Parr v. Pinson

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CARLEY; BANKE, P.J., and BENHAM
• Citation: Parr v. Pinson, 356 S.E.2d 740, 182 Ga.App. 707 (Ga. App. 1987)
• Decision Date: 23 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 73806,73806
• Parties: PARR et al. v. PINSON.

Page 740

356 S.E.2d 740

182 Ga.App. 707

PARR et al. v. PINSON.

No. 73806.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 23, 1987.

Roger E. Bradley, Blue Ridge, for appellants.

R. Clay Porter, Atlanta, for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

Appellants Mr. and Mrs. Parr brought this action to recover for damages allegedly resulting from a collision between automobiles driven by Mrs. Parr and appellee. Mrs. Parr sought to recover for personal injuries which she contends were sustained in the collision. Mr. Parr sought to recover for loss of consortium. Following a jury trial, a verdict was returned in appellee's favor and judgment was entered thereon.

1. Appellants enumerate the general grounds. The evidence was conflicting, and did not demand a verdict in appellants' favor. "Questions of negligence, diligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are peculiarly matters for the jury, and this case was not so plain and indisputable as to justify invading the jury's province. [Cit.] There being some evidence to support the jury's verdict, we will uphold the judgment. [Cit.]" Rossville Apts. Co. v. Britton, 178 Ga.App. 194, 196(2), 342 S.E.2d 504 (1986). This court considers only the sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight. Foster v. Morrison, 177 Ga.App. 250, 252(6), 339 S.E.2d 307 (1985). The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

2. The trial court's giving of a charge to the jury on negligence per se, in general, and on OCGA § 40-6-180, in specific, is enumerated as error.

Evidence was adduced at trial which would authorize a finding that Mrs. Parr drove over the crest of a hill at forty miles per hour. She was familiar with the narrow dirt and gravel road on which she was driving and knew that there was a blind driveway several feet past the crest of the hill. Mrs. Parr was unable to stop before colliding with the rear of appellee's car as it was pulling into the driveway. "No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistently with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a reasonable and prudent speed ... when approaching and traversing a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazards exist with respect to ... other traffic or by reason of ... highway conditions." OCGA § 40-6-180. Evidence as to Mrs. Parr's 40-mile-per-hour speed under the existing circumstances authorized a charge on OCGA § 40-6-180. Cohran v. Douglasville Concrete Prods., 153 Ga.App. 8, 11-12(2), 264 S.E.2d 507 (1980). See also Exum v. Long, 157 Ga.App. 592, 594-95(3), 278 S.E.2d 13 (1981). Violation of this Code section is negligence per se. Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga.App. 214, 226-27(4), 176 S.E.2d 715 (1970). The charge as given by the trial court was a correct statement of the law and was adjusted to the evidence. There was no error.

3. Appellants enumerate as error the trial court's giving of a charge on comparative negligence. For the reasons set out in Division 2, the jury was authorized to find that Mrs. Parr's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. " 'The amount of evidence which makes [a charge on plaintiff's negligence] appropriate ... need not be great. It is sufficient if there is slight evidence...