Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC

• Citation: 959 F.Supp.2d 1291
• Decision Date: 07 August 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:12–CV–777–VEH.
• Parties: Saniya PARRIS, Plaintiff, v. KEYSTONE FOODS, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama

959 F.Supp.2d 1291

Saniya PARRIS, Plaintiff,

v.KEYSTONE FOODS, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 4:12–CV–777–VEH.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Middle Division.

Aug. 7, 2013.

Saniya Parris, Piedmont, AL, pro se.

Tamula R. Yelling, J. Tobias Dykes, Constangy Brooks & Smith LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) filed by Defendant Keystone Foods, LLC, d/b/a Equity Group—Alabama Division (“Equity”). The court has considered the arguments made in Equity's “Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 20) and in its Reply brief (Doc. 22). Plaintiff Saniya Parris (“Ms. Parris”), who is proceeding pro se, did not submit a formal response to this Motion. She did file various evidentiary materials, which Equity has moved to strike. Doc. 24. Ms. Parris has also filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 26) some of the evidentiary materials Equity filed in support of its Summary Judgment Motion. For the following reasons, Equity's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike are GRANTED, and Ms. Parris's Motion to Strike is DENIED.

I. Factual Background¹

Neither party disputes the following material facts. Equity is a “further processing facility” that processes chicken products for various customers and restaurant chains. Doc. 21–5 ¶ 1. The company maintains as official policy a commitment to provide equal employment opportunity for all individuals without regard to race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, ancestry, disability, medical condition, veteran status, or marital status. Id. ¶ 2. On June 14, 2010, Equity hired Ms. Parris to work in a general utility position within the Offline Department of Equity's Gadsden, Alabama, facility. Id. ¶ 7; Doc. 21–1 at 18. Upon her hire, she received and reviewed the company's anti-harassment policy, which she also signed. Doc. 21–1 at 21; Doc. 21–4 at 1.

Ms. Parris, who identifies as transgender, was born biologically male but presented as a female at the time of her hire and throughout her employment with Equity. Doc. 21–1 at 25. When the company initially hired Ms. Parris, her paperwork indicated that her name was “K'Shun A. Nelson.” Doc. 21–5 ¶ 3. Her correct legal name at that time, however, was “Andrew K' Shun Nelson,” and the company had her change her paperwork to reflect that. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. In the workplace, Ms. Parris initially went by the name “K'Shun.” Doc. 21–1 at 25. On or around October 22, 2010, Ms. Parris announced that she should be referred to as “Saniya Lashai Marai Parris” from thereon. Doc. 21–5 ¶ 8; see also Doc. 21–4 at 17. After she was issued a new Social Security card with that name, Equity altered her personal information within its database to reflect the change. Doc. 21–1 at 28; see also Doc. 21–4 at 18.

Equity has established a “progressive discipline” policy for its employees that dictates a scaled list of punishments for various infractions, with the sanctions ranging from verbal warnings to termination. See Doc. 21–4 at 5–6. On June 23, 2010, Equity issued Ms. Parris her first verbal warning for alleged tardiness. Id. at 15. On January 7, 2011, she received her second verbal warning over an alleged dispute with a co-worker. Id. at 20. She received a written warning on January 13, 2011, for allegedly failing to obey her supervisor's instructions. Id. at 21. On January 31, 2011, Equity suspended Ms. Parris from work for several days over her alleged misuse of machine equipment. Id. at 22.

Ms. Parris called the company hotline on February 23, 2011, to complain about her workplace treatment. See Doc. 21–4 at 25–27. When she was asked why she was calling, she replied, “harassment/discrimination.” Id. at 26. When asked what type of harassment she was reporting, she replied, “Sexual. My life style. I'm in transition.” Id. She explained that she thought that the Human Resources Department (“Human Resources”) had unfairly handled her suspension. See id. at 26–27. On or around March 23, 2011, Bobby Crays, Ms. Parris's supervisor at that time, accused her and two other female employees of disappearing from their positions. Id. at 32, 36; Doc. 21–5 ¶ 15. He decided to remove Ms. Parris from that position but not the other employees. Id. Upon learning of this decision, Ms. Laurel Hale (“Ms. Hale”) of Human Resources instructed Mr. Crays to return Ms. Parris to her previous position, which he did. Doc. 24–1 at 32, 36; Doc. 21–5 ¶ 16.

Equity terminated Ms. Parris from her employment on April 6, 2011, after she allegedly failed to return from her break on time. See Doc. 21–4 at 23. Following her termination, Ms. Parris filed another formal complaint with the company hotline alleging “Discrimination of Personal Lifestyle.” Doc. 21–5 ¶ 19. She also filed a grievance with the union that represented her. Id. After having its officials meet with Ms. Parris and Ms. Hale, the union elected not to pursue her grievance any further. Id.

II. Procedural Posture

Ms. Parris filed a “Charge of Discrimination” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on October 7, 2011. Doc. 21–4 at 38. On December 15, 2011, the EEOC dismissed her charge and issued her a notice of her right to sue. Id. at 42.

She filed her Complaint with this court on March 9, 2012. Doc. 1. She alleged that Equity violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating her “because of her sex (gender nonconformity) and/or in retaliation for her having complained of unlawful workplace termination.” Id. ¶ 15. On April 18, 2012, Equity filed its Answer. Doc. 8. On September 27, 2012, Equity filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15), which the court granted in part and denied in part in an Order dated October 1, 2012 (Doc. 16). Equity filed the present Motion on November 29, 2012. Doc. 19. It filed a brief and evidentiary material in support of this motion on the same date. Docs. 20, 21. On January 3, 2013, Equity filed a Reply Brief. Doc. 22. Ms. Parris filed evidentiary materials on January 8, 2013. Doc. 23. On January 18, 2013, Equity moved to strike this material (Doc. 24), and Ms. Parris moved to strike Equity's evidentiary material on April 17, 2013 (Doc. 26).

III. Equity's Motion to Strike

The court must first resolve Equity's Motion to Strike Ms. Parris's evidentiary materials because it affects how the court will evaluate Equity's Motion for Summary Judgment. Equity argues for striking said evidentiary materials because they were filed several weeks after the court's imposed deadlines and because they do not conform to the court's formatting prescriptions. Doc. 24 at 1–3. Equity is correct that Ms. Parris unjustifiably filed her materials late. While the complaints of pro se litigants should be liberally construed, “[l]iberal construction does not mean liberal deadlines.” Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc). More importantly, Ms. Parris did not file a brief or otherwise explain why she filed her materials late. Further, her assertions in these documents are not under oath or declaration and thus are not in proper form. For these reasons, the court will GRANT Equity's Motion to Strike and will consider its Motion for Summary Judgment unopposed.

IV. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).² The party requesting summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By its own affidavits—or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file—it must designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may still be granted. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).

How the movant may satisfy its initial evidentiary burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). If the movant bears the burden of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on summary...