Parks v. Utah Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 14 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 991023.,991023.
• Citation: 2002 UT 55,53 P.3d 473
• Parties: Ron PARKS and Cindy Parks, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah governmental corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

53 P.3d 473

2002 UT 55

Ron PARKS and Cindy Parks, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah governmental corporation, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 991023.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 14, 2002.

David R. Olsen, Paul M. Simmons, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Att'y Gen., Jody K. Burnett, Daniel S. McConkie, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

John P. Soltis III, Salt Lake City, for amicus Salt Lake County.

HOWE, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 In this wrongful death case, the parents of the deceased, plaintiffs Ron and Cindy Parks, appeal from an amended judgment they obtained against defendant Utah Transit Authority (UTA) that had been reduced by the trial court from $785,000 to $250,000 pursuant to section 63-30-34 of the Utah Code, which imposes a cap on damages in actions against governmental entities.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Dustin Parks was traveling west in his automobile on 4500 South in Salt Lake County. A UTA bus was traveling east on 4500 South, intending to turn left on 500 East. As the traffic light for east-west traffic turned yellow, the bus turned left in front of Dustin. His car struck the right front of the bus, killing him.

¶ 3 At trial, the jury found UTA negligent and returned a verdict awarding general damages of $387,500 to each plaintiff and $10,000 in special damages. A judgment was entered for that amount. Subsequently, UTA moved to limit the total amount of the judgment to $250,000 based on section 63-30-34(1)(a) and (b) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act). In a memorandum decision, the trial court held that UTA's activities "were governmental, as opposed to proprietary," and thus fell within the scope of the Act. It further explained that in reaching its conclusion, it had considered "the overall operations" of UTA, not the specific activity UTA was engaged in at the time of the accident. It held that a $250,000 per person limit, not a $500,000 per occurrence limit, applied and entered an amended order reducing the total judgment to $250,000. Plaintiffs appeal from the reduced judgment, assailing it on several grounds including constitutional challenges.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4 Determining the constitutionality of a statutory provision is a question of law, which this court reviews for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's conclusion. Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). The interpretation of a statute also presents a question of law, which this court reviews for correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 Plaintiffs contend that the damage cap imposed by section 63-30-34 of the Utah Code violates various provisions of the Utah Constitution. Alternatively, plaintiffs assert that the cap should be interpreted to allow each of them to recover $250,000. We will address each issue separately.

I. ARTICLE I, SECTION 11

¶ 6 Plaintiffs contend that by imposing a damage cap of $250,000 in this case, the legislature has violated article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which provides in relevant part: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, ... shall have remedy by due course of law...." Plaintiffs argue that prior to 1987, under our case law, UTA's operation would have been held to have been a proprietary function as opposed to a governmental function. Governmental entities engaged in proprietary functions did not come within the scope of the Act with its provision for a cap on damages. See, e.g., Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984) (holding that the one-year statute of limitations provided for in section 63-50-11 does not apply to actions arising from proprietary functions). However, in 1987, the legislature amended section 63-30-2(4)(a) to make all activities of governmental entities governmental functions. Thus the damage caps in the Act limited governmental entities' liability for their negligence. Consequently, plaintiffs further argue, by placing a cap on the amount of damages they can recover, the legislature has diminished and eroded the remedy plaintiffs enjoyed before the 1987 amendment. This, their argument continues, is not constitutionally permissible unless the requirements of the two-part test enunciated by this court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), are met.

¶ 7 It is unnecessary for us to here determine whether the 1987 amendment passes the scrutiny of the Berry test because we conclude that prior to the 1987 amendment, UTA's operation would have been held to have been a governmental function, and consequently, its liability would have been limited by the damage cap provision of the Act. Plaintiffs' contention that UTA's operation would have been classified as a proprietary function prior to the 1987 amendment is bottomed on their assertion that UTA operates a bus service that historically has been provided by private companies with whom UTA competes, that UTA produces revenue from its bus operations, and that UTA seeks to make a profit. To adequately answer this assertion, we must examine the essence of UTA's creation and operation.

¶ 8 For the purposes of this case, we will assume that prior to the 1987 amendment, the operation of a public transportation system by a governmental entity would have been classified as a proprietary function. See 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 813 (1999) (noting a split of authority on that point). However, UTA's genesis and the scope of its operation and activities are vastly different from traditional urban public transportation systems operated by municipalities. UTA was established as a political subdivision known as a "public transit district" pursuant to sections 17A-2-1001 to -1064 of the Utah Public Transit District Act. In section 17A-2-1002, the legislature identified the necessity and public policy in support of establishing public transit districts:

The legislature hereby finds and declares:

(1) that the predominant part of the state's population is located in its rapidly expanding metropolitan and other urban areas which generally cross the boundary lines of local jurisdictions and often extend into two or more counties;

(2) that usage of present public urban transit systems has been declining while cost of operation has been increasing, so that present public transit systems have been forced to curtail services rendered, and their plans and equipment have been deteriorating with the result that they are unable to provide the type of service needed by citizens and are unable to plan, establish and coordinate area-wide metropolitan public transit systems;

(3) that the welfare and vitality of urban areas, the satisfactory movement of people within these areas, the lessening of traffic congestion and the effectiveness of housing, tourist, highway and other governmental programs, are being jeopardized thereby; and

(4) that the problems involved in adequately furnishing public urban transportation for the present and future needs of the people of the state are of such magnitude and complexity that the various urban transit systems, municipalities and counties acting individually, lack the ability, finances and jurisdiction to resolve, establish and coordinate urban transportation.

Therefore, it is essential to establish a public agency known as a transit district which can operate in its own right and authority and exercise jurisdiction without being restricted to municipal corporate or county limits, governed by representatives of the governmental units lying within the district. It is the purpose of this part to provide the means necessary for mass transportation of persons presently and in the future.

Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1002.

¶ 9 UTA provides transit services for 61 political jurisdictions, serving approximately 1,650,000 people over 1,400 square miles in Utah, Tooele, Salt Lake, Davis, Weber, and Box Elder Counties. In addition to scheduled bus operations, it provides light rail operations and expensive Flextrans services catering to the needs of the disabled.

¶ 10 For the ten-year period from 1989 to 1998, an average of 78.5% of UTA's total revenues came from public financing, including a combination of state sales taxes and federal grants. In 1998, 79.5% of revenues came from sales tax or federal sources and only 14.5% from operating revenues. Other income was made up of interest, property sales, and other nonoperating transactions. UTA's capital expenditures are generally funded by federal grants covering 75 to 80% of costs.

¶ 11 Plaintiffs rely heavily on Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that UTA should be treated like University Hospital, as a proprietary or non-core governmental function. We note that Condemarin was a plurality opinion in which three justices, each of whom wrote separate opinions, reached the same result but did not all agree on the legal basis for that conclusion. Condemarin addressed the proprietary and governmental distinction in relation to University Hospital, but it did not do so in a manner that could be practically applied to any other governmental entity. As a result, there is limited precedential value to that opinion. Three justices concurred in the narrow holding of that opinion as encapsulated in one sentence, "[T]he holding of the Court is limited to the following: the recovery limits statutes are unconstitutional as applied to University Hospital." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366.

¶ 12 Condemarin is distinguishable from the present case on its material facts. Only 3.5% of the University Hospital's operating budget came from legislative appropriations, less than one-fourth of the cost of construction came from state sources, with the rest coming from private subscriptions and contributions, and the hospital was "practically self-supporting." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373-74. The...