Parrish v. Berryhill, CIVIL ACTION NO. H–15–3717
Decision Date | 21 February 2017 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H–15–3717 |
Citation | 237 F.Supp.3d 520 |
Parties | Aaron Ray PARRISH, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
James Foster Andrews, The Law Office of James F. Andrews, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Thomas Edward Chandler, Social Security Administration, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court2 in this social security appeal is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Document No. 10) and Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 12). After considering the cross motions for summary judgment, each side's Response to the other's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document Nos. 14 & 15), the administrative record, the written decision of the Administrative Law Judge dated August 11, 2015, and the applicable law, the Court ORDERS, for the reasons set forth below, that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Plaintiff Aaron Ray Parrish ("Parrish") brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of an adverse final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") on his claim for disability insurance benefits. In one claim, Parrish argues that "Defendant failed to consider all of the evidence." Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 12) at 1. The Commissioner, in contrast, argues that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision, that the decision comports with applicable law, and that the decision should be affirmed.
On or about January 25, 2013, Parrish filed an application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), claiming that he had been unable to work since April 1, 2009, as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder
, depression, and chronic leg and back pain (Tr. 203–205; 222). The Social Security Administration denied his application at the initial and reconsideration stages. After that, Parrish requested a hearing before an ALJ. The Social Security Administration granted his request and the ALJ, Robert N. Burdette, held a hearing on May 12, 2015, which was re-convened on July 16, 2015, at which Parrish's claims were considered de novo. (Tr. 29–46). Thereafter, on August 11, 2015, the ALJ issued his decision finding Parrish not disabled. (Tr. 10–25).
Parrish sought review of the ALJ's adverse decision with the Appeals Council.
The Appeals Council will grant a request to review an ALJ's decision if any of the following circumstances are present: (1) it appears that the ALJ abused his discretion; (2) the ALJ made an error of law in reaching his conclusion; (3) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's actions, findings or conclusions; or (4) a broad policy issue may affect the public interest. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470. On October 19, 2015, the Appeals Council found no basis for review (Tr. 1–3), and the ALJ's decision thus became final.
Parrish filed a timely appeal of the ALJ's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both sides have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, each of which has been fully briefed. The appeal is now ripe for ruling.
The court's review of a denial of disability benefits is limited "to determining (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, and (2) whether the Commissioner's decision comports with relevant legal standards." Jones v. Apfel , 174 F.3d 692, 693 (5th Cir. 1999). Indeed, Title 42, Section 405(g) limits judicial review of the Commissioner's decision: "The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." The Act specifically grants the district court the power to enter judgment, upon the pleadings and transcript, "affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing" when not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While it is incumbent upon the court to examine the record in its entirety to decide whether the decision is supportable, Simmons v. Harris , 602 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979), the court may not "reweigh the evidence in the record nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner] even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner's] decision." Johnson v. Bowen , 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988) ; Jones v. Apfel , 174 F.3d 692, 693 (5th Cir. 1999) ; Cook v. Heckler , 750 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1985). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve. Anthony v. Sullivan , 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992).
The United States Supreme Court has defined "substantial evidence," as used in the Act, to be "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B. , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance." Spellman v. Shalala , 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). The evidence must create more than "a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, but no ‘substantial evidence’ will be found only where there is a ‘conspicuous absence of credible choices' or ‘no contrary medical evidence.’ " Hames v. Heckler , 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983).
An individual claiming entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the Act has the burden of proving his disability. Johnson v. Bowen , 864 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1988). The Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be proven through medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). The impairment must be so severe as to limit the claimant in the following manner:
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied to work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The mere presence of an impairment is not enough to establish that one is suffering from a disability. Rather, a claimant is disabled only if he is "incapable of engaging in any substantial gainful activity." Anthony v. Sullivan , 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Milam v. Bowen , 782 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1986) ).
The Commissioner applies a five-step sequential process to decide disability status:
Anthony , 954 F.2d at 293 ; see also Leggett v. Chater , 67 F.3d 558, 563 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1991). Under this framework, the claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps of the analysis to establish that a disability exists. If successful, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, at step five, to show that the claimant can perform other work. McQueen v. Apfel , 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1999). Once the Commissioner shows that other jobs are available, the burden shifts, again, to the claimant to rebut this finding. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990). If, at any step in the process, the Commissioner determines that the claimant is or is not disabled, the evaluation ends. Leggett , 67 F.3d at 563.
Here, the ALJ found at step one that Parrish had worked at the substantial gainful activity level after the alleged onset date of April 1, 2009. In particular, the ALJ determined that Parrish had exceeded the substantial gainful activity level in 2012 by earning $10,138.77, but that his earnings in 2013 "did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity." (Tr. 12). At step two, the ALJ determined that Parrish had the following severe impairments: lumbar spine degenerative disc disease
, major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and personality disorder. (Tr. 12). At step three, the ALJ concluded that Parrish did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed impairment, including Listings 1.04, 12.04, 12.06 and 12.08. (Tr. 13–15). Prior to consideration of steps four and five, the ALJ determined that Parrish had the ...
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