Parks v. Starks, 58

Decision Date06 June 1955
Docket NumberNo. 58,58
Citation70 N.W.2d 805,342 Mich. 443
PartiesLester L. PARKS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Fay A. STARKS and Eddy A. Goodrich, copartners, doing business as Starks & Goodrich, and Myron Grant, Defendants and Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Claude J. Marshall, Robert T. Arvidson, Lansing, for Myron Grant, defendant and appellant.

Gregg, Glassen, Parr & Rhead, by R. F. Rhead, Lansing, for Lester L. Parks, plaintiff and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench, except BOYLES, J.

DETHMERS, Justice.

At about 11:00 p. m. defendnat Grant negligently drove his automobile against one of two pillars supporting a canopy which extended back from the pillars, over gasoline pumps, to the front of a garage to which it was attached. The pillar was knocked almost out from under the canopy. Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, arrived at the scene and gave defendant a ticket for reckless driving whereupon the latter went home. At about 1:30 a. m. plaintiff informed one of the two owners of the garage, the other defendants herein, that the premises were in an unsafe condition and told him that barricades ought to be erected. The next morning plaintiff was present to complete his investigation. He found that no barricades had been erected. He did not go under the canopy because he considered it to be unsafe. While standing back about a pace from the outer edge of the canopy he noticed three children under it. He warned them to get out and when they failed to heed his warning he took a step forward, toward them, again warning them to get out. At that instant the canopy let loose from the garage, slid toward the side where plaintiff had been standing, collapsed, fell upon and severely injured him. For resultant damages plaintiff brought this suit against the three defendants, but before trial effected a settlement with the two garage owners. Grant, hereinafter called the defendant, appeals from judgment against him for $7,500.

Starting with the assumption that his negligence caused the collision with the pillar, defendant contends that that negligence was not a proximate, but only a remote cause of plaintiff's injuries the following morning. This he predicates on the fact that a period of nine hours elapsed between his said act of negligence and plaintiff's injuries and on the theory that an independent, subsequent act of negligence intervened as an efficient cause of the injuries, namely, negligence of the garage owners in failing to erect barricades around the dangerous premises to keep people out. In support he cites Luck v. Gregory, 257 Mich. 562, 241 N.W. 862, 244 N.W. 155, and Fuller v. Hessler, 226 Mich. 311, 197 N.W. 524. The cases are distinguishable from this in that the intervening causal factor there consisted of an overt act, not a failure to act as claimed here. Defendant urges, however, that even though the intervening negligence consists only of a failure of another to act to prevent injury to plaintiff, it must be held to render his own negligence a remote rather than a proximate cause and, in law, excused, under authority of Schneider v. C. H. Little Co., 184 Mich. 315, 151 N.W. 587, and Fowles v. Briggs, 116 Mich. 425, 74 N.W. 1046, 40 L.R.A. 528. In Schneider, however, this Court said [184 Mich. 315, 151 N.W. 589], with respect to such claim, 'the cases * * * do not go so far.' This Court held, under the facts of that particular case, that the defendant was not excused by an intervening failure of another to act and, in speaking of the Fowles case and others in which the intervening negligence of another was held to excuse the initial negligence of defendant and render it only a remote cause, went on to say:

'In all of these cases, some one other than defendant had assumed a duty which, performed, would have averted the injury, or had done some act which, if properly done, would have averted it. Responsibility for proper conditions had been assumed.'

The quoted language distinguishes the instant case, in which the garage owners had not assumed a duty which they failed to perform, nor had they undertaken to do some act and performed it improperly with consequent injury to plaintiff. As said in Solomon v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732, 733:

'* * * where an act of negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, it does not cease to be a legal and proximate cause thereof because of the intervention of a subsequent act of negligence of another which contributed to the injury, if the prior act of negligence is still operating, and the injury inflicted is not different in kind from that which would have resulted from the prior act. 2 Restatement, Torts, §§ 440-442, 447 * * *.'

As for the lapse of nine hours, no authorities are cited by defendant in which it is held that the mere lapse of time between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's resultant injuries will serve to transform that which otherwise would be a proximate cause into a remote cause excusing defendant from liability. Appropriate to such situation is the following from 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 55:

'The proximate cause of an injury is not necessarily the immediate cause; not necessarily the cause nearest in time, distance, or space. Assuming that there is a direct, natural, and...

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31 cases
  • Richards v. School Dist. of City of Birmingham
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • June 3, 1957
    ...C when the facts clearly showed that A hit B and that B alone hit C. Greenwod v. Faber, 234 Mich. 217, 207 N.W. 911; Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d 805. Defendant refers to a domino-like action in the collapse of the stand and contends that plaintiff was seated on one of the last......
  • Hickey v. Zezulka
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    • January 1, 1992
    ...intervening cause jury instruction are concerned with the intervention of a third-party or outside force. See, e.g., Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d 805 (1955); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 574-575, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972) (intentional acts of a third party can be superseding ......
  • Ray v. Swager, 152723
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    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • July 31, 2017
    ......Mullins and John L. Miller ), for Eric Swager. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH Viviano, J. 501 Mich. 58 At issue is whether the conduct of defendant Eric Swager, 1 who is a government employee, 501 ... have foreseen might probably occur as the result of his negligent act.") (emphasis added); Parks v. Starks , 342 Mich. 443, 448, 70 N.W.2d 805 (1955) (" The proximate cause of an injury is not ......
  • Solomon v. Shuell
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • July 3, 1990
    ...the doctrine established a causal nexus linking the tortfeasor's negligent conduct to the rescuer's injuries. See Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d 805 (1955). Consequently, the fact that the rescuer voluntarily exposed himself to an increased risk of harm was not, as a matter of la......
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