Parris v. Delaney (In re Delaney), Bankruptcy Nos. 12–21924 (ASD), 12–22099(ASD).

• Decision Date: 29 January 2014
• Docket Number: 12–02081,Adversary Nos. 12–02078,Bankruptcy Nos. 12–21924 (ASD), 12–22099(ASD).,12–02078.
• Citation: 504 B.R. 738
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: In re Robin DELANEY, Debtor. Donna Parris, Plaintiff, v. Robin Delaney, Defendant. In re Charles Pappas, Debtor. Donna Parris, Plaintiff, v. Charles Pappas, Defendant.

504 B.R. 738

In re Robin DELANEY, Debtor.

Donna Parris, Plaintiff,

v.Robin Delaney, Defendant.

In re Charles Pappas, Debtor.

Donna Parris, Plaintiff,

v.Charles Pappas, Defendant.

Bankruptcy Nos. 12–21924 (ASD), 12–22099(ASD).

Adversary Nos. 12–02078, 12–02081, 12–02078.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut.

Jan. 29, 2014.

Michael J. Coolican, Esq., Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff, Donna Parris.

Derek G. Poirier, Esq., Law Offices of John Q. Gale, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Defendants/Debtors, Robin Delaney and Charles Pappas.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S UNCONTESTED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COMPLAINTS TO DETERMINE NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 523(a)(6)

ALBERT S. DABROWSKI, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In these consolidated adversary proceedings ¹, Adv. P. No. 12–02078 ( Parris v. Delaney ) and Adv. P. No. 12–02081 ( Parris v. Pappas ), Donna Parris (hereinafter, “Parris” or the “Plaintiff”) seeks to have declared non-dischargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6) a debt arising from “willful and malicious injury” to her by the Defendants/Debtors, Robin Delaney (hereinafter, “Delaney”) and Charles Pappas (hereinafter, “Pappas”) (hereinafter, together, the “Defendants”). The Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment based upon the alleged preclusive effect of a prior judgment rendered by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (hereinafter, the “District Court Judgment”) in Parris v. Charles Pappas, Robin Delaney, Case No. 3:10CV1128 (WWE) (hereinafter, the “District Court Case”). Neither Delaney nor Pappas have filed a response to the summary judgment motion within the 21 day period provided by the Local Rules or at any time thereafter. See D. Conn L. Civ. R. 7(a)1 and 56(a)(4), made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings by D. Conn. LBR 1001–1. For the reasons which follow, the motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.

II. JURISDICTION

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), and the Bankruptcy Court derives its authority to hear and determine these matters on reference from the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(1). These are “core proceedings” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2012, Delaney commenced Bankruptcy Case No. 12–21924 by the filing of a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Thomas C. Boscarino, Esq. was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee. On November 13, 2012, the Plaintiff commenced Adversary Proceeding 12–2078 by the filing of a Complaint against Delaney seeking to have declared non-dischargeable the District Court Judgment debt for damages in the amount of $262,407, a previously determined attorneys' fee award in the amount of $87,392, and an additional, unliquidated sum awarded for supplemental attorneys' fees and costs.² Delaney received her general discharge of debts under Bankruptcy Code § 727 on November 15, 2012.

On August 29, 2012, Pappas commenced Bankruptcy Case No. 12–22099 by the filing of a voluntary petition under Chapter 7. Thomas C. Boscarino, Esq. was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee. On November 26, 2012, the Plaintiff commenced Adversary Proceeding 12–2081 by the filing of a Complaint against Pappas seeking to have declared non-dischargeable the same District Court Judgment debt for damages in the amount of $262,407, the same attorneys' fee award in the amount of $87,392, and the same additional, unliquidated sum awarded for supplemental attorneys' fees and costs. In the Complaint against Pappas, the Plaintiff also sought a denial of Pappas' discharge under Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)(2) on the grounds that Pappas transferred or concealed property with the “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor,” within one year before the date of the filing of his bankruptcy petition. As a consequence, Pappas has not as yet received a general discharge of his debts ³.

