Parson v. Barney
| Docket Number | 12-cv-0646 (DWF/DJF) |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2023 |
| Parties | Raymond A. Parson, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Sharyn L. Barney, Nancy Johnston, Thomas Lundquist, and Department of Human Services, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court for preservice review of Plaintiff Raymond A. Parson, Jr.'s Third Amended Complaint (“3AC”) (ECF No. 31). For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the bulk of Mr. Parson's 3AC be dismissed; however, it orders service on Defendant Sharyn L. Barney because a limited portion of Count 1 in the 3AC survives its review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Mr Parson commenced this action in March 2012 by filing a “Complaint for Violations of Civil Rights Under Title 42 [U.S.C.] §1981, §1982, §1983, §1985 §1986, §1988” (“Complaint”) (ECF No. 1). The Complaint was over 145 pages long, named dozens of defendants, and asserted thirty-two causes of action. (See id. at 1, 118-40.[1]) As relevant here, the Complaint presented wide-ranging attacks on procedures and policies at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”), where Mr. Parson has been civilly committed since 2007. (See Id. at 42, 118-41; cf. In re Civ. Commitment of Parson, No. A08-1731, 2009 WL 818925, at *1 (Minn.Ct.App. Mar. 31, 2009) ().)
Less than a week after Mr. Parson filed the Complaint, then-Chief Judge Michael J. Davis entered an order staying this action (and numerous others) because of the then-ongoing classaction litigation in Karsjens v. Minnesota Department of Human Services, No. 11-CV-3659 (DWF/TNL) (D. Minn.). (See ECF No. 7 at 12-14.) Over the years, numerous follow-on orders extended that stay-until October 3, 2022, when Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz entered an order lifting it upon final judgment in Karsjens. (See Docket; ECF No. 25 at 17, 24-25.) On October 7, 2022, the Court ordered Mr. Parson to file an amended complaint. (See ECF No. 20 at 4.[2])
Mr. Parson filed a short amended complaint in November 2022. (See ECF No. 21.) Later that month, the Court noted that this pleading had problems as well: It did not clearly identify the Defendants' actions and failed to state a claim. (See ECF No. 23 at 1-4.) The Court ordered Mr. Parson to submit a second amended complaint on or before January 13, 2023 and referred him to the Federal Bar Association (“FBA”) for potential assistance from a volunteer lawyer. (See Id. at 4.) The Court later extended the deadline for Mr. Parson to file his second amended complaint until March 14, 2023. (See ECF No. 26.)
As of March 13, 2023, the Court had not received an amended complaint, but based on an ex parte request from Mr. Parson the Court extended the deadline until April 14, 2023 to allow more time for him to consult with a volunteer attorney, if possible, and to address problems with his printer. (See, e.g., ECF No. 28 at 1.) Coincidentally, on that same day, the Clerk's office received and filed Mr. Parson's second amended complaint (“2AC”) (ECF No. 29).[3]
Mr. Larson filed his 3AC on July 10, 2023. (ECF No. 31.) He simultaneously filed a letter stating he was able to receive help from a law firm based on the earlier FBA referral and suggesting the 3AC reflected that assistance. (See ECF No. 32 at 1.) The Court subsequently entered an order accepting that filing and establishing the 3AC as the operative pleading in this matter. (ECF No. 33.)
The 3AC names four defendants. (See ECF No. 31 at 1.) Three are individuals: (1) Sharyn L. Barney, the MSOP's “family medicine doctor ... at the time of the events underlying” the 3AC; (2) Nancy Johnston, the MSOP's “[e]xecutive [d]irector”; and (3) Thomas Lundquist, the MSOP's “[h]ealth [c]are [p]rogram [d]irector.” (Id. at 1-3.) Mr. Parson sues all three individuals in their individual and official capacities. (See id. at 1.) The fourth defendant is “Department of Human Services,” which the Court construes as the Minnesota Department of Human Services (“MDHS”)-“part of the executive branch of the State government of Minnesota,” and as relevant here, the agency that oversees the MSOP. (See id. at 1, 3.)
