Parks v. Rogers

• Decision Date: 18 June 2003
• Citation: 825 A.2d 1128,176 N.J. 491
• Parties: Elizabeth PARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter ROGERS, Helen Rogers and Bruce Rogers, Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, and John Doe I (a person or entity whose identity is as yet unknown) and John Doe II (a person or entity whose identity is as yet unknown), Defendants and Richard Redy, Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

825 A.2d 1128

176 N.J. 491

Elizabeth PARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter ROGERS, Helen Rogers and Bruce Rogers, Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, and John Doe I (a person or entity whose identity is as yet unknown) and John Doe II (a person or entity whose identity is as yet unknown), Defendants and Richard Redy, Third-Party Defendant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued February 3, 2003.

Decided June 18, 2003.

James J. Seaman, Secaucus, argued the cause for appellant (Waters, McPherson, McNeill, attorneys; Patrick J. Arre, of counsel).

Kevin J. Conyngham, Saddle Brook, argued the cause for respondents (Zimmerer, Murray & Conyngham, attorneys; Joseph P. Kreoll, on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by ALBIN, J.

In this appeal, we revisit the scope of a homeowner's duty to protect an unsuspecting social guest of dangers on the premises. Plaintiff Elizabeth Parks was a guest at defendants' home, where she descended in darkness a deck stairway with a prematurely short banister that she claims caused her to misstep and fall, suffering serious injuries. The Appellate Division, in affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluded that the indisputable facts showed that plaintiff was on notice of the condition of the handrail and, therefore, aware of the risk. We disagree that the record supports such an irrefutable conclusion. The facts are sufficiently contested that plaintiff should not be denied her day in court. We reaffirm the well-settled principle that a homeowner has a duty to warn the unwary social guest of a condition of the premises that the homeowner knows or has reason to know creates an unreasonable risk of injury.

I

As this matter comes before us on summary judgment, in presenting the facts, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and give her the benefit of all favorable inferences in support of her claim. R. 4:46-2(c); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995). On the evening of June 14, 1996, plaintiff attended a concert at the Garden State Arts Center with her date, Robert Duane, and his two friends, defendant Bruce Rogers and "Joe". Following the concert, plaintiff and Duane drove to a beach house in the Borough of Seaside Park owned by Bruce's parents, defendants Peter and Helen Rogers. Plaintiff and Duane arrived at the house sometime after 10:00 p.m. In the darkness, they walked up the two-flight wooden stairway to the second floor exterior deck, where they joined Bruce Rogers and Joe. A landing separated the two flights of stairs. The deck was "rather dark" with the only illumination coming from interior lights within the house. A lamppost at the base of the deck stairway was not lit.

Plaintiff and Duane intended to sleep at the beach house that evening. After the four conversed for approximately twenty minutes, plaintiff, feeling tired, decided to retrieve her overnight bag from the car. As she walked down the deck stairway and approached the landing between the two flights, she yelled, "Wow, it's really dark down here." No one responded by turning on any lights. Because of the darkness, she held onto the handrail to guide her way. Unknown to plaintiff, the handrail ended on the second to the last step. She had never before visited the Rogers' house and did not see during her ascent that the banister fell short of the bottom of the stairs. Not realizing that there was an additional step before she reached the ground, plaintiff lost her footing, fell, and fractured her left ankle. Immediately before she fell, she said to herself, "My goodness, where is the rest of the banister?"

Defendants Peter and Helen Rogers hired Richard Redy, a contractor, to build the stairway and deck in 1991. The deck stairway remained in continuous use through the date of the accident. In his report, plaintiff's expert enumerated seven defects in the stairway, one of which was that the banister ended nine inches short of the final step when it should have extended at least another twelve inches beyond the final step pursuant to the State Uniform Construction Code.¹ Of the seven defects, only the inadequate length of the handrail received the attention of the lower courts as a putative cause of plaintiff's injuries.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendants were negligent by failing to maintain the beach house "in a reasonably safe condition" and by failing "to correct the hazardous and dangerous condition" of the stairway leading to the deck. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant Bruce Rogers was negligent in not rendering her assistance after her fall. Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Redy, the contractor who built the stairway. Redy did not participate in the summary judgment motion and has no role in this appeal.

