Parsons v. State, 121918 AKCA, A-12399
|Opinion Judge:||MANNHEIMER JUDGE.|
|Party Name:||LOGAN AARON PARSONS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.|
|Attorney:||Lars Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Timothy W. Terrell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge.|
|Case Date:||December 19, 2018|
|Court:||Court of Appeals of Alaska|
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Trial Court No. 3PA-13-032 CR Palmer, Eric Smith, Judge.
Lars Johnson, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Timothy W. Terrell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge.[*]
In 2015, the Alaska legislature amended AS 12.55.027(d) to grant defendants credit against their sentences of imprisonment for the time they spend under electronic monitoring while on bail release, provided that certain requirements are met. The two statutory requirements are (1) that the defendant must not have committed any new criminal offense while on electronic monitoring, and (2) that the defendant's conditions of electronic monitoring must require the defendant to be confined to a residence except for the specified types of absences listed in the statute.
Logan Aaron Parsons seeks credit against his sentence for 63 days that he spent under electronic monitoring in mid-2013. The State opposes Parsons's request on two grounds.
First, the amended version of AS 12.55.027(d) did not take effect until August 18, 2015. Until that time, AS 12.55.027(d) affirmatively barred sentencing courts from granting credit against a sentence of imprisonment for time spent under electronic monitoring. The State argues that the new version of AS 12.55.027(d) does not apply to periods of electronic monitoring that were served before the amendment of the statute - and, therefore, Parsons cannot properly claim credit for the time he spent under electronic monitoring in 2013.
Second, the State argues that even if the new version of AS 12.55.027(d) should be interpreted as retroactively allowing credit for pre-2015 periods of electronic monitoring, Parsons does not qualify for credit because he committed a new...
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