the jury that one of the grounds upon which the plaintiff asked damages was the refusal of the defendant to deliver the cotton to him, when it is respectfully submitted that the sole ground of damage, as set out In the complaint, was the refusal of the defendant to allow an inspection of its books.

"(6) Because he erred in charging the jury as follows: 'I have to charge you that the plaintiff had a legal right to see those books, and that in the refusal to allow him to see those books, if you find as a fact in this case that he was not allowed to see those books, then he has been deprived of a legal right; and where a man's legal right has been Invaded, where he has been denied a legal right, he is entitled for the invasion of that legal right to some damages in the law. They may be actual damages, they may be punitive damages, or they may be nominal damages. If there are no actual damages, and no punitive damages, then he is entitled to only nominal damages, which means the smallest sum possible—a trifling amount The law has to recognize that there must be some damages for the invasion of a legal right; and in the refusal to allow Its books to be inspected, if you find there was such refusal, there was the Invasion of a legal right which the plaintiff had'—the error being: (a) In charging that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, notwithstanding that the jury might find that he had not suffered either actual or punitive damages, when it is respectfully submitted that, In the circumstances of this case, If the jury had found that the plaintiff had not sustained either actual or punitive damages, then he was not entitled to recover anything at all.

"(7) In charging the jury that the plaintiff, under his complaint, was entitled to recover damages for the refusal on the part of the defendant to deliver the cotton to the plaintiff, when it is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover damages, if at all, for the refusal on the part of the defendant to allow him to inspect its books.

"(8) Because the circuit judge erred In charging the jury that the plaintiff was en-titled to recover damages for the refusal of the defendant to allow the sheriff or his agent, to inspect its books; it being respectfully submitted that a refusal of the defendant to allow the sheriff, or his agent, to inspect its books, could in no wise damage the plaintiff, and could in no sense be considered as an element of damage to the plaintiff.

"(9) In charging the jury, at the request of the plaintiff, that, 'in order for the advice of the counsel to even mitigate damages, the testimony must satisfy the jury that the defendant, in seeking the advice of counsel, did so with an honest purpose to do what was right, and obey the laws of the state, and that such advice was given upon a full and fair statement of the facts in case, or such facts as were material to the issue between the parties'; the error being: (a) That such charge, in effect, instructed the jury that advice of counsel could only mitigate damages; whereas, under the law, the advice of counsel was a fact upon which the jury might have found that there was no punitive damages at all. (b) In, in effect, instructing the jury that, to have that effect, the advice of counsel must be given upon a full and fair statement of the facts in the case, when the court had refused to allow counsel and W. E. Lucas, when he was upon the stand, to state facts upon which the advice was given.

"(10) In charging the jury that the advice of counsel 'is introduced into a case for the purpose of mitigation, and not excuse'; the error being in holding that the advice of counsel, if properly established, could not do away with punitive damages altogether.

"(11) Because it is respectfully submitted that the circuit judge erred in refusing the motion made by the defendant for a new trial, on the grounds, first, that the finding of the jury was not supported by the preponderance of the evidence; and, second, that the finding of the jury was excessive, for the reason that, according to plaintiff's own testimony, he was not...