The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on those counts alleging failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and denied summary judgment to Bruce Rogers on the negligent failure to assist claim. The trial court reasoned that defendants were not negligent as landowners for plaintiff's fall because they had no "actual knowledge" of the stairway's dangerous condition. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the failure to assist claim and appealed the grant of summary judgment.

In an unpublished, per curiam decision, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment, but on a different ground. Unlike the trial court, the appellate panel found that "a reasonable person living in the house would have observed that the stairway banister did not extend to the bottom of the steps by a material degree, and would have recognized the danger presented" and the "need for nighttime illumination." However, the panel concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to relief because she was aware of the two conditions she now claims were responsible for her injuries—the inadequate length of the banister and the lack of illumination. We granted plaintiff's petition for certification, 174 N.J. 42, 803 A.2d 637 (2002), and now reverse.

II

That plaintiff was a social guest at defendants' beach house is not subject to dispute. We, therefore, begin by applying the principles of law that define the duty of a landowner to a social guest in analyzing the viability of plaintiff's claim.

The duty of an owner or possessor of land² to a third person coming onto his property derives from the common law. The scope of the landowner's duty is defined by that person's status as a business visitor, social guest, or trespasser. Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 311-12, 153 A.2d 1 (1959). The duty of care owed to a social guest is greater than that owed to a trespasser, but less than that owed to a business visitor.³ A landowner is not required to provide greater safety on his premises for a social guest than he would for himself. For example, the landowner does not have a duty to scour the premises to discover latent defects. On the other hand, the social guest should be at no greater risk than the landowner, who, by reason of his knowledge of the property, has the ability to protect himself against a dangerous condition. Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 433-34, 625 A.2d 1110; Snyder, supra, 30 N.J. at 311-12,153 A.2d 1; Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 97-99, 152 A.2d 20 (1959).

From that simple and fair-minded premise, the law places on the landowner the duty to disclose to the social guest the dangerous condition or to correct it. Thus, "the social guest ... is at least entitled to the same knowledge possessed by the host of dangerous conditions and should not be expected to assume the risk of such conditions in the absence of a warning." Berger, supra, 30 N.J. at 98, 152 A.2d 20. Once the proofs show that the landowner knew of a particular condition of the property, "[t]he inquiry is not whether the defendant realized the condition held any risk but whether a reasonable man would be cognizant of it." Id. at 100, 152 A.2d 20. If, however, "the guest is aware of the dangerous condition or by a reasonable use of his faculties would observe it, the host is not liable" because of the guest's failure to use due care. Id. at 99, 152 A.2d 20.

In Berger, this Court recognized that the Restatement (First) of Torts § 342 (1934) reflected "the law of this State." 30 N.J. at 99, 152 A.2d 20. Since then, the Restatement has been revised, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), and applied by the courts of this state. See, e.g., Tighe v. Peterson, 356 N.J.Super. 322, 326, 812 A.2d 423 (App.Div.)

(applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 to question of landowner liability to social guest), aff'd, 175 N.J. 240, 242, 814 A.2d 1066 (2002); Vallillo v. Muskin Corp., 218 N.J.Super. 472, 476-77, 528 A.2d 53 (App.Div.) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 496, 537 A.2d 1287 (1987); Giordano v. Mariano, 112 N.J.Super. 311, 314-15, 271 A.2d 20 (App.Div.1970) (following Berger and applying revised § 342). Section 342 construes the duty of a land possessor to social guests:⁴

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees [social guests] by a condition on the land if, but only if,

(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees [social guests], and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and

(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees [social guests] of the condition and the risk involved, and

(c) the licensees [social guests] do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.

[Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342.]

The Restatement was revised to impose liability on the land possessor if he "has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an...