Parris v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 25 April 1949 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 3506. |
| Citation | 189 Va. 321 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOE PARRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. |
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — Plea of Guilty — Withdrawal of Plea and Substitution of Plea of Not Guilty — Discretion of Court. — In the absence of statutory regulation or established practice, whether or not an accused should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty for the purpose of submitting one of not guilty is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. No fixed or definite rule applicable to and determinative of all cases can be laid down.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — Plea of Guilty — Withdrawal of Plea and Substitution of Plea of Not Guilty — Plea Based on Honest Mistake or Induced by Fraud. — A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty should not be denied, if timely made, and if it appears from the surrounding circumstances that the plea of guilty was submitted in good faith under an honest mistake of material fact or facts, or if it was induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence and would not otherwise have been made.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — Plea of Guilty — Withdrawal of Plea and Substitution of Plea of Not Guilty — Mistake of Material Facts — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for seduction, accused submitted a plea of guilty. In good faith he believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that if he pleaded guilty, a marriage which he had entered into, before he knew of the pregnancy of the prosecutrix, would be annulled and that the prosecutrix and he would then be married and further prosecution thus avoided. The prosecutrix refused to marry the accused and accused moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and substitute one of not guilty.
Held: That accused labored under a mistake and misapprehension of a material fact or facts which induced a plea that would otherwise not have been made and the facts required the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and substitution of one of not guilty.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Washington county. Hon. Walter H. Robertson, judge presiding.
The opinion states the case.
H. E. Widener and John C. Summers, Jr., for the plaintiff in error.
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, and Henry T. Wickham, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.
On the 24th day of May, 1948, Joe Parris was indicted for seduction. The crime was alleged to have been committed in August, 1947. He was arraigned on the 3rd of June, 1948, and pleaded guilty. No evidence was heard and the court did not then impose punishment but deferred determination of that phase of the case to a later date.
On June 28, 1948, accused moved for leave to withdraw his plea and interpose one of not guilty. The motion was refused by the court and he was, on that day, sentenced to two years confinement in the penitentiary.
The sole assignment of error is that the court erred when it declined to allow withdrawal of the plea of guilty and the substitution therefor of a plea of not guilty.
Determination of this question requires an examination of the circumstances confronting accused immediately prior to and at the time he pleaded to the charge. Facts and considerations that influenced him to interpose the plea of guilty and to later move for its withdrawal are detailed by him in two affidavits presented on the day his motion was submitted and denied.
Briefly stated, they disclose that on February 19, 1948, before accused knew of the pregnancy of the prosecutrix and when he had no indication that she would be willing to marry him, he had married one Ruby Barr, who, it is stated, was then under sixteen years of age. Her foster parents were much incensed at the marriage. They interviewed counsel with the view of securing an annulment and had been advised that such could be obtained. The affidavit further states that "* * * at the time said plea was entered by defendant, he, in good faith, thought that said foster parents were proceeding on behalf of the said Ruby Barr to have the said marriage annulled.
"These facts were well known to the attorney for the Commonwealth, who stated to defendant's counsel that in his opinion the marriage could be annulled without undue delay and leave defendant free to marry to prosecutrix."
When he pleaded to the indictment, accused had been assured by the prosecutrix that she was willing to marry him and he had been advised by his counsel that marriage was a complete defense to further proceedings. However, before pleading, his counsel sought a continuance until the contemplated marriage could take place but the Commonwealth's Attorney insisted that he be arraigned and plead. Accused states that he understood, and in good faith believed, that the marriage could and would be...
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