Mr. Parson alleges that in 2012-13, during his confinement at the MSOP, he “was asked to participate in a health service assessment to evaluate his medical condition.” (Id. at 3.) He states that he had a “severe heat rash,” as well as “swelling around his neck, arms, hands, and eyes”; “bleeding from his neck and arms”; and an eye infection. (Id.) Mr. Parson claims he reported his condition to various individuals and asked “health service's staff to prescribe the medication needed for treatment.” (Id.) He says he was told, however, that Defendant Barney would need to “approve the treatment,” even though “medications were already specified in [Mr. Parson's] medical record.” (Id.)
After two days, Mr. Parson met with Defendant Barney. (See id.) According to Mr. Parson, Defendant Barney “refused to prescribe the necessary medicines or provide any other type of medical care to treat [Mr. Parson's] condition,” and furthermore, “provided no explanation as to why [Mr. Parson] was denied medical care.” (Id. at 4.) Mr. Parson's medical condition allegedly worsened, and he “continued going to health services every other day to ask for help.” (Id.) Each time, Defendant Barney “was present .. and continued to refuse to provide medical attention.” (Id.) Mr. Parson alleges Defendant Barney even “mocked” him and threatened to issue disciplinary reports against him and call security if he “did not leave health services.” (Id.)
Mr. Parson asserts he filed a “formal complaint” against Defendant Barney “before Health Services,” and eventually raised the complaint “before the Hospital Review Board” (“HRB”). (Id. at 4-5.) After Mr. Parson filed the complaint, Defendant Barney “agreed to have a conversation with [him].” (Id. at 5.) But according to Mr. Parson, during this conversation Defendant “Barney expressed herself in a discriminatory matter ... using derogatory terms that referred to the color of [his] skin.” (Id.) He specifically alleges she said, “Blackie, listen boy, you are not in the south no more, you are up north with us now.” (Id.)
Mr. Parson alleges he reported Defendant Barney's conduct to the MSOP staff, but that he continued to suffer in pain, without medical care, for months. (See id.) Mr. Parson asserts that because he did not get proper care, he was temporarily blinded in his left eye, suffered “[m]ental and emotional trauma,” and sustained “[p]hysical marks and scars all over his body and constant headaches.” (Id.) He also claims lost wages and “future earning capacity” and “[p]ast, present, and future medical expenses.” (Id.)
Mr. Parson states that he eventually attended a “hearing held in front of the HRB Panel.” (Id.) He asserts the panel found in favor of him, at which point he “communicated he wished to pursue further action.” (Id.)
Mr. Parson brings five claims based on these allegations. Count 1 names all Defendants and asserts that his treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. (See id. at 6-7.) Count 2 names only Defendant Barney and claims she negligently failed to provide him proper medical care. (See id. at 7-9.) Count 3 also names Defendant Barney, claiming her reported conduct constituted race and disability-based discrimination. (See id. at 10-12.) In Count 4, Mr. Parson claims Defendants Johnston and Lundquist failed to properly train or supervise Defendant Barney. (See id. at 12-14.) Finally, Count 5 claims MDHS had “policies, practices, or customs” leading to violations of his federal rights. (Id. at 15; see also id. at 14-17.) For relief, Mr. Parson asks for monetary damages; “reasonable attorney fees”; and any “other legal, injunctive, or equitable relief as the Court deems just and fair.” (Id. at 17.)
Rather than pay this action's filing fee, Mr. Parson applied to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2). The Court grated his IFP application on March 31, 2023 (ECF No. 30). The Court now reviews the 3AC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as a prerequisite to ordering service on the Defendants. Under section 1915, the federal statute governing IFP proceedings, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case”-that is, a case brought by an IFP litigant-“at any time if the court determines that ... the action ... is frivolous [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While the wording here refers to “the case,” courts in this District routinely dismisses portions of cases under this provision as well. See, e.g., Frelix v. Hendrie Grant Lending Inc., No. 23-CV-0896 (DWF/TNL), 2023 WL 3571906, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. May 18, 2023) (citing cases); Hunter v. Mayo Clinic, No. 21-CV-0742 (ECT/HB), 2021 WL 1877638, at *2 n.3 (D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2021) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-CV-742 (ECT/HB), 2021 WL 1873430 (D. Minn. May 10, 2021).
A case is frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S 319, 325 (1989); see also, e.g., Jones v. Norris, 310 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Neitzke). With respect to legal frivolity, a claim “lacks an arguable basis in law if [it] is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327); see also, e.g., Hines v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., No. 18-CV-3250 (ECT/BRT), 2020 WL 1102210, at *11...
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