Parrott v. State of Arkansas
Decision Date | 20 June 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 73-1836.,73-1836. |
Citation | 497 F.2d 1123 |
Parties | Charles H. PARROTT, Appellant, v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
James L. Crabtree, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Walter A. Murray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, Senior District Judge.*
The issue on this appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Charles H. Parrott's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition alleged that Parrott had been denied a fair and impartial trial in an Arkansas state court proceeding.
Parrott is currently serving a sentence in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, pursuant to a federal conviction. The State of Arkansas filed a detainer against the petitioner requesting that upon his release from federal custody, he be returned to the State of Arkansas to serve a twelve-year state sentence imposed pursuant to the conviction he challenged in the District Court.
Parrott was convicted on July 9, 1968, of armed bank robbery after a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Sebastian County, Arkansas (Greenwood District). The trial was conducted in the cafeteria of a Greenwood, Arkansas school building rather than in the Greenwood Courthouse, because the latter building had been destroyed by a tornado some time prior to the dates of trial. A motion for a new trial, based on allegations of jury misconduct, was filed by the petitioner on July 12, 1968.1 The motion alleged, in substance, that:
(1) the county prosecutor made arrangements for jurors to lunch at a community recreation center on the two days of the trial;
(2) two prosecution witnesses, Nina Dunn and Connie Ford, were observed talking to jurors during recesses;
(3) jurors were permitted to mingle freely with witnesses for the prosecution prior to trial and during recesses; and
(4) law enforcement officers mingled with jurors and discussed Parrott's reputation in tones loud enough to be overheard by the jurors.
On July 28, 1968, the Arkansas trial court held a hearing on the motion. It denied the motion.
The petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. It stated:
Parrott v. State, 246 Ark. 672, 439 S.W. 2d 924, 928 (1969).
On April 3, 1973, Parrott filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court. He reiterated the claims of error asserted in the state courts, and additionally alleged that the trial was held in an inadequate facility and in a carnival atmosphere.
The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied relief to the petitioner. Parrott v. State of Arkansas, 365 F.Supp. 915 (W.D.Ark.1973).
On this appeal, Parrott again raises the issues raised in the state courts and those raised for the first time in the District Court.2 We affirm the denial of relief by the District Court.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas and the District Court properly held that the arrangements made by the county prosecutor for the jurors to lunch at the community recreation center were not prejudicial to Parrott. The reasons given by the Arkansas Supreme Court for so holding are sound and are adopted by this Court.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas and the District Court properly held that Parrott was not denied a fair trial by virtue of conversations between prosecution witnesses, Nina Dunn and Connie Ford, and one or more jurors. They also correctly held that contacts between other prosecution witnesses and jurors prior to trial and during recesses were not such as to deprive Parrott of a fair trial.
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150, 13 S.Ct. 50, 52-53, 36 L.Ed. 917, 920, 921; Wheaton...
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