Parrish v. St. Joseph's/Candler Health Sys., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 June 2022
• Docket Number: A22A0484
• Citation: 364 Ga.App. 228,874 S.E.2d 413
• Parties: PARRISH et al. v. ST. JOSEPH'S/CANDLER HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

364 Ga.App. 228

874 S.E.2d 413

PARRISH et al.

v.ST. JOSEPH'S/CANDLER HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. et al.

A22A0484

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 9, 2022

Harris Lowry Manton, Sarah Goldberg Adle, Stephen Glenn Lowry, Brookhaven, for Appellant.

Brennan & Wasden, William Richard Dekle, Savannah; Huff Powell & Bailey, Daniel James Huff, Atlanta, Randolph Page Powell Jr., B. Nicole Smith ; Oliver Maner, Andrew M. Wilkes, Irving William Drought III, Savannah, for Appellee.

Gobeil, Judge.

Jason Parrish, in his capacity as parent of minor child S. P., consented to an order dismissing with prejudice S. P.’s wrongful death claims against two defendants in this multi-party medical malpractice/wrongful death litigation. Later, represented by new counsel, Parrish moved to vacate that order, claiming that his former counsel had mistakenly believed S. P.’s wrongful death claims were time-barred. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, but issued a certificate of immediate review. Parrish filed an application for interlocutory review, which we granted. In the instant appeal, Parrish contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the consent order because the court: (1) failed to conduct a substantive analysis or weigh the relative benefit and harm to the parties; (2) erroneously interpreted its duty to protect the interests of a minor child; (3) failed to consider that there is a legitimate basis for vacating the order, as the statute of limitation for S. P.’s claims has not expired; and (4) wrongly declined to exercise its equitable powers, given the compelling and unique facts of this case. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The record shows that Heather Ruggles went into cardiac arrest and died during childbirth on September 29, 2016, at Candler Hospital in Savannah. Her baby, S. P., was successfully delivered by C-section. After an autopsy, the cause of Ruggles's death was determined to be acute toxicity from a local anesthetic, Bupivacaine, administered in conjunction with her epidural. Ruggles was unmarried at the time, but was engaged to S. P.’s father, Parrish. Parrish is the administrator of Ruggles's estate.

In December 2017, in his capacities as administrator of the estate and parent of S. P., Parrish filed this medical malpractice/wrongful death action against St. Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc., and three nurses involved in Ruggles's care. In June 2019, Parrish filed a motion to add as party-defendants Michael Marshall, M.D. and Mary Finn, M.D., two anesthesiologists responsible for the epidural. The trial court granted the motion, and in August 2019, Parrish filed an amended complaint asserting both wrongful death and estate claims against those defendants.¹ In particular, Parrish alleged that Marshall and Finn failed to identify the source of Ruggles's cardiac arrest as local anesthetic system toxicity and failed to administer the standard treatment for that condition.

In September 2019, Marshall and Finn filed separate motions to dismiss S. P.’s newly added wrongful death claims against them, arguing that those claims were barred by OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) ’s two-year statute of limitation for medical malpractice claims. Parrish's lawyer did not respond to the motions to dismiss. Instead, he consented to the entry of an October 2019 order dismissing the claims with prejudice. The consent order noted that Marshall and Finn had moved to dismiss the claims as time-barred and that Plaintiff "agreed that [S. P.’s] wrongful death claims against [Marshall and Finn] should be dismissed," but the order did not address the merits of the statute of limitation defense. The order further noted that the estate's claims against Marshall and Finn remained pending, as did all other claims brought by S. P. and the estate against the hospital and three nurses.

In November 2019, Parrish's present counsel entered an appearance in the case as co-counsel. With the court's permission, Parrish later added additional vicarious liability claims against Marshall and Finn's professional corporation, Obstetric Anesthesia & Pain Consultants ("OAPC"). In January 2021, Parrish's original counsel withdrew from representation. Present counsel claims that he only discovered that S. P.’s wrongful death claims against Marshall and Finn had been dismissed with prejudice per the October 2019 consent order after Marshall alerted him to this fact in a letter dated January 22, 2021. Present counsel began researching the statute of limitation issue and concluded that the claims in question were not time-barred because of a minority tolling provision in OCGA § 9-3-73 (b). Accordingly, in March 2021, present counsel filed a motion to vacate the consent order, arguing that (1) S. P.’s wrongful death claims against Marshall and Finn were not time-barred; (2) the court should not have entered the consent order without considering the consequences to the minor child, S. P.; and (3) vacating the consent order would not prejudice Marshall and Finn because the estate's claims against them remain pending.

