Parodi v. American President Lines, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1967
• Docket Number: No. 29582.,29582.
• Citation: 269 F. Supp. 696,1967 AMC 2378
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Vincent PARODI, Libelant and Cross-Respondent, v. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., a corporation, Respondent and Cross-Libelant.

269 F. Supp. 696

1967 AMC 2378

Vincent PARODI, Libelant and Cross-Respondent, v. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., a corporation, Respondent and Cross-Libelant.

No. 29582.

United States District Court N. D. California.

June 22, 1967.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Nichols, Rogers & Hamilton, San Francisco, Cal., for libelant.

Lillick, Geary, Wheat, Adams & Charles, San Francisco, Cal., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GEORGE B. HARRIS, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, a fifty year old, immigrant seaman of French extraction, filed an admiralty libel in October, 1965, pursuant to the provisions of 46 U.S.C. § 688 et seq. and the principles of General Maritime Law, requesting that this court set aside and declare a legal nullity a document titled "Release of All Claims and Demands," executed on January 31, 1964, between himself and defendant, American President Lines, for a consideration of $3,500, and that he be declared free to litigate his claim for alleged personal injuries encompassed within said release. The defendant filed a cross-libel denying any liability for the alleged injuries and pleading the general release as a bar to the asserted cause of action.

Accordingly, and pursuant to the stipulation of both parties, a court trial was had on the sole and preliminary issue of whether the release is legally vital and binding on the parties so as to effectively estop the plaintiff from proceeding with this suit for damages.

The plaintiff is ostensibly a man of little formal education having terminated his schooling in France at the age of thirteen to follow the sea. He came to this country in 1942 as a member of the crew of a French vessel which was surrendered to the United States. From that time until July, 1964, he sailed aboard various American merchant ships in unskilled ratings.

In October, 1962, plaintiff was employed by the American President Lines to work aboard the SS President Monroe as a wiper. It was during this voyage that he claims he received work-related injuries to his groin and back that form the basis of the release in question. Pursuant to the issuance of an appropriate master's certificate, plaintiff sought medical treatment at the United States Public Health Service Hospital commencing on July 3, 1963, at which time he was marked "not fit for duty" and referred to the surgical clinic with a preliminary diagnosis of a right inguinal hernia. He returned to the clinic on July 12, 1963, also complaining of low back pain. Subsequently, he was operated on for the hernia and marked "fit for duty" in respect thereto, as of September 10, 1963.

On September 20, 1963, he was examined at the Orthopedic Clinic concerning the back pains and marked preliminarily "unfit for duty" pending further examination. That duty status was continued until December 9, 1963, when plaintiff was given a "not fit for duty indefinitely" slip with no return appointment.

Upon receipt of this information, and because of the unique nature of the classification, defendant had plaintiff examined by its own orthopedic surgeon and radiologist who submitted their findings to President Lines in January, 1964. Shortly thereafter, a release was executed, and on February 3, 1964, plaintiff returned to the Public Health Service Hospital where he was marked "fit for duty-no return."

Plaintiff subsequently joined the crew of the SS President Wilson as an engine room maintenance man and worked thereon until July, 1964, when he was repatriated to San Francisco because of another alleged injury to his back. He was treated for this back condition until January, 1965, when he was declared permanently not fit for duty with a diagnosis of a "congenitally weak back, chronic lumbosacral strain." Following, plaintiff was examined by the California State Department of Rehabilitation for possible retraining, with negative results.

From this summary of events, we now turn to the applicable law. The question, being one that affects the rights of a seaman under the Maritime law, is governed by and must be resolved in accord with those principles developed and refined by Federal Courts, which have traditionally and jealously sought to safeguard the rights of seamen who "* * * are emphatically the wards of the admiralty; and though not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated in the same manner as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their expectancies, wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trust with their trustees. * * * If there is any undue inequality in the terms, any disproportion in the bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side which are not compensated by extraordinary benefits on the other, the judicial interpretation of the transaction is that the bargain is unjust and unreasonable, that advantage has been taken of the situation of the weaker party, and that pro tanto the bargain ought to be set aside as inequitable." Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed.Cas. No. 6047, at pp. 480, 485.

