Parsons v. City of Ann Arbor
| Decision Date | 02 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-10486 |
| Parties | DREW PARSONS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
Plaintiff Drew Parsons sued the City of Ann Arbor, its police department ("AAPD"), and several police officers. ECF 1. Plaintiff asserted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendants for excessive force in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 6-8. Plaintiff also asserted several state law claims of assault and battery against Officers Kandt and Scott, id. at 9-10, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") against Sergeant Pulford, Officers Kandt, Scott, Shafer, and Chinn, id. at 10-13, and negligent supervision and training against the City and AAPD, id. at 14-15. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. ECF 10. In response, Plaintiff requested that the Court sanction Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. ECF 13, PgID 119-20. The Court reviewed the briefs and finds that a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f). For the reasons below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss and will deny the sanctions request.
One night, Plaintiff was at an Ann Arbor bar. ECF 1, PgID 3. Plaintiff claimed that while he was inside the bar, "an altercation occurred and Plaintiff was misidentified as one of the individuals involved in the altercation." Id. Two bouncers then escorted Plaintiff out of the bar and Officer Kandt exited his patrol car and approached Plaintiff. Id.
Officer Kandt then allegedly "grabbed Plaintiff by the arm[,] pulled him over to the front [of] the police car" and told Plaintiff "to put his hands behind his back." Id. Plaintiff allegedly did not resist Officer Kandt, but the officer grabbed him "and forced him face-first onto the hood of the police car, trapping one of Plaintiff's arms between his chest and the hood of the police car." Id. at 4. Then Plaintiff alleged that Officer Kandt, "without hesitation, grabbed Plaintiff, picked him up, and body-slammed him face-first down onto the pavement." Id. While Plaintiff was on the ground, Officer Kandt called out that "he had 'one resisting.'" Id.
Shortly after the call, Officer "Scott arrived on scene[,]" "climbed on top of Plaintiff and began assisting [Officer] Kandt in executing the 'arrest' of Plaintiff." Id. Once the officers handcuffed Plaintiff, they lifted him "off of the ground and led him to the back of the police car." Id. Eventually, Sergeant Pulford and Officers Shafer and Chinn arrived on scene. Id.
As a result of the takedown, Plaintiff was "disoriented and bleeding profusely from his face[.]" Id. at 5. Shortly after, an ambulance arrived on scene to treat Plaintiff for his injuries and transport him to the hospital. Id.
Last, Plaintiff also alleged that the City and AAPD were "grossly negligent" and had "official policies, practice[s], orders, directives, or customs, which tolerated, authorized, and/or permitted insufficient supervision, training, placement, and discipline of" the officers that caused Plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 6.
The Court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if the complaint fails to allege facts "sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,' and to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)). The Court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, presumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual assertions, and draws every reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's favor. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
But the Court will not presume the truth of legal conclusions in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If "a cause of action fails as a matter of law, regardless of whether the plaintiff's factual allegations are true or not," then the Court must dismiss. Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 553 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009).
The Court may also rely on video evidence if the "video 'utterly discredit[s]' [Plaintiff's] version of events and allows [the Court] to ignore the 'visible fiction' [of] his complaint." Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007)). But the Court cannot employ videoevidence if "the video captured only part of the incident or would distort [the Court's] view of the events." Id. (citation omitted).
To support the motion to dismiss, Defendants attached videos recorded on the officers' body cameras and on the dashboard cameras of the officers' patrol cars. ECF 11. The Court will first discuss whether the Court may rely on the videos to resolve the motion. After, the Court will address the individual claims against the officers and then the claims against the City and AAPD. Last, the Court will discuss Plaintiff's request for sanctions.
Defendants first contended that the Court should consider evidence from outside the complaint to resolve the motion to dismiss, ECF 10, PgID 70-72, including several videos that recorded the incident, ECF 11. Although the Court has reviewed the videos, the Court will not rely on the videos because the events in the video do not satisfy the high bar of "utterly discredit[ting]" Plaintiff's allegations. Bailey, 860 F.3d at 386 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81).
Two videos recorded the alleged events: Officer Kandt's body camera video and the video from his patrol car's dashboard. Both videos show a very quick interaction between Officer Kandt and Plaintiff that ends with Officer Kandt bringing Plaintiff to the ground. There is a lot of yelling, no indication that Plaintiff was violent towards Officer Kandt, and no indication that Plaintiff fled, see ECF 11, although the argument that Plaintiff resisted the officer is certainly colorable.
The complaint alleged that Officer Kandt "body-slammed" Plaintiff while Plaintiff was "attempting to comply with [Officer] Kandt's orders[.]" ECF 1, PgID 4. An excessive force claim "depends on the facts and circumstances of each case viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and not with 20/20 hindsight." Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007). Without more evidence about the encounter, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff's excessive force claim has merit. Thomas v. Noder-Love, 621 F. App'x 825, 830 (6th Cir. 2015). The videos therefore do not "utterly discredit" Plaintiff's excessive force claim and the Court will not consider the videos at the motion to dismiss stage. Bailey, 860 F.3d at 386 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81). The Court will now address the claims to dismiss the complaint.
For the § 1983 claims against Officers Shafer, Chinn, and Sergeant Pulford, each officer asserted that the complaint fails to state a claim against them. ECF 10, PgID 72-73. The complaint alleged that the three officers violated Plaintiff's right against police use of excessive force. ECF 1, PgID 6-8.
"A plaintiff who claims that a defendant used excessive force must show that the officer '(1) actively participated in the use of excessive force, (2) supervised the officer who used excessive force, or (3) owed the victim a duty of protection against the use of excessive force.'" Fazica v. Jordan, 926 F.3d 283, 289 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff's claimsagainst Officers Shafer, Chinn, and Sergeant Pulford stem from the officers' "duty to protect Plaintiff from the use of excessive force[.]" ECF 13, PgID 110.
The Sixth Circuit "has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right." Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Because of that, the Court must "analyze separately whether [Plaintiff] has stated a plausible constitutional violation by each individual defendant, and [] cannot ascribe the acts of all Individual Defendants to each individual defendant." Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 565 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The Court will sequentially analyze the claims against Officer Shafer, Officer Chinn, and Sergeant Pulford.
The complaint alleged that Shafer "arrived on scene" after Officers Kandt and Scott handcuffed Plaintiff and "lifted [him] off of the ground and led him to the back of the police car." ECF 1, PgID 4. In other words, Officer Shafer arrived on scene after the alleged excessive force occurred. The complaint made no other specific reference to Officer Shafer. See ECF 1.
The Sixth Circuit has held that an "officer who fails to act to prevent the use of excessive force may still be held liable" if two conditions are met. Fazica, 926 F.3d at 290 (emphasis in original). First, "the officer observed or had reason to know thatexcessive force would be or was being used, and [second] the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring." Id. (quoting Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2008)). Put differently, "mere presence at the scene . . . without a showing of direct responsibility for the action, will not subject an officer to liability." Binay, 601 F.3d at 650 (quoting Ghandi v. Police Dep't of the City of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 352 (6th Cir. 1984)).
The §...
To continue reading
Request your trial