Parsons v. Aaron
| Decision Date | 04 October 2002 |
| Parties | James T. PARSONS et al. v. Patrick AARON, and Pat & Pat, Inc. James T. Parsons et al. v. Patrick Aaron, and Pat & Pat, Inc. Patrick Aaron, and Pat & Pat, Inc. v. James C. Parsons et al. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
E. Allen Dodd, Jr., of Scruggs, Dodd & Dodd Attorneys, P.A., Fort Payne; and James W. Fuhrmeister of Allison, May, Alvis, Fuhrmeister, Kimbrough & Sharp, L.L.C., Birmingham, for James C. Parsons, James T. Parsons, and James C. Parsons, Inc.
John E. Medaris, Pelham, for Patrick Aaron, and Pat & Pat, Inc.
James C. Parsons, James C. Parsons, Inc.,1 and James T. Parsons (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "the Parsonses") appeal from a judgment entered by the Shelby Circuit Court in favor of Patrick Aaron and Pat & Pat, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "Aaron"), on claims of tortious interference with contractual or business relations, breach of contract, and conversion, arising out of Aaron's sale of World Gym Health and Fitness Center-Pelham (hereinafter "World Gym"), to James C. Parsons and James C. Parsons, Inc.2 The jury awarded Aaron a total of $107,000 in compensatory damages and $193,000 in punitive damages; the trial court remitted the punitive-damages award to $60,000. Aaron filed with this Court a motion to dismiss the Parsonses' appeals as untimely filed; Aaron also conditionally cross-appeals as to the trial court's order of remittitur of the punitive-damages award. We deny the motion to dismiss the appeals and we affirm in part, reverse in part, render a judgment in part, and remand.
These appeals result from two actions filed in the Shelby Circuit Court. The plaintiffs in case no. CV-98-903 are James C. Parsons ("Jimbo"), James C. Parsons, Inc. ("the corporation"), and Jimbo's father, James T. Parsons ("Jim Parsons" or "Parsons"). The Parsonses sued Aaron seeking to enjoin him from taking certain actions the Parsonses contended would violate a noncompetition agreement Aaron had entered into in conjunction with the sale of World Gym to the Parsonses.
Aaron responded by filing his own complaint in Shelby Circuit Court, suing Jimbo and the corporation (case no. CV-98-955). Aaron alleged breach of contract and conversion. In a later amendment to his complaint, Aaron added Jim Parsons as a defendant, alleging a claim of tortious interference with contractual or business relations.3
The Parsonses then filed a counterclaim in case no. CV-98-955, alleging that Aaron had breached the noncompetition agreement and seeking monetary damages. The cases were consolidated and all of the above-identified claims were tried before a jury. At the close of Aaron's evidence, the Parsonses moved for a judgment as a matter of law; the trial court denied that motion.
The jury returned a verdict against the Parsonses on their claim alleging breach of the noncompetition agreement and seeking an injunction. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Aaron on his claims of breach of contract, conversion, and tortious interference, awarding Aaron compensatory and punitive damages.
The Parsonses filed postjudgment motions pursuant to Rules 50 and 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking a judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or alternatively, a remittitur of the punitive-damages award. On June 6, 2001, the trial court entered on the case action summary the following notation:
On July 5, 2001, the trial court entered its order on all the Parsonses' postjudgment motions. The trial court conditionally granted the Parsonses' motion for a new trial unless Aaron accepted a remittitur of the $193,000 punitive-damages award to $60,000.
On July 19, 2001, Aaron filed a motion styled "Request for Correction/Amendment of Order." In that motion, Aaron argued that the trial court should correct or amend its postjudgment order to reflect that, if Aaron accepted the remittitur, the Parsonses must agree to forgo any appeal of the judgment. Aaron asserted that the trial court had no authority to order a remittitur without also ordering that the Parsonses forgo their right of appeal upon Aaron's acceptance of the remittitur. The trial court set this motion for a hearing on August 29, 2001. On July 23, the Parsonses responded to Aaron's request for correction or amendment of the postjudgment order by noting that Rule 59(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., allows the trial court to order a remittitur and, even if accepted, Aaron would still retain the right on appeal to seek reinstatement of the entire damages award. On July 25, Aaron filed a notice styled "Involuntary Acceptance of Remittitur." However, Aaron did not withdraw his motion to correct or amend.