The burden rests as such upon one who asserts that a seaman has bargained away by way of release his rights to what may be due him, to demonstrate that the release "* * * was executed freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full understanding of his rights. The adequacy of the consideration and the nature of the medical and legal advice available to the seaman at the time of signing the release are relevant to an appraisal of this understanding." Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248, 63 S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942).

These controlling pronouncements serve then as the judicial yardstick against which the court must measure the facts as developed by the parties through both oral and documentary evidence so that an accurate and just determination regarding the validity of the release may be reached.

Since plaintiff has conceded that no one "at President Lines deliberately defrauded or over-reached" him in regard to the release negotiations (Plaintiff's trial brief, p. 6), and since no evidence was produced at trial to indicate contra, it is concluded that the release was in fact executed voluntarily "without deception or coercion," notwithstanding the suggestion on direct examination that plaintiff was hard pressed financially, at the time he signed the release. (Tr. p. 41) Moreover, any financial pressure which libelant was under at the time of settlement was not known to respondent's representatives.

The initial inquiry relates herein to whether plaintiff fully comprehended his rights, the significance of the release, and the claims surrendered by him therein, and by acting alone and without the aid of counsel, "* * * has intelligence enough fully to understand the situation and the risk he takes in giving up the right to prosecute his claim * * *." Sitchon v. Amer. Export Lines, Inc., 113 F.2d 830, 832 (2nd Cir. 1940).

It was brought out during plaintiff's testimony that he was practically unschooled formally; that he had an IQ range of between 78 and 88 placing him intellectually in the dull-normal range; and that he was illiterate, at least in the English language. (Exh. 1, report of Dr. Wolton) Plaintiff further testified as follows:

"Q. Mr. Wilson? All right. Did you believe and understand that you were signing a release for hernia?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. Did you believe or understand that you were signing a release for your back?

"A. No.

"Q. How much money did President Lines give you when you signed that release?

"A. Thirty-five hundred.

"Q. $3,500?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Would you have signed that paper if you believed you were selling your back?

"A. No. (Tr. p. 30)

"The Court: What did you understand when you signed the paper?

"The Witness: I understand I sign this paper only for my release for hernia, because when I sign I ask Mr. Wilson (Watson) was my condition to my back. He told me, `nothing is wrong with your back,' so I sign, because, like I say, I believe Mr. Wilson (Watson). I am handicap for English. I am very proud myself, too, to be in this country and I have to talk to people." (Tr. p. 31)

The sketch thus drawn by counsel seemingly reveals a seaman who was not able and in fact did not fully comprehend the essence of the bargain he made. Harmon v. United States, 59 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1932). The finished portrait, however, depicts quite a different person, one possessed of adequate native ability, and one who had full knowledge and understanding of the situation and of what he was signing. As aptly stated by another Federal court, "He was personally a man of mature years and fair intelligence and from previous experience was not unfamiliar with the subject of releases in settlement of claims for personal injuries * * *." Haddock v. North Atlantic & Gulf SS. Co., 81 F.Supp. 421, 425 (D.C. Md.1948).

The plaintiff's awareness and comprehension was illustrated on the witness stand. He had little difficulty in following questions and understanding their significance. In fact he refused to answer inquiries on cross-examination related to prior injuries and settlement thereof and had to be instructed by his own counsel to so answer. (Tr. p. 75) Furthermore, plaintiff was certainly not a novice at the bargaining table, nor was he unfamiliar with releases. On August 12, 1955, he executed a release with Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., in the amount of $5,500 for head injuries sustained aboard the SS. Fleetwood. On that occasion he was represented by counsel who he declared had explained the meaning of the document to him. (Exh. B)

Again, in 1961, plaintiff had occasion to participate in negotiations, this time with President Lines, for the adjustment of a personal injury claim emanating from his work aboard the SS. President Hayes. In this regard, Mr. Watson, a senior claims adjuster employed by defendant, testified that he suggested settlement to the plaintiff in February, 1961, but that plaintiff was not receptive to...