Parks v. Norris
Decision Date | 16 June 1894 |
Citation | 59 N.W. 428,101 Mich. 71 |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Parties | PARKS v. NORRIS. |
Error to circuit court, Van Buren county; George M. Buck, Judge.
Action by E. Frank Parks, administrator, against Margaret Crippen Norris. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Hawes & Luby, for appellant.
Mills Osborn & Cavanaugh, for appellee.
This action was brought by the administrator of the estate of Thomas Crippen deceased, to recover the value of certain personal property which it is claimed the defendant, the widow of the deceased, reduced to her possession and converted to her own use. Mr. Crippen died August 6, 1886, and the plaintiff was appointed administrator August 1, 1892. The suit was commenced by summons issued September 19, 1892. It appears that Mr. Crippen and his wife, prior to Crippen's death, lived upon, and owned as tenants by the entirety, a farm of about 130 acres in Van Buren county. Upon the farm, at the time of Crippen's death, was a large quantity of personal property, and immediately after his death the widow took possession of all of said personal property, and appropriated it to herself, claiming it as her own, and thereby keeping it from the estate. She afterwards disposed of it, and appropriated the proceeds. The question litigated was, who was the owner of this personal property before the death of Thomas Crippen? He left surviving him six children, some of whom were minors at the time this suit was commenced, and the widow has since married Mr. Norris. For some time before Mr. Crippen's death, he lived with his daughter Mary, about two miles from the farm. At his death the personal property in controversy was on the farm, and consisted of horses, cows, hogs, mower, reaper, carriages, plows, cultivators, fanning mill, scales, about 1,500 bushels of corn, 240 of oats, 912 of wheat, 30 to 40 tons of hay, 250 bushels of potatoes, and other property. The wheat had been cut and stacked. The testimony shows that Mr. Crippen always had charge of the farm and worked it, and that this property was always recognized and called his property. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, with her plea of the general issue, and, on the trial, objected to any evidence under the pleadings, for the reason that the declaration shows that all the causes of action alleged accrued more than six years before the action here was commenced, as the declaration alleges that the conversion took place on August 6, 1886, and also that the declaration counts specially upon the promises made to Thomas Crippen in his lifetime for the sums of money sued for, and thereafter, after the death of Crippen, defendant promised the plaintiff to pay him, as administrator, the said sums of money, but that she has paid no part thereof. The court overruled the objection, and permitted the proofs to be introduced. The defendant introduced testimony tending to show that some portion of this personal property belonged to her, and she also made the claim that portions of the personal property in the way of crops which were on the farm, and uncut and unharvested, passed to her at the time of her husband's death by right of survivorship, as it was a part of the real estate which she and her husband held by the entirety.
At the close of the testimony the defendant requested the court to charge the jury as follows:
The first, second, and sixth requests were refused. The third and fourth requests were given. The fifth request was given, with the following modification:
The court instructed the jury in the general charge substantially, that if they found from the evidence that, at the time of the death of Mr. Crippen, he was the owner of the personal property, then their verdict should be for the plaintiff; that, under the laws of this state, the children of the deceased husband are entitled to their share of personal property, just as much as the widow is entitled to hers; that, Crippen having died intestate, all of his personal property would go to his administrator. The court further instructed the jury that, if they found from the evidence that the defendant took possession of the personal property after her husband's death, it would make no difference what became of it, as defendant would be liable for the value as the jury might find it at the time of the death of her husband; that, if she took possession of it, and appropriated it to her own use or disposed of it, and kept it from the estate, she would be liable to the administrator for its value. The above charge was given in connection with the modification contained in defendant's fifth request. The court further directed the jury that whoever goes into possession of the personal property of an intestate at his death, and assumes control, becomes responsible for it to the administrator of the estate of the deceased when appointed. When a man dies intestate, his property does not, like real estate,...
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