Parks v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of Southington

• Decision Date: 21 August 1979
• Citation: 425 A.2d 100,178 Conn. 657
• Parties: William E. PARKS et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF SOUTHINGTON et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 100

425 A.2d 100

178 Conn. 657

William E. PARKS et al. v.PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF SOUTHINGTON et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 13, 1979.

Decision Released Aug. 21, 1979.

David B. Beizer, for appellant(defendant Mt. Southington Ski Area, inc.).

Joseph H. Thalberg, Southington, for appellees(plaintiffs).

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and PETERS, JJ.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Mount Southington Ski Area, Inc.(Mount Southington), after a grant of certification by this court, from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas sustaining the plaintiffs' appeal from a decision of the defendantSouthington Planning and Zoning Commission(the commission).That decision amended the town zoning regulations to permit the sale of food and alcoholic beverages as an incidental and subordinate use in ski areas of a stipulated size.In its appeal, Mount Southington contends that the court acted beyond the scope of review permissible for reviewing decisions of municipal legislative bodies and that the court erred in finding only one possible reason for the commission's decision.

Mount Southington applied to the defendant commission on March 24, 1975, for an amendment to the town zoning regulations to permit as a special exception in certain residential zones "(t)he sale of food and alcoholic beverages ... when part of a bona fide ski area consisting of no less than 100 acres ... provided that said use is clearly incidental and subordinate to the principal use and located within a principal building."Previously existing regulations already permitted such a use as part of a bona fide golf course of nine or more holes.Mount Southington was and is the only ski area that would benefit by the amendment.

The commission on May 6, 1975, held a public hearing on Mount Southington's application, and subsequently approved it by a vote of four to two at an executive meeting of the commission on May 20, 1975.Although the commission as a collective body gave no formal statement of the reasons for its decision, the minutes of the May 20 meeting contain summarized statements by individual commissioners and by the town planner indicating various viewpoints and concerns about the amendment.The plaintiffs, ninety-four residents of the town of Southington, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the commission's decision, alleging that it had acted illegally, arbitrarily, unreasonably, and in abuse of its discretion in granting Mount Southington's application.Specifically, the plaintiffs maintained that no valid reasons for the amendment had been given, and that the amendment did not serve the public interest but was rather for the sole benefit of Mount Southington.¹

The court heard the appeal on the record of proceedings before the commission, and concluded that the record did not support the decision to amend the regulations.The court found that no reason for the amendment had been given in the commission's decision, and that the only reason relevant to the amendment given by any commission member was that Mount Southington could not compete well with other ski areas without a liquor permit.Finding that reason insufficient to support the commission's action, the court sustained the plaintiff's appeal.In its appeal to this court, Mount Southington contends that the court abused its discretion by acting beyond the scope authorized for judicial review of decisions of local legislative bodies, since the record as a whole sufficiently contains reasons validly supporting the commission's decision.We agree.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that a local zoning authority, in enacting or amending its regulations, acts in a legislative rather than an administrative capacity.A.P. & W. Holding Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Board, 167 Conn. 182, 184, 355 A.2d 91(1974);Morningside Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Board, 162 Conn. 154, 158-59, 292 A.2d 893(1972);Damick v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 158 Conn. 78, 81, 256 A.2d 428(1969);Malafronte v. Planning & Zoning Board, 155 Conn. 205, 208, 230 A.2d 606(1967).Acting in such legislative capacity, the local board is free to amend its regulations "whenever time, experience, and responsible planning for contemporary or future conditions reasonably indicate the need for a change....The discretion of a legislative body, because of its constituted role as formulator of public policy, is much broader than that of an administrative board, which serves a quasi-judicial function."Malafronte v. Planning & Zoning Board, supra, 209, 230 A.2d 609.The board is "not bound by the general rule which would prohibit it from reversing an earlier decision without evidence of a change in conditions."Morningside Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Board, supra, 162 Conn. 158, 292 A.2d 893.

The broad discretion of local zoning authorities acting in their legislative capacity is not, however, unlimited.Damick v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 158 Conn. 83, 256 A.2d 428.We have long recognized that any change "must be in harmony with and in conformity to a comprehensive plan as mandated by General Statutes § 8-2."Jablon v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 157 Conn. 434, 438, 254 A.2d 914, 916(1969).As Southington has not adopted a master plan, the comprehensive plan is to be found in the zoning regulations themselves and in the zoning map, all of which are part of the record before us.Damick v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 158 Conn. 81, 256 A.2d 428.SeePierrepont v. Zoning Commission, 154 Conn. 463, 466, 226 A.2d 659(1967).

In the review of matters that lie within the discretion of local zoning authorities, each case must be considered individually on its own facts and circumstances.Jablon v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 157 Conn. 439, 254 A.2d 914.Because the general purposes of zoning in Southington are similar to those set forth in General Statutes § 8-2;²Damick v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 158 Conn. 81, 256 A.2d 428;we must determine if the amendment in question could reasonably fall within the provisions of that statute.The commission's failure to state on the record the reasons for its actions, in disregard of General Statutes § 8-3, renders appellate review more cumbersome, in that the trial court must search the entire record to find a basis for the commission's decision; we, in turn, review the action of the trial court.A.P. & W. Holding Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Board, supra, 167 Conn. 186-87, 355 A.2d...