Parliament House Motor Hotel v. Equal Emp. Op. Com'n
Decision Date | 07 July 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 30568.,30568. |
Citation | 444 F.2d 1335 |
Parties | PARLIAMENT HOUSE MOTOR HOTEL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant. WESTMINISTER HOUSE RESTAURANT AND LOUNGE AND GUEST HOUSE MOTEL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
David W. Zugschwerdt, Atty., Stanley P. Hebert, Gen. Counsel, Russell Specter, Julia P. Cooper, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
C. A. Powell, III, C. John Holditch, Birmingham, Ala., for Parliament House Motor Hotel.
George V. Eyraud, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for Westminister House Restaurant and Lounge and Guest Motel.
Before THORNBERRY and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges, and BOOTLE, District Judge.
Parliament House Motor Hotel, Westminister House Restaurant and Lounge, and Guest House Motel, appellees,1 filed petitions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama seeking orders setting aside Demands for Access to Evidence served on them by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The information sought by the Demands purported to relate to charges of racial discrimination filed with the EEOC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In support of the petitions, appellees asserted that the charges of discrimination were insufficiently precise to invoke the procedures of Title VII and that the EEOC's Demands were overly broad in scope. The district court determined that the charges were sufficient to trigger the EEOC's investigative procedures but modified the Demands by delimiting the scope of permissible discovery. Parliament House, Westminister House, and Guest House have not challenged the district court's decision. The EEOC, however, contends that the lower court improperly modified and limited the Demands.
The instant controversy is comprised of two actions, the Parliament House matter and the Westminister House-Guest House matter, which were consolidated and considered together by the district court. In the following discussion we have chosen to separate the two actions in the interest of clarity.
On January 20, 1969, Eloise Robinson, a Negro waitress in that portion of Parliament House's business known as "The Sidewalk Cafe," filed a charge of racial discrimination against Parliament House with the EEOC pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a). In pertinent part the charge stated, "I, Eloise Robinson, was employed at the Parliament House Motor Hotel at 420-South 20th Street, Birmingham in October, 1968. Since my employment, I along with other Negro employees have not been promoted above our present positions. As of now, I am still a waitress and other Negro employees are not being promoted above positions such as porter, dish-washers, bus boys, and maids. Yet, White employees can be hired off the street for any desired position. Although no Negro has applied for any other job, I feel if there is a vacancy they should be given an opportunity to get these positions.
"For reasons stated above, I believe that I and others have been discriminated against because of race."
The formal, sworn charge was served upon Parliament House's General Manager on March 12, 1969.3 In the course of its investigation of the alleged discrimination, the EEOC, after Parliament House had declined to furnish the Commission with certain information, served appellee with a Demand for Access to Evidence, requiring the submission of the following information:
On April 11, 1969, Parliament House petitioned the district court for an order (1) setting aside the Demand on the ground that the charge "* * * wholly fails to allege any act of discrimination but, to the contrary, discloses on its face that no unlawful employment practice has occurred," and (2) limiting the scope of the Demand. The EEOC answered and cross-petitioned for an order enforcing the Demand. Although the district court rejected the attack on the validity of the charge, a determination not here challenged, the court accepted appellee's contention that the Demand was unduly broad. Noting that complainant Robinson was employed in "The Sidewalk Cafe" sphere of appellee's business, the trial court determined that the only records relevant to the charge were those concerning that one department.
On January 6, 1969, Willie Lee Harris, a Negro, filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Commission, alleging that Westminister House, which was wholly owned by Guest House, had, because of his race, discharged him (on December 26, 1968) from his employment as a pot washer. The charge, which was not verified by oath at the time of filing, was perfected on March 11, 1969, and served upon the Resident Manager and Manager, respectively, of Westminister House and Guest House on March 13 and 14, 1969. When the parties refused to grant the Commission access to any employment records other than those of Harris, the EEOC served both parties with a Demand for Access to Evidence, requiring the submission of the following information:
On April 11, 1968, Westminster House and Guest House petitioned the district court for an order (1) setting aside the Demand on the ground that the charge "* * * wholly fails to allege any act of discrimination * * * and fails to `set forth the facts upon which it is based * * *,'" and (2) limiting the scope of the Demand. The EEOC answered and cross-petitioned for an order enforcing the Demand. The district court upheld the validity of the charge, a ruling not here challenged, but limited the Demand to records held by Westminister House. In addition to excluding Guest House from the inquiry, the district court refused to grant the EEOC permission to discover documents evidencing a sale of Westminister House by Guest House.
The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the EEOC's Demands were improperly modified and limited by the district court. We begin our consideration of this question by focusing on the Commission's investigatory powers, which are set forth in the following two sections of Title VII:4
While the EEOC cannot engage in a "wholesale fishing expedition," it is clearly entitled to discover any information relevant to the charge under investigation. The query is whether this standard was properly applied in the proceeding below.
Viewing complainant Robinson's charge of racial discrimination as limited to Parliament House's hiring and promotion policies in its Sidewalk Cafe department, the district court refused to order the production of information relating to any employees other than those employed in that department. The EEOC argues that the lower court's determination of relevance was predicated on an unduly narrow construction of the scope of the charge. We agree. Once a charge of discrimination has been held sufficient to invoke the procedures of Title VII, the court must very carefully scrutinize the charge to determine the complete substance of the aggrieved party's allegations. Often, of course, the charge will not constitute a textbook example of precision pleading, but courts have refused to exalt form over substance in the area of civil rights.5 Mindful of the "remedial and humanitarian underpinning" of Title VII,6 and in the belief that the Civil Rights Act of...
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