Parrino v. Landon

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MAXWELL; BRISTOW
• Citation: Parrino v. Landon, 8 Ill.2d 468, 134 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. 1956)
• Decision Date: 22 March 1956
• Docket Number: No. 33803,33803
• Parties: Joseph PARRINO et al., Appellees, v. Margaret LANDON et al. (Elmer R. Pike, Appellant.)

Page 311

134 N.E.2d 311

8 Ill.2d 468

Joseph PARRINO et al., Appellees, v. Margaret LANDON et al. (Elmer R. Pike, Appellant.)

No. 33803.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 22, 1956.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 22, 1956.

Rathje & Woodward, Wheaton (John S. Woodward, Wheaton, of counsel), for appellant.

Lloyd C. Moody, Chicago (William C. Wines, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

MAXWELL, Justice.

Leave to appeal has been granted for the purpose of reviewing a default judgment for substantial sums for plaintiffs, Joseph and Marjorie Parrino, rendered in the circuit court of Du Page County and affirmed in the Second District Appellate Court. Suit was originally brought against the appellant, Elmer R. Pike, and Margaret Landon for injuries and damages suffered in an automobile collision. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that defendant Landon drove the automobile of defendant Pike with the latter's knowledge and consent and that Landon was negligent in various respects.

Landon was never served with process but Pike was served. Pike did not enter his appearance and a default judgment was entered against him. After the court heard the evidence as to the occurrence, the nature and extent of the injuries and damages of plaintiffs, Pike's ownership of the automobile and his knowledge and permission relative to his sister, Landon, driving the car immediately prior to the collision in question, the damages were assessed. Although a second count based on alleged wilful and wanton misconduct was included, neither the Appellate Court nor this court regard reference to it as of importance in the decision of this case. The complaint joined the owner and the permissive user of the automobile, alleged misconduct of only the driver, contained no express allegation of a principal-and-agent or master-and-servant relationship, averred knowledge and permission on the part of Pike and prayed for damages against both Pike and Landon. The specific point for decision presented is whether such allegations of a complaint will sustain a default judgment against the defendant Pike.

Grounds for reversal of the judgment are reassertions of the substance of the dissenting opinion below. Contrariwise, plaintiffs restate the pronouncements of the majority opinion. See, 6 Ill.App.2d 375, 128 N.E.2d 356. In final analysis there appears to be a basic agreement in both opinions as to the fundamental rules of law which are applicable to the problem. As is often the case, there exists a sharp difference as to the application and interpretation in a specific situation. After a thorough examination of the cited and other authorities on the question we feel it is not an over-simplification of the problem to state at the outset that had the author of the complaint (in referring to defendant Landon) inserted the words 'as the authorized agent and servant of the defendant Pike,' there could have been no objection on the part of Pike. (And presumably Pike then would have appeared by motion or otherwise for his defense on the merits in respect to the question of his liability.) The issue then is-is the omission of such words fatal to the complaint so that it cannot support the default judgment?

It is unquestioned that, as a matter of evidence, mere proof of one defendant's ownership of an automobile driven by another defendant is prima facie proof of agency, which if not rebutted will support a judgment for plaintiff, insofar as the proposition of agency is concerned. Howard v. Amerson, 236 Ill.App. 587. It is urged by defendant, however, that this rule of evidence based upon a presumption cannot be projected into the field of pleading. The prime purpose of pleading must never be hidden in a morass of technicalities. Pleading must inform and notify both adversary and court of the charges and defenses of the pleader. The desire to avoid extremes does not give license to mislead. Courts must look to substance and apply basic rules of other fields of the law when deemed necessary. If the law in one breath can say that all persons are presumed to know the law it cannot refuse to recognize that a mere proof of ownership of an automobile can result in judgment when the principles of the law of agency apply. This consequence results in a liability and judgment-a matter of substance and no mere idle theory. On the other hand, it is equally well established that the family-purpose doctrine is not the law in this State. White v. Seitz, 342 Ill. 266, 174 N.E. 371.

Section 33 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 110, par. 157,) of our Civil Practice Act, in force during these proceedings, provided that all pleadings shall contain a plain and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action, counterclaim, defense or reply. Section 42 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 110, par. 166,) of the same act provides in substance that the court may order a fuller or more particular statement if any pleading is insufficient in substance or form and may order new pleadings if those filed do not sufficiently define the issues; that no pleading shall be deemed bad in substance which shall reasonably inform the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to meet; and that all pleading defects, in form or substance, not objected to in the trial court shall be deemed to be waived. Section 6 of the Amendments and Jeofails Act (ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 7, par. 6) in substance provides, as pertains to the present problem, that judgment shall not be arrested or stayed after verdict, nor shall any judgment upon verdict or finding by the court, or upon confession nil dicit (or non sum informatus) or upon any writ of inquiry of damages be reversed, impaired, or in any way affected, by reason of any of the following imperfections, omissions, defects, matters or things in the process, pleadings, proceedings or records, namely: for the want of any allegation or averment on account of which omission a motion raising an objection to such omission in the pleading could have been maintained.

There are numerous foreign and Illinois cases which have dealt with the problem of whether certain complaints have stated a good cause of action effectively or stated no cause of action at all. A careful analysis of a great many of these cases gives rise to a serious doubt as to the proper basis for decision and one becomes somewhat confused by conflicts that appear irreconcilable. A black or white label can be applied either way. The path of proper direction for future travelers along this course is rendered no less hazardous by compounding the confusion by a mere choice of labels. The consequence of such condition is a greater liberality in legislation governing procedure and practice in both Federal and State courts. The delays and injustices which occurred in the common law were recognized and remedies appropriately fashioned. The law has always favored prompt and fair hearings of issues on their merits and whenever possible has placed practice and procedure in its proper place of secondary importance-as the means employed to accomplish the ends of justice. The law in its wisdom, in order to prevent abuses and unjust surprise, afforded to litigants rights of pretrial discovery, the right to obtain particularization by motion or demand in order to become apprised of anything concerning which there may exist honest doubt.

What can a defendant, such as Pike here, reasonably conclude from the type of information contained in the filed...