Parr v. Spartanburg

• Decision Date: 19 February 1895
• Citation: 20 S.E. 1009,43 S.C. 197
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: PARR . v. SPARTANBURG, U. & C. R. CO.

20 S.E. 1009

43 S.C. 197

PARR .

v.SPARTANBURG, U. & C. R. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 19, 1895.

Lease or Railroad—Negligence of Lessee's Receiver.

A railroad company which has leased its line to another company is liable for injuries caused in the operation of the road, though it is being operated by receivers appointed for the lessee.

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Fairfield county; Ernest Gary, Judge.

Action by Henry L. Parr against the Spartanburg, Union & Columbia Railroad Company to recover damages for the negligent killing of a mule colt. From an affirmance by the circuit court of a judgment of a trial justice for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. S. Cothran and W. D. Douglass, for appellant.

Ragsdale & Ragsdale, for respondent.

POPE, J. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant before Jos. McMeekin, Esq., a trial justice in and for Fairfield county, in June, 1893, for $95 damages for the negligent killing of plaintiff's mule colt. The defendant denied any liability for the tort, on the ground that it had leased its railroad to the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company, which latter company had, under the order of the United States circuit court, been put into the hands of receivers, who were operating such leased road at the time the mule colt was killed. The trial justice overruled the defense, and gave plaintiff his judgment for $95. Thereupon the defendant appealed to the circuit court upon two grounds: First, that it was not liable for any tort while its property was managed by receivers of its lessee; second, that plaintiff had failed to prove ownership of the mule colt. This appeal came to be heard before the Honorable Ernest Gary, as presiding judge, who overruled both grounds of appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the trial justice. From this judgment the defendant now appeals to this court, upon the single ground that it cannot be held liable for this tort, which occurred while its property was in the hands of receivers of its lessee, under the appointment of the United States circuit court.

We have been very much interested by the clear and able argument of the counsel for appellant. He frankly admits that under the authority of the cases of National Bank v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 25 S. C. 222, and Harmon v. Railroad Co., 28 S. C. 401, 5 S. E. 835, re-enforced by the case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 450, he cannot contend that if the defendant railroad were in the hands of its lessee, the Richmond & Danville Railway Company, it would not be liable to the plaintiff for this tort Yet he contends that, when defendant's property passed into the hands of receivers of its lessee, the defendant ceased to be liable for torts that occurred while such receivers had control of its property, and that the plaintiff must apply to the court, whose servants the receivers are, for his relief. It seems that the defendant was not a party to the suit in the United States circuit court, when receivers were appointed to take charge of and operate lessee's property. The respondent here suggests that this presents a barrier to the assertion by the defendant of its release of responsibility for this tort; that these receivers of the Richmond & Danville Railway Company are in no sense its (defendant's) receivers; therefore that, granting that the Richmond & Danville Railway Company as a corporation, is not liable for any torts occurring while its...