Parlier v. Casteen

• Decision Date: 26 May 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-00085-RLV-DCK
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: JAMES LEE PARLIER, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL (D/B/A JIMMY PARLIER HORSE TRANSPORT, PARLIER FARMS, AND PARLIER EQUINE TRANSPORT & CARRIAGES), Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, v. BRENDA CASTEEN, ET AL., Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff.

JAMES LEE PARLIER, JR.,AN INDIVIDUAL (D/B/A JIMMY PARLIER HORSE TRANSPORT, PARLIER FARMS,AND PARLIER EQUINE TRANSPORT & CARRIAGES), Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, v. BRENDA CASTEEN, ET AL., Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-00085-RLV-DCK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA STATESVILLE DIVISION

May 26, 2016

ORDER

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Brenda Casteen's (hereinafter, "Casteen") original and renewed Motions to Dismiss and for Contempt, Sanctions, and Attorneys' Fees (collectively, the "Motion"). [Doc. No. 66]; [Doc. No. 71]. In her Motion, Casteen also moved for default judgment against Plaintiff (hereinafter, "Parlier"), and requested that this Court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine damages. See [Doc. No. 66] at p. 3; [Doc. No. 71] at p. 3. On February 25, 2016, the Court granted the Motion, in-part, and placed Parlier in default as to Casteen's amended counterclaim (Doc. No. 44). See [Doc. No. 72]. The Court deferred consideration of the remainder of the Motion until an evidentiary hearing could be held for the dual purposes of entering a default judgment and awarding damages. Id. A hearing on Parlier's default was subsequently held before this Court on April 7, 2016. For the reasons that follow, default judgment in favor of Casteen and against Parlier is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.

I. DISCUSSION¹

A. Standard of Review

The entry of default judgment is governed by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in relevant part, that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once a default is entered, a party seeking affirmative relief may seek a default judgment against the defaulting party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Both a default and a default judgment may be ordered by the court as a sanction under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(b)(2)(iii)&(vi).

Upon entry of default, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted all well-plead allegations of fact contained in a counterclaim. Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) ("An allegation - other than one relating to the amount of damages - is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied."). However, the defaulting party is not deemed to have admitted conclusions of law, and the entry of "default is not treated as an absolute confession by the [defaulting party] of his liability and of the [claimant's] right to recover." Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780 (quoting Nishimatsu Const. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206). Rather, in determining whether to enter judgment on the default, the court must determine whether the counterclaim's well-plead allegations support the relief sought. See Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780; see also Silvers v. Iredell Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13865, at *9-21 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2016) (Voorhees, J.) ("[W]hen reviewing a motion for defaultjudgment, this Court must examine the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the . . . complaint [in accordance with Twombly and Iqbal]."); accord 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civ. § 2688 (3d ed. Supp. 2015) ("[L]iability is not deemed established simply because of the default and the court, in its discretion, may require some proof of the facts that must be established in order to determine liability.").

If the court finds that liability has been established, it must then determine damages. See Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780-81; Arista Records LLC v. Gaines, 635 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416-18 (E.D.N.C. 2009). Such a determination requires an independent examination of the evidence, and the court must not accept mere allegations of damages as being sufficient. See, e.g., SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422 (D. Md. 2005). Under Rule 55 and established law, the court may sit to determine any damages owed to the claimant due to another party's default.² See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(2). In so doing, the court may rely on hearing testimony, affidavits, or documentary record evidence to determine the appropriate amount of damages. See id.; see also Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944) ("It is a familiar practice and an exercise of judicial power for a court upon default, by taking evidence when necessary or by computation from facts of record, to fix theamount which the [claimant] is lawfully entitled to recover and to give judgment accordingly."); EEOC v. North Am. Land Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78928, at *4-6 (W.D.N.C. 2010).

