Parran v. Wetzel

Decision Date23 March 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. 3:14-CV-1522
PartiesRANDAL EUGENE PARRAN, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZEL, et al., Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Judge Munley)

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Ronald Eugene Parran ("Parran" or "plaintiff"), at all times relevant an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill ("SCI-Camp Hill"), commenced this action on August 14, 2014. (Doc. 1). The matter is proceeding via an amended complaint (Doc. 14) filed on November 25, 2014. Named as Defendants are the following individuals collectively referred to as the Commonwealth defendants: Tamika Byrd ("Byrd"), Joe Francis ("Francis"), Laurel Harry ("Harry"), Timothy Henry ("Henry"), Richard Hibshmen ("Hibshmen"), Brian Hoerner ("Hoerner"), John Horner ("Horner"), Adam Huber ("Huber"), Todd E. Leedom ("Leedom"), Paul Leggore ("Leggore"), Lewis ("Lewis"), Robin Lewis ("R. Lewis"), James A. Meintel ("Meintel"), Bettylou Mihal ("Mihal"), Keri Moore ("K. Moore"), Scott Moore ("S. Moore"), Stephan Noll ("Noll"), Kristen Reisinger ("Reisinger"), Edwin Shoop ("Shoop"), James Simms ("Simms"), Anthony Stern ("Stern"), David Swartz ("Swartz"), Cole Taylor ("Taylor"), Dorina Varner ("Varner"), John E. Wetzel ("Wetzel"), Scott Whalen ("Whalen"), Tracey Williams ("Williams"), and Kathleen Zwierzyna ("Zwierzyna").1 Also named as a defendant is Dr. Theordoor Voorstad ("Voorstad"). Additionally named as defendants are "Gonzales" and "Little" or "Littles." Although these defendants have not been served, Parran will be afforded time to provide the Court with additional information to effect service on these defendants.

Presently pending are the Commonwealth defendants motion (Doc. 30) to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Voorstad's motion to dismiss (Doc. 42) the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, the Commonwealth defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part; Voorstad's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part and the motion for summary judgment will be deemed unopposed and granted.

I. Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept as true all [factual] allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Kanter v. Barella, 489F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). Although the court is generally limited in its review to the facts contained in the complaint, it "may also consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, "the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id.; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the well-pleaded factual allegations have been isolated, the court must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level"). A claim "has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. Allegations of the Complaint

Parran states that "[t]his is a civil rights action file[d] under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985, 42 U.S.C. 1986." (Doc. 14, ¶ 1). He initially alleges that "[t]he issues outline[d] in this complaint took place from Dec. 7, 2012 to Jan. 4, 2013, 27 days, all simultaneously right behind the other by different employees/officials/and medical officials, which was a conspiracy (directly and indirectly) to retaliate and punish unlawfully Parran, because of his religion/speech activities which the deprivations of constitutional rights secured by the United States Constitution by all named Defendants named in this complaint." (Id. at 8).

On December 7, 2012, while housed in the Special Management Unit ("SMU"), A-Pod, Parran allegedly had a conversation with other inmates during which he revealed that he was a "Muslim, Follower of Messenger Elijah Muhammad" and stated that every black person is a Muslim and that "we were rob [sic] of everything by white people, our culture, religion, etc. They hung us from trees, set us on fire, and that white people don't care for human life and that they all are devils." (Id. at 9- 10). He alleges that defendant Mihal, Byrd, and Little overheard the statements and "[e]ven though Parran was not talking to them (Mihul [sic], Little, or Byrd) or about them they (Mihul, Littles and Byrd) conspire amongst themselves/each other and with Taylor and Houser and other SMU officers to deprive Parran of his [First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment] constitutional rights which lead [sic] to the incidents/violations outline[d] in this complaint." (Id. at 11-13, 61-65). Byrd allegedly returned to A-pod, commented that "All Muslims are going to burn in hell," andslammed the food wicket on Parran's hand. (Id. at 14). He alleges that Byrd's conduct violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights and that defendants Mihal, Little and Taylor conspired to conceal Byrd's misconduct in that they failed to report Parran's allegation of Byrd's abuse. (Id. at 15-18). He alleges that defendant Huber retaliated against him by destroying religious texts because of his "color, religion, or speech." (Id. at 33). He also alleges that Mihal, Little and Taylor violated his Equal Protection rights when they made derogatory statements about his religion and that Byrd retaliated against him "because of his color/religion/speech" in filing a false misconduct report for refusing to obey an order and using abusive language against him. (Id. at 19, 21).

With respect to the false report, he contends that the disciplinary hearing officer defendant Reisinger conspired with Sergeant Thomas to deny him Equal Protection of the laws. (Id. at 24). He further avers that Reisinger violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when she found him guilty of the charged conduct. (Id.)

Parran alleges that between the dates of December 10, 2012, and December 19, 2012, defendant Hibshmen, Huber, Little, Mihal, Taylor, Stern, and Swartz, conspired to deprive him of "sheets, blankets, toilet paper, food, towels, etc." for nine days because of his "color, Religion, or speech." (Id. at 26). Further, from December 12, 2012, through December 16, 2012, defendants Gonzales, Hibshmen, Lewis, Mihal, Swartz, and Taylor retaliated against him because of his "color, Religion, or speech" by using food as punishment and starving him. (Id. at 28).

He alleges that defendants Whalen, Zwierzyna, and Horner, members of the ProgramReview Committee, conspired to cover up his reports of SMU officers' deliberate indifference to his serious mental illness and violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to take corrective action against the SMU officers. (Id. at 30-32).

Parran alleges that the SMU officers' deliberate indifference to his serious mental illness caused him to stop eating. (Id. at 34). On December 24, 2012, the DOC successfully obtained an emergency court order allowing them to administer a feeding tube and "force feed [him] due to immediate life threatening conditions to his physical health." (Id. at 35). On December 25, 2012, SMU officers, including defendant Leedom, allegedly removed him from the medical unit and returned him to the SMU even though he still had the feeding tube, and placed him in a cell covered with feces. (Id. at 37-38). He contends that he was deprived of soap, sheets, and a blanket and was "freezing, shaking and shivering and coughing up blood throughout the days and nights." (Id. at 39-40). He alleges this was part of a conspiracy among defendants Leedom, Lewis, Mihal, Taylor, Hibshmen, and Swartz to deprive him of his constitutional rights because of his "color, Religion, speech activities." (Id. at 38).

From December 25, 2012, through December 28, 2012, he alleges that, despite voicing complaints of coughing up blood to SMU officers and defendant Voorstad, he continued to be force-fed. (Id. at 41-44). He was taken to the hospital on the morning of December 29, 2012, and transported back to SCI-Camp Hill by day's end and placed back in the SMU. (Id. at 47-48). He alleges that defendants Gonzales, Hoerner, Lewis, Mihal, Hibshmen, Taylor, Francis and other SMU officers conspired to deprive him of hisconstitutional rights when ...

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