Parsons v. State
| Decision Date | 05 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 577,Docket No. 42308 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | DANIEL D. PARSONS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent. |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge.
Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.
Daniel D. Parsons, Jr., Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ted S. Tollefson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
____________________
Daniel D. Parsons, Jr., appeals from the district court's judgment summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. He makes numerous claims, including several allegations of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Parsons and his wife drove to Idaho from Nevada equipped with disguises, a police scanner, and a loaded gun. They rented a minivan under Parsons's name and used that vehicle to drive to a bank. Wearing a disguise, Parsons's wife attempted to rob the bank while he waited in the vehicle. Unsuccessful in her attempt, she ran back to the van and the couple sped away. This process was repeated the next day at a different bank and in a different vehicle, but Parsons'swife succeeded in robbing that bank. However, the teller gave her money with a tracker inside, which police used to intercept the couple, leading to a high-speed chase that ended with Parsons crashing the vehicle. Parsons's wife initially claimed sole responsibility for the robbery. However, she admitted that Parsons was aware of her intent to rob the bank when he drove her there and remained outside while she committed the robbery. She also told law enforcement that she never threatened Parsons, pointed the gun at him, or otherwise forced him to participate in the robberies.
Parsons was charged with aiding and abetting robbery, I.C. §§ 18-6501 and 18-204, and eluding a peace officer, I.C. § 49-1404. A jury found him guilty of both charges. The jury also found Parsons to be a persistent violator of the law, I.C. § 19-2514, based on his four previous felony convictions. As a result, Parsons was sentenced to consecutive terms of fixed life imprisonment. Parsons appealed, contending that the district court had erred in its jury instructions pertaining to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. This Court held that, although Parsons had shown that the district court committed fundamental error, that error was harmless; accordingly, we affirmed Parsons's judgment of conviction. State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 667-72, 289 P.3d 1059, 1060-65 (Ct. App. 2012).
Parsons filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging numerous instances of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, as well as several trial errors. Parsons's petition also included a request that the district court judge be disqualified, which was denied. Parsons requested and was appointed post-conviction counsel. The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal. Parsons objected and a hearing was held. The district court subsequently filed a notice of intent to dismiss and gave Parsons more than twenty days to respond. Ultimately, the district court summarily dismissed Parsons's petition, holding that his alleged trial errors were either barred because they could have been raised in his direct appeal or were conclusory and unsupported by the record. The district court further held that Parsons had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Parsons appeals.
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. I.C. § 19-4907; Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the petition will be subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to make the most probable inferences that can be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Suchinferences will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in his or her favor. For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when the state does not controvert the petitioner's evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
From Parsons's pro se petition for post-conviction relief and brief on appeal, we have gleaned the following general categories of claims: (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; (3) errors occurred during Parsons's criminal trial; and (4) the district judge who presided over both Parsons's criminal trialand post-conviction proceedings was biased against him and should have been disqualified. We will address each category in turn.
Parsons raised numerous ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in his petition for post-conviction relief, most of which he alleges the district court erred in summarily dismissing. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray, 121 Idaho at 924-25, 828 P.2d at 1329-30. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a...
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