B. The Material and Well-Plead Facts Admitted by Parlier's Default

This action arises out of certain wrongs alleged to have occurred during Parlier and Casteen's personal and business dealings.³ In 2009, Casteen purchased a Peruvian Paso Mare horse named Allie ("Allie") from Parlier. [Doc. No. 44] at p. 14 (¶ 1). In November 2011, Casteen purchased a Belgian/Percheron Cross Mare horse named Ruby ("Ruby"), a Belgian Draft Mare horse named Buttercup ("Buttercup"), and a Bay Mare Mule named Maggie ("Maggie"). Id. at pp. 14-15 (¶¶ 3, 7, 10). Thereafter, Parlier and Casteen entered into an agreement whereby Parlier would sell both Ruby and Buttercup and later divide the proceeds from the sales with Casteen. Id. at pp. 14-15 (¶¶ 4, 8). The parties also entered into an agreement whereby Parlier would sell Maggie, reimburse Casteen for the costs associated with Maggie's purchase, and later divide the proceeds from the sale with Casteen. Id. at pp. 15 (¶ 11). Rather than place either Ruby or Buttercup up for sale, Parlier reneged on his deal with Casteen, retained possession of the horses, and began using them as part of Parlier Equine Transport and Carriages (the "Carriage Business"), a business operated by Parlier. Id. at pp. 14-15 (¶¶ 5-6, 9). Parlier did, however, broker a sale of Maggie; yet, following the transaction, Casteen was not reimbursed for her costs, and the balance of the proceeds from the sale were not shared with her. Id. at p. 15 (¶ 12). Parlier also retained possession of Allie without Casteen's permission. Id. at p. 21 (¶¶ 112-114).

In addition to the above, Parlier agreed to sell another of Casteen's horses; however, in that instance, the parties ultimately decided that Parlier would grant Casteen possession of a Draft Gelding Horse named Jameson ("Jameson") in lieu of splitting the proceeds from the sale. See [Doc. No. 44] at p. 15 (¶¶ 13-16). In brokering this trade (the "Jameson trade"), Parlier represented to Casteen that Jameson was of equal value to the horse being sold, and provided documentation showing Jameson to be five (5) years old at the time of the transaction. Id. at p. 15 (¶¶ 17-20). However, Parlier forged Jameson's documentation and it was later discovered that the horse was actually between twelve (12) and fourteen (14) years old. Id. at pp. 15-16 (¶¶ 21-22, 34).

During the above-discussed dealings, Parlier and Casteen were involved in a romantic relationship, which began in July 2011. [Doc. No. 44] at p. 14 (¶ 2). Over the course of that relationship, Casteen kept her horses, including Allie, Ruby, Buttercup, and Jameson, at Parlier's barn.⁴ Id. at p. 15 (¶ 23). On June 1, 2012, the parties terminated their romantic relationship. Id. at p. 16 (¶ 24). At that time, Casteen attempted to leave Parlier's home with her horses. Id. at p. 16 (¶ 25). Parlier initially refused to allow Casteen or her horses leave; however, he eventually relented and allowed Casteen to return to her apartment with some of her belongings. Id. at p. 16 (¶¶ 26-27). Over Casteen's objections, Parlier retained custody of Allie, Ruby, and Buttercup. Id. at p. 16 (¶¶ 29-33).

This action was subsequently filed on May 29, 2014. See [Doc. No. 2]. On October 9, 2014, Casteen filed her amended counterclaim against Parlier. [Doc. No. 44]. The amended counterclaim alleges several causes of action against Parlier, including (1) claim and delivery; (2) breach of contract; (3) implied contract/quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; (4) conversion; (5) possessionof personal property; (6) fraud; (7) unfair and deceptive trade practices; (8) punitive damages; (9) battery; (10) assault; (11) false imprisonment; and (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Doc. No. 44]. By way of this Court's June 8, 2015 Order, Parlier returned Allie to Casteen. See [Doc. No. 62]; see also [Doc. No. 72] at p. 2 (¶ 9) (testimony from Casteen regarding the return of Allie). Subsequently, on February 25, 2016, the Court found Parlier in default on Casteen's amended counterclaim. [Doc. No. 72]. This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on April 7, 2016 regarding Parlier's default. At that hearing, arguments were heard from counsel,⁵ evidence was submitted for the Court's consideration, and Casteen's testimony was admitted by way of affidavit.

In her affidavit, Casteen admits that Allie was returned to her by order of the Court. [Doc. No. 72] at p. 2 (¶ 9). She testifies that both Ruby and Buttercup are worth $1,750.00 each. Id. at p. 2 (¶ 5). She does not demand the return of either Ruby or Buttercup. Id. at p. 2 (¶ 13). Casteen further testifies that Maggie's purchase price "was $1,612.50." Id. at p. 2 (¶ 7). Casteen also testifies that Jameson was not five (5) years old at the time of the trade, as Parlier represented to her, but that the horse was, in actuality, between twelve (12) and fourteen (14) years old. Id. at p. 2 (¶ 8). She testifies that, as a result of this fraud in trade, she lost $1,000.00 in value. Id.

Consequently, Casteen seeks liquidated damages against Parlier as follows:...