On August 17, 2001, the Parsonses filed their notices of appeal. They indicated that they were appealing from a final judgment and that the date of that judgment was February 15, 2001; that the date of the trial court's postjudgment order was July 5, 2001; and that two postjudgment motions had been filed: (1) the Parsonses' motion for new trial; and (2) Aaron's request for correction or amendment of the trial court's order. The Parsonses did not indicate on their notices of appeal the date of filing or the date of disposition of the postjudgment motions. However, the Parsonses added to each notice of appeal the following: "This notice is filed although some post-trial motions remain pending." These appeals are case no. 1002086 and case no. 1002087.
On August 22, 2001, Aaron filed a motion to dismiss the Parsonses' appeal in case no. 1002086, claiming that the notice of appeal in that case was not timely filed.4 On August 29, 2001, Aaron filed a conditional cross-appeal, seeking reinstatement of the full punitive-damages award in the event the Parsonses' appeals were not dismissed as untimely. Aaron's cross-appeal is case no. 1010105.
Aaron asserts that the time for filing a notice of appeal began to run the day the trial court entered its order on the Parsonses' postjudgment motions. The trial court entered its order on those motions on July 5, 2001. Forty-two days from that date was August 16; the Parsonses filed their notice of appeal on August 17.
However, the Parsonses assert that their notice of appeal was timely because, they say, the July 5, 2001, order was not a final judgment. The Parsonses assert several bases for their position. First, they assert that their claim seeking equitable relief against Aaron (seeking to enjoin Aaron from proceeding with the purchase, lease, or operation of a competing gym) was never ruled upon—even though the jury returned a verdict on that claim—and that it remained pending. The Parsonses also assert that the trial court had not certified the judgment awarding damages as final for purposes of appeal.
The Parsonses also allege that the July 5, 2001, order was conditioned upon Aaron's accepting the trial court's order of remittitur. Thus, the Parsonses allege that the July 5, 2001, order was conditional; that it required further action by the parties; and that it did not have the effect of a final judgment.
The Parsonses also allege that the 42-day period did not begin to run until after all postjudgment motions had been ruled upon. The Parsonses assert that Aaron's July 19, 2001, motion styled as a "Request for Correction/Amendment of Order," prevented the 42-day period for appeal from running. The Parsonses assert that the request for correction or amendment of the order was another postjudgment motion and that, although Aaron filed a notice of acceptance of the remittitur on July 25, Aaron never withdrew the pending postjudgment motion to correct or amend. Because the trial court has not ruled upon that motion, the Parsonses argue, the request for correction or amendment of the order remains pending.
Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., provides (with limited exceptions) that a party wanting to appeal to an appellate court must file his or her notice of appeal within 42 days of the date of the entry of the judgment appealed from. Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P., provides that the filing of a postjudgment motion under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., suspends the time for filing a notice of appeal; it provides that "the full time fixed for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of the entry in the civil docket of an order granting or denying such motion."
However, what saves the Parsonses' appeal from being untimely in this case is the effect of Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. To avoid the automatic denial of pending motions after 90 days as mandated by Rule 59.1, the trial court entered upon the case action summary a statement reflecting that the parties had expressly consented to the posttrial motions' remaining pending until July 6, 2001, unless they were ruled upon by the court before that date. On July 5, 2001, the trial court unconditionally denied all posttrial motions except for the Parsonses' motion for a new trial, which the court denied conditioned upon Aaron's acceptance of a remittitur. Because that remittitur had not been accepted as of July 6, that aspect of the Parsonses' posttrial motions remained pending on July 6, 2001.5 Because the Parsonses' notices of appeal were filed on August 17, 2001, 42 days after July 6, the notices of appeal were timely filed. For this reason, we deny Aaron's motion to dismiss the Parsonses' appeals.
From a factual standpoint, this case is riddled with conflicts—interpersonal ones among the...
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