Paroczay v. Hodges
Decision Date | 26 June 1963 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 3085-60. |
Citation | 219 F. Supp. 89 |
Parties | Ernest PAROCZAY, Plaintiff, v. Luther H. HODGES, individually and as Secretary of Commerce of the United States, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., Charles T. Duncan, Principal Asst. U. S. Atty., Joseph M. Hannon, Gil Zimmerman, Asst. U. S. Attys., for defendants.
The prior history of this case is fully set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals of December 28, 1961. Paroczay v. Hodges, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 362, 297 F.2d 439 (1961). Following the decision of the Court of Appeals, the case was remanded to the District Court, which on March 20, 1962, remanded the case to the Civil Service Commission "with directions to conduct further administrative proceedings, including an oral hearing, not inconsistent with the aforesaid opinion of the Court of Appeals * * *." The opinion of the Court of Appeals indicated that the sole issue in the case is whether the plaintiff's resignation of February 17, 1960, from the Department of Commerce was voluntary or involuntary. If the resignation was voluntarily given, then plaintiff has no right to the reinstatement in government employment which he seeks in this law suit. If the resignation was involuntarily given, however, then plaintiff's separation from government employment constituted a discharge, and he would be entitled to certain procedural rights under the Veterans' Preference Act, 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 364, n. 4, 297 F.2d at 441, including the right to respond on the merits to certain charges made against him. Upon remand to the Civil Service Commission, the Appeals Examining Office held a hearing and concluded, in an opinion filed June 7, 1962, that the resignation was voluntary. This decision was affirmed by the Commission's Board of Appeals and Review on January 15, 1963. Both plaintiff and defendants have now moved for summary judgment in this Court.1
In reversing the earlier conclusion of the District Court to the effect that the resignation was voluntary, the Court of Appeals noted that there were conflicting affidavits relating to the issue of voluntariness and that this precluded summary judgment. 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 363, 297 F.2d at 440, 441. One of these affidavits was made by Mr. Davis, a personnel officer of the Department of Commerce. The other was made by the plaintiff. These affidavits described conversations between these two men on February 16 and 17, 1960. Concerning these affidavits, the Court of Appeals stated:
Implicit in this holding by the Court of Appeals must be the conclusion that if the facts as related by the plaintiff are substantially true, then plaintiff would be entitled to summary judgment.
On the basis of this testimony, the Board of Appeals and Review concluded that on February 16 the plaintiff "must certainly have understood that charges looking to his removal would be preferred without delay as soon as Mr. Davis received a written report from the Security Control Office * * *." There is no reason to disturb this finding of the Board of Appeals and Review, since the crucial finding required by the Court of Appeals — that plaintiff received no suggestion of necessity for an immediate decision — is not controverted. When plaintiff left Mr. Davis on February 16 he knew that he could prevent charges being filed by resigning, but there was no indication that on the next day he would be faced with the need for an immediate decision. Indeed, the interview of the next day was sought by the plaintiff, not by Mr. Davis. Some urgency there was, of course; but plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, that the night between February 16 and February 17 would be his sole chance to consult family or others for advice.
As to the events of February 17, it is undisputed that on the morning of that day plaintiff came to see Mr. Davis to deny the derogatory allegations which he had admitted the day before. Plaintiff's version of the conversation, as quoted by the Court of Appeals from his affidavit, was as follows:
(quoted at 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 363-364, 297 F.2d at 440).
At the hearing before the Appeals Examining Office, the following answers were given by Mr. Davis to questions propounded by plaintiff's attorney relating to whether the above-quoted account of plaintiff was substantially correct:
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...10 111 U.S.App.D.C. 362, 297 F.2d 439 (1961). 11 58 Stat. 390 (1944), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1958) (now § 7701). 12 Paroczay v. Hodges, 219 F.Supp. 89, 90 (1963). 13 123 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 358 F.2d 533 (1965). 14 Id. at 167, 358 F.2d at 534. 15 Id. at 168, 358 F.2d at 535. 16 Id. 17 Id.......
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