Parris v. State

• Decision Date: 21 December 1911
• Parties: PARRIS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

57 So. 857

175 Ala. 1

PARRIS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 21, 1911

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1912.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette County; Bernard Harwood, Judge.

Henry Parris was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The plea in abatement is based on the fact that the judge of the circuit court, whose duty it was to draw the grand jury which returned the indictment, did not draw it before the last term before the present term of the circuit court adjourned, but that the court, on about the 24th day of March, 1910, drew from the jury box of Fayette county the grand jury. The other grounds are that the judge did not draw the jury in Fayette county, Ala., but had the jury box of Fayette county, Ala sent to Livingston, which is in Sumter county, Ala., and the judge in Sumter county drew the jury from the box and mailed or expressed them to the clerk of the circuit court of Fayette county. Motion was made to strike the names of Hardy Mitchell and Franklin Mills from the venire, because they were regularly drawn and summoned for the week in which defendant's case was set for trial, and before selecting the panel to try the cause the court excused them, and after excluding them they were resummoned as jurors, and placed on the venire to try the cause. The motion to quash the venire sufficiently appears from the opinion.

The following charges were given at the instance of the state (A) "While the law requires the guilt of the accused to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not require that each fact which may aid the jury in reaching the conclusion of guilt shall be clearly proved; but, on the whole evidence the jury must be able to pronounce guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (B) "The state is not required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond all doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt." (C) "The court charges the jury that a doubt, to acquit the defendant, must be actual and substantial, not mere possibility or speculation. It is not a mere possibility, or possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt."

The following charges were refused to the defendant: (27) "If the jury believe from the evidence that the deceased stated to the defendant that 'there is an old grudge between us, and I am going to kill you,' and threw his hand to his hip pocket in such a manner as to indicate to the defendant that the deceased was attempting to draw a pistol or a weapon, and if the manner of the deceased was such as to create in the mind of defendant that he was in danger of losing his life or receiving bodily harm, then the defendant had a right to shoot in self-defense, and the law does not require him to retreat." (30) "If the jury believe from the evidence that deceased made threats against the defendant, which were not communicated to him until after the killing, and if the jury believe that the deceased said to the defendant that 'I am going to kill you,' and threw his hand to his hip pocket at the time the defendant fired the fatal shot, you can consider such threats as directing the nature of such threats." (31) "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the rule of law governing self-defense that the defendant may and must act upon reasonable appearance of same, for the law of self-preservation would be very incomplete if the defendant then threatened or being beaten and assailed by the deceased and other parties, was required to wait to see whether they were going to inflict great bodily harm or take his life. He may act upon a reasonable appearance of same, and defend himself, even to the taking the life of the assailant, if he was free and without fault in bringing on the difficulty, and there was no reasonable mode of escape." (33) "If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was justified under all the evidence in shooting deceased while deceased was facing him, and that he was using an automatic gun which shot in rapid succession, and that some of the bullets struck the deceased in the back, this would deprive the defendant of his right to a plea of self-defense." (36) "If you believe from the evidence that the defendant was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty and the deceased said to him, 'I am going to kill you,' and placed his right hand at or near his hip pocket, and that the manner of the deceased was such as to create in the mind of the defendant that h...