Parsons v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC
| Decision Date | 28 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-cv-00649 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | RODERICK D. PARSONS, et al., individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated in the State of West Virginia, Plaintiffs, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiffs Roderick D. Parsons, Charles B. Hunt, Brenda L. Hunt, Jerry E. Cunningham, Belinda Cunningham, Chelsea R. Miller, James D. Miller, Bruce W. Cunningham, Joseph Cunningham, Annettea S. Fields, Kelvin M. Greathouse, Kay M. Greathouse, David S. Casto, Debra D. Casto, Jacob Somerville, and Pamela Doss (collectively, "Plaintiffs") bring this purported class action against Defendants Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC ("CGT") and Columbia Pipeline Group Services Company ("CPG") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants unlawfully stored natural gas in a storage field underlying Plaintiffs' properties and, in the process of withdrawing the storage gas, unlawfully removed "native gas" that occupied the storage field prior to the injection of storage gas. (ECF No. 2.) Before this Court is Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. (ECF No. 15.) For the reasons explained more fully herein, the motion is DENIED.
Plaintiffs are landowners whose real property "lies within the boundaries of CGT's Ripley Storage Field." (ECF No. 2 at 2-4.) The Ripley Storage Field is one of twelve such underground natural gas storage fields that CGT, a subsidiary of CPG, operates throughout West Virginia "under authorization granted by, and subject to the jurisdiction of, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")." (Id. at 4, 5.) When the demand for natural gas is low, Defendants inject natural gas into these underground storage fields, and the natural gas is withdrawn when demand is high. (Id. at 6.) But in the process, Defendants "also remove[] some quantity of 'native gas' that pre-existed [Defendants'] injection of storage gas into the [underground storage field]." (Id.)
Defendants obtain the legal right to store and remove natural gas by either negotiating an agreement with the landowners within whose property the underground storage field lies or using eminent domain authority granted under the Natural Gas Act ("NGA"), 15 U.S.C. § 717, et seq. (Id.) However, Defendants cannot do so without first procuring a FERC-approved certificate of public convenience and necessity designating the boundaries of the underground storage field. (Id. at 8.) A predecessor of Defendants first obtained such a certificate for the Ripley Storage Field on March 23, 1953, and began gas-storage operations at some point between that date and 1971. (Id. at 6.) Defendants later determined that the FERC certificate did not cover the entirety of their operations in the Ripley Storage Field, so they sought and obtained an expanded FERC certificate, which was awarded on September 21, 1992. (Id. at 7.)
Although Defendants maintain records identifying the landowners whose real property lies within the boundaries of their underground storage fields, those records are not available to the general public "or even to the persons or entities who own real property or mineral rights within the certificated boundaries." (Id. at 9.) Therefore, the landowners cannot themselves ascertain whether one of Defendants' underground storage fields "extends below their real property or any real property to which they hold mineral rights, thereby allowing [Defendants] to use the property without paying just compensation." (Id.) Defendants have previously notified some Plaintiffs "that their real property is located above the Ripley Storage Field, and that [Defendants have] been using the Ripley Storage Field for an indeterminate amount of time without previous notice and without paying just compensation" for that use. (Id.) Plaintiffs have not reached an agreement with Defendants to allow for the use of their property, nor have Defendants acquired the right to use Plaintiffs' property through eminent domain during the time Defendants have operated the Ripley Storage Field. (Id. at 10.) "As a result, [Defendants have] knowingly and wrongfully taken Plaintiffs' property without paying just compensation." (Id.)
Based upon this conduct, Plaintiffs allege claims for trespass, conversion, unjust enrichment, and inverse condemnation. (Id. at 12-17.) They also seek a declaratory judgment that they "are entitled to just compensation for [Defendants'] use of their properties for storage of gas, past and present," and that Defendants must negotiate an agreement to use Plaintiffs' property or institute eminent domain proceedings, as well as a permanent injunction prohibiting the use of their property unless Defendants do so. (Id. at 17-19.)
Defendants filed their Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on November 1, 2019. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiffs timely responded on January 15, 2020 (ECF No. 26), and Defendants timely replied on January 31, 2020 (ECF No. 27). As such, Defendants' motion is fully briefed and ready for resolution.
In general, a pleading must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) (). However, to withstand a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint "must be sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that alleges enough facts "to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by [the relevant] statute" will survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 648 (quoting McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first "identif[ies] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption oftruth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then "assume[s] the[] veracity" of the complaint's "well-pleaded factual allegations" and "determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. Review of the complaint is "a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged." Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
CGT moves to dismiss Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Six, and Seven of Plaintiffs' complaint, and CPG moves to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims against it. (ECF No. 15 at 1.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims for trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment are preempted by the NGA and are barred by the applicable statute of limitation, leaving only claims for inverse condemnation, which do not entitle Plaintiffs to the damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief sought. (ECF No. 16 at 6-11.) In addition, they argue that no claims lie against CPG because it does not operate the Ripley Storage Field. (Id. at 11.)
This Court first turns to Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' claims for trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment are time-barred. Columbia Venture, LLC v. Dewberry & Davis, LLC, 604 F.3d 824, 828-29 (4th Cir. 2010) (); see Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. Prince George's Cty., 212 F.3d 863, 865 (4th Cir. 2000). Defendantscontend that claims for trespass and conversion must be brought within two years of the date Plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered their injuries and that claims for unjust enrichment must be brought within five years of that time. (Id. at 10.) According to Defendants, "Plaintiffs admit that the key facts giving rise to their claims, notably [CGT] or its predecessor storing natural gas on their property, arose as late as the 1970's and as early as the 1950's." (Id. at 10-11 (citing ECF No. 2 at 6).)
This Court may dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as barred by the applicable statute of limitation only if "[a]ll facts necessary to decide whether" the claim is time-barred, "including when the cause of action first accrued, appear on the face of the complaint." Meridian Invs., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 855 F.3d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Leichling v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 842 F.3d 848, 850-51 (4th Cir. 2016)); Sansom v. TSI Corp., No. 2:17-cv-04444, 2019 WL 1179410, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 13, 2019) (citing Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Because Plaintiffs bring their claims pursuant to West Virginia law, this Court looks to state law to determine the limitations period for each claim and further applies "any rule . . . that...
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