Parks v. Satterthwaite

• Decision Date: 14 October 1892
• Docket Number: 15,414
• Parties: Parks v. Satterthwaite, Administrator
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

32 N.E. 82

132 Ind. 411

Parks v. Satterthwaite, Administrator

No. 15,414

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 14, 1892

From the Huntington Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

O. W Whitelock and S. E. Cook, for appellant.

H. B Sayler, S. M. Sayler and J. M. Sayler, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

In the year 1865 the county of Huntington offered a bounty of five hundred dollars to each person who would enlist in the military service of the United States. This offer was accepted by the appellant, and he entered the service. At the time of his enlistment he was under the age of twenty-one years. Shortly after his enlistment his father, Joseph Parks since deceased, collected the bounty without his knowledge or consent. The deceased admitted to divers persons the collection of the money, and stated that he was keeping it for his son, and at one time (the date does not appear) declared, in response to a request from the appellant, that he had arranged it so that the appellant would get the money. This suit was not brought until more than fifteen years after the receipt of the money by the father, and was not brought until after the father's death. The facts we have outlined are embodied in a special finding.

As there is no finding that the appellee's intestate was guilty of actual fraud, we must treat the case as one into which no element of that kind enters, for it is well settled that where fraud is essential to a recovery it must be found as an ultimate or inferential fact. See authorities cited in Elliott's Appellate Procedure, section 787, note 2. The case before us does not come within the rule that suits against a trustee are not necessarily barred where the person charged as trustee was guilty of fraud. We fully recognize the rule that even in cases of constructive or implied trusts the statute will not bar a suit where there is fraud, but we can not assume that there was fraud on the part of Joseph Parks. Piatt v. Vattier, 1 McLean, 146; Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Pet. 405; Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662.

The appellee's intestate undoubtedly received and held the money under such circumstances as entitled the appellant to treat him as a trustee. If the suit had been brought in due time, there would have been no question as to the appellant's right to recover as the beneficiary of an implied or constructive trust. The question, however, in the actual case is not as to the abstract right of recovery, but as to the effect of the statute of limitations upon the right to maintain a suit. If the case is to be regarded as the ordinary one of a trust imposed by law, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the statute operates as a bar. The case falls fully within the doctrine thus stated in Raymond v. Simonson, 4 Blackf. 77: "The general rule, however, that the statute of limitations is a bar to suits in equity, as well as actions at law, has its limits. It is opposed by another general rule, that in cases of frauds and trusts, the statute of limitations does not run. The trusts coming within this rule are direct trusts, technical and continuing trusts, which are not cognizable at law, but which are mere creatures of a court of equity, and fall within the proper and exclusive jurisdiction of chancery. There are numerous eventual and possible trusts, that are raised by law and otherwise, and that fall within the control of the statute. Every deposit is a trust; every person who holds money to be paid to another, or to be applied to a particular and specific purpose, is a trustee, and may be sued either at law or in equity." If the trust imposed upon Joseph Parks must be regarded as an ordinary trust imposed by law, then it is within the statute, inasmuch as the trust is not one of exclusive equity cognizance, and such a trust is not a continuing one. If the trust was completed when the money was received, then a cause of action enforceable at law arose, for the appellant might have sued upon an implied contract or for money had and received. It is well settled that in such case the statute prevails. Smith v. Calloway, 7 Blackf. 86 (88); Newsom v. Board, etc., 103 Ind. 526, 3 N.E. 163, and authorities cited; Stone v. Brown, 116 Ind. 78, 18 N.E. 392 (80); Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U.S. 201, 25 L.Ed. 431; Johnson v. Smith, 27 Mo. 591. Where, however, there is a continuing trust or obligation the rule does not, as we shall presently show, operate in full force or vigor.

We agree with counsel that there may be cases where the person charged as a trustee may be estopped from availing himself of the statute, but we can not hold that the appellee is estopped from setting up that defence. There is no finding that there was any fraudulent concealment of the receipt of the money, nor any fraudulent attempt to prevent the appellant from ascertaining and enforcing his rights. We can not agree with appellant's counsel that the assurance of the deceased that he had so arranged the matter that the appellant would get his money operates, by way of estoppel, to preclude the appellee from setting up the defence of the statute, since there is no finding that there was a fraudulent act or fraudulent intent.

The statement in the special finding that the appellee's intestate declared to third persons that he was keeping the money for his son is the statement of a matter of evidence and is not the statement of a fact. As we have already impliedly said, the statements of mere matters of evidence are out of place in a special finding, for it is the duty of the trial court to determine what the evidence proves and state its...