A new trial court judge heard the motion as the original judge had retired. As an initial matter, the trial court questioned why the October 2019 consent agreement between the parties "was made an order of the [c]ourt at all," because (1) the order did not resolve all the claims against Marshall and Finn, and thus leave of court was not required under OCGA § 9-11-21 ; and (2) there was no settlement between the parties. The new judge highlighted that he "was not privy to any discussions regarding the entry of the consent order." In any case, the court acknowledged that the order at issue had been consented to and signed by all parties, as well as the trial judge presiding over the case at the time. The judge continued that while he had discretion to vacate the consent order, he was

persuaded by the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff willingly and knowingly entered into this agreement to dismiss these claims "with prejudice" seventeen months ago. The Plaintiff obtained the benefit of avoiding potentially significant motion practice and agreed to provide finality to the Defendants as to these claims. The length of the delay and the benefit derived as a result of the agreement convince this [c]ourt that it is proper to allow the order to remain in place.

The judge further noted that Parrish's "change in strategy more than a year and a half later is not compelling and fails to convince this [c]ourt to exercise its discretion and vacate the prior order." With respect to Parrish's argument that the court should have safeguarded S. P.’s rights, the judge ruled that "a simple consent agreement such as this" did not require judicial approval and it did not implicate the court's duty to protect the interests of the child. The court did not address the merits of Parrish's statute of limitation argument. At Parrish's request, the court certified its order for immediate review. Parrish filed an application for interlocutory review, which we granted. See Case No. A22I0033 (Sept. 28, 2021). This timely appeal followed.

As an initial matter, the trial court was correct that it had the authority to vacate the 2019 consent order because it was an interlocutory order that adjudicated fewer than all claims in the case. See Hudson v. Godowns , 320 Ga. App. 157, 159 (2), 739 S.E.2d 462 (2013) ("An order adjudicating fewer than all the claims is not final ... and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.") (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 9-11-54 (b).

Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on a motion to vacate an interlocutory order for abuse of discretion. See Bradley v. Tattnall Bank , 170 Ga. App. 821, 823 (1), 318 S.E.2d 657 (1984) ("while a judge should be cautious about overruling prior orders of another judge in the same case[,] nevertheless, he may do so in the exercise of sound discretion and particularly if he is convinced that such action is dictated by the interests of justice") (citation and punctuation omitted). Although this standard of review is deferential, "it is not toothless." Eagle Jets, LLC v. Atlanta Jet s, Inc. , 347 Ga. App. 567, 576 (2) (c), 820 S.E.2d 197 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Intl. Harvester Co. v. Cunningham , 245 Ga. App. 736, 739 (1), 538 S.E.2d 82 (2000) (trial court's exercise of discretion "must be based on sound legal analysis"). With these guiding principles in mind, we now turn to Parrish's specific claims of error.

1. Parrish contends that the trial court failed to conduct a substantive analysis or weigh the relative benefit and harm to the parties before denying the motion to vacate the consent order. He argues that the court's "sole basis" for denying relief was the length of time (17 months) between the entry of the consent order in October 2019, and the filing of the motion to vacate in March 2021. Parrish also challenges the court's characterization that former counsel's consent to the dismissal order constituted a calculated decision that benefitted S. P., and present counsel's motion to vacate as a belated "change of strategy." For the reasons that follow, we find no reversible error.

Like the trial court, we begin our analysis by considering the nature of the October 2019 order, styled as a "Consent Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Wrongful-Death Claim." Here, the 2019 consent order does not resemble a traditional settlement, as Marshall and Finn admitted no liability and made no litigation concessions; and Parrish and S. P. received no money. Nevertheless, as highlighted by the trial court in its order denying the motion to vacate, the order at issue was consented to and signed by all parties, and, at the parties’ request, the agreement was adopted by and decreed to be an order of the trial court. As we have explained:

A consent order is essentially a binding

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