On February 1, 2013, the Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter, the “Motion”), ECF No. 17, accompanied by Exhibit A, Plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement, ECF No. 17–1, Memorandum of Law, the Affidavit of Donna Parris in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 18–2 with attached Exhibits A and C through Z; Exhibits AA, AB, AC, AD, AE, AF, AG, AH, and the Declaration of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit AJ. In her Motion and Memorandum of Law, the Plaintiff asserts that her claims for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) as set forth in each of the Complaints, have been conclusively resolved in the District Court Case.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

For purposes of summary judgment, the Plaintiff relies on numerous findings of material fact as determined in the District Court Case and asserts by reason of collateral estoppel those findings to be dispositive of these adversary proceedings as no genuine issue remains to be tried in connection with these proceedings. The Plaintiff's fifteen (15) page Rule 56(a)1 Statement consists of ninety-two separately numbered paragraphs with specific citation to numerous exhibits and evidence, supported by a Memorandum of Law with copies of 37 Exhibits attached thereto. Against this background of, inter alia, the Plaintiff's conforming Rule 56(a)1 Statement, the failure of the Defendants to file a responsive a Rule 56(a)2 Statement, the pleadings, together with the affidavits, supporting exhibits, and other relevant files and records of the instant cases and proceedings, and the determinations of in the District Court Case,⁴ the following facts, are undisputed or cannot be disputed, and/or are deemed admitted.

At all relevant times, the Plaintiff was the owner of, and resided in, a mobile-manufactured home purchased from Anna Alexis, LLC on November 5, 2006, which was located on a rented parcel of land known as Lot # 6 at Normandies Park in Dayville, Connecticut (hereinafter, the “Park Property”). A rental agreement dated July 1, 2008 (hereinafter, the “Rental Agreement”) required, inter alia, that the Park Property owner Anna Alexis, LLC, shall maintain all electrical, plumbing, gas, or other utilities provided in good working condition. The Rental Agreement also required the maintenance and service of the septic system, and further required the Park Property owner to maintain all water and sewer lines and connections. During an emergency situation, repairs are required to be made within 72 hours. Anna Alexis, LLC, was an owner of Normandies Park from at least December 2005 through April 8, 2010, and Delaney was manager of Normandies Park and a member of Anna Alexis, LLC. From April 8, 2010 forward, Normandies Park, LLC, was the owner of the Park Property, and Pappas was a member of Normandies Park, LLC.

The Plaintiff is a person with a disability. The Social Security Administration has deemed Plaintiff disabled as a result of her diabetes mellitus, retinopathy, generalized sensory-motor polyneuropathy, bilateral ulnar neuropathy and orthostatic hypotension. Plaintiff's disabilities cause frequent drops in blood pressure that lead to her loss of consciousness, eye problems and significant nerve damage in her extremities. Plaintiff requires a 24–hour live-in aide to manage her federally-recognized disabilities. In February 2009, an aide moved into Plaintiff's home to provide 24–hour live-in care. Defendants had been aware of the aide since the time he moved into Plaintiff's home and accepted monthly rental checks from the aide.

In March 2009, Plaintiff began to experience problems with her septic tank, including sewage backing up into the toilets, the failure of the leaching mechanism causing sewage to surface underneath her home and into the yard, unbearable stench in and around her home, and the destruction of property stored under her home. The septic system required servicing on numerous occasions and often the repair work was not performed timely. In an effort to remediate the septic problems, the Plaintiff contacted the Town of Killingly in October 2009 and March 2010 and the Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection. The Town of Killingly notified the Northeast Division of the Department of Public Health on Plaintiff's behalf.

On at least three different occasions, Defendants pressured Plaintiff to alter the Rental Agreement so that Plaintiff would bear the burden of repairing and maintaining the septic system. After Plaintiff reported that the septic system had overflowed to the Town of Killingly, the Defendants sent the Plaintiff a letter stating that she was in violation of her lease because she had an unauthorized tenant (her live-in aide) and an unauthorized shed on the Park Property. The Plaintiff's physician requested this reasonable accommodation of a tenant in writing, but the Defendants denied the request and sought to evict the Plaintiff on the ground that her live-in aide was an “unauthorized tenant.”

On March 23, 2010, the Defendants' attorney at that time issued an ultimatum to Parris, allowing her to have a 24–hour live-in aide but only if she agreed to pay $300 every time the septic tank required servicing; if she did not agree, the Defendants would evict her. The following day, the Defendants served the Plaintiff with a “Notice to Quit,” alleging that she had an unauthorized tenant and an unauthorized shed on the property. The Defendants also filed and served in the Connecticut Superior Court a Summary Process Complaint dated June 17, 2010.

On July 20, 2010, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Plaintiff filed a civil rights action against the Defendants for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, alleging a violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (hereinafter, the “FHA”); a violation of ...