Parsons v. State

Decision Date23 October 2000
Docket NumberNo. 29680.,29680.
Citation116 Nev. 928,10 P.3d 836
PartiesDavid Earl PARSONS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
CourtNevada Supreme Court

Harry R. Gensler, Public Defender, and Harold Kuehn, Deputy Public Defender, Nye County, for Appellant.

Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, Carson City; Robert S. Beckett, District Attorney, and John J. Friel, Jr., Deputy District Attorney, Nye County, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant David Earl Parsons was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of felony driving under the influence in violation of NRS 484.379 and NRS 484.3792(1)(c). On appeal, a panel of this court reversed the conviction, concluding that the district court erred by permitting the State to file an information by affidavit pursuant to NRS 173.035(2). See Parsons v. State, 115 Nev. 91, 978 P.2d 963 (1999)

. The State filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied by the three-justice panel. The State then filed a petition for en banc reconsideration.

The primary concern raised in the petition is whether the constitutional validity of the prior DUI convictions used to enhance the instant offense to a felony was properly the subject of the preliminary examination in justice's court. We conclude that this is a substantial public policy issue and, therefore, en banc reconsideration is warranted. See NRAP 40A(a). We further conclude that the constitutional validity of a prior conviction that is being used for enhancement purposes is not at issue at the preliminary examination stage of a criminal proceeding. However, we conclude that the three-justice panel was correct to reverse the conviction in this case because, under the particular circumstances of this case, the district court erred by permitting the State to file an information by affidavit. We therefore grant reconsideration, but reverse the judgment of conviction.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

This case has a rather long and tortured procedural history that begins in December 1991, when the State charged Parsons by criminal complaint with one count of felony driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of NRS 484.379 and NRS 484.3792(1)(c). The State alleged that Parsons had two prior DUI offenses within the preceding 7 years: (1) an arrest on November 21, 1987, and conviction on April 15, 1988, in Flagstaff, Arizona; and (2) an arrest on September 9, 1990, and conviction on December 13, 1990, in Beatty, Nevada.

During the preliminary examination in justice's court, Parsons challenged the constitutional validity of the Beatty conviction.1 Parsons moved to have the felony offense "stricken down to a second offense DUI" on the ground that the complaint charging him with a second-offense DUI in Beatty had been improper because it incorrectly stated the location of his first DUI offense. Parsons therefore requested that the justice's court permit him to enter a plea to a second offense DUI and receive his sentence.

The justice's court, having personal knowledge of the Beatty proceedings, opined that if Parsons had had effective counsel at the time of his hearing on the Beatty DUI the problem with the complaint would have been noted and the charge could have been dismissed or reduced to a first-offense DUI.2 The justice's court also noted that the complaint in the instant case listed the prior offenses correctly. Nonetheless, the justice's court went on to "strike the complaint" and allow Parsons to enter a guilty plea to a second-offense misdemeanor DUI charge. The justice's court sentenced Parsons to 30 days in jail, to be served intermittently, and ordered Parsons to pay an $800.00 fine. Parsons subsequently fled the jurisdiction without serving the sentence or paying the fine.

After unsuccessfully attempting to appeal the judgment to the district court, the State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the district court. The district court granted the petition, issuing an order nullifying Parsons' conviction and rescheduling the preliminary examination in justice's court.

Parsons filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in this court. Parsons asked this court to issue a writ directing the district court to void its order and vacate the rescheduled preliminary examination. This court denied Parsons' petition, concluding that the district court correctly determined that the justice's court exceeded its jurisdiction by amending the complaint and accepting the guilty plea. Parsons v. District Court, 110 Nev. 1239, 885 P.2d 1316 (1994) (Parsons I).

The justice's court conducted a preliminary examination on August 21, 1995. The State offered the testimony of the law enforcement officer who arrested Parsons. At the conclusion of the testimony, Parsons again challenged the constitutional validity of the Beatty conviction. This time Parsons argued that because the Beatty complaint did not allege that Parsons had been driving on a highway or premises to which the public has access— an element of a DUI offense, it was unclear whether he had had a sufficient understanding of the law and the elements of the offense to have entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Parsons further argued that the documents offered by the State were ambiguous as to whether Parsons had waived his right to an attorney or had been represented by counsel. After hearing argument from the State, the justice's court concluded that the Beatty complaint was deficient as it did not include an element of the offense and that it was not clear whether Parsons had counsel in the Beatty proceedings. The justice's court therefore declined to bind Parsons over for trial in the district court.

The State subsequently filed a motion to file an information by affidavit in the district court pursuant to NRS 173.035(2).3 The State relied in large part on the evidence presented to the justice's court; however, the State also provided an affidavit from Teresa Stucker, the Beatty Justice Court Clerk. In her affidavit, Stucker explained that Parsons had waived counsel for the arraignment, but informed the Beatty Justice Court that he would be represented at further proceedings by retained counsel. The district court granted the State's motion and permitted the State to file the information by affidavit, concluding that the justice's court had committed egregious error in discharging the criminal complaint.

The district court arraigned Parsons on the information on November 28, 1995. After the district court denied various pretrial motions, a jury trial commenced on March 4, 1996. The jury found Parsons guilty of driving under the influence. At sentencing, the district court found the prior convictions to be sufficient and constitutionally valid for enhancement purposes. The court sentenced Parsons to one year in prison and a $2,000.00 fine.

DISCUSSION

In resolving this petition for en banc reconsideration, we address whether the justice's court properly considered the constitutional validity of the prior offenses in deciding whether there was probable cause to bind Parsons over for trial in district court. We take this opportunity to clarify the role of the justices' courts with respect to a felony charge of driving under the influence in violation of NRS 484.379 and NRS 484.3792(1)(c) and the related issue of what the State is required to present at a preliminary examination on such a charge.

The justices' courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have only the authority granted by statute. See NRS 4.370. The criminal jurisdiction of the justices' courts is limited to misdemeanors unless otherwise provided by specific statute. NRS 4.370(3). Thus, the justices' courts do not have jurisdiction over gross misdemeanor or felony offenses. Because gross misdemeanor and felony offenses are not triable in justice's court, a person charged with such offenses cannot be called upon to plead in justice's court. See NRS 171.196. However, the justice's court is required to conduct a preliminary examination in such cases. The justice's court's role at a preliminary examination is to make an evidentiary evaluation of whether there is "probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." See NRS 171.206. The preliminary examination is not a trial and the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence is not a matter before the court. State of Nevada v. Justice Court, 112 Nev. 803, 806, 919 P.2d 401, 402 (1996). At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the justice's court must either bind the defendant over to district court or discharge the defendant.4 See NRS 171.206.

A person who violates the provisions of NRS 484.379 is guilty of a category B felony where the violation is "[f]or a third or subsequent offense within 7 years." NRS 484.3792(1)(c). As such, a charge of felony driving under the influence in violation of NRS 484 .379 and NRS 484.3792(1)(c) may not be tried in justice's court. The justice's court's role is solely to conduct a preliminary hearing and determine whether there is probable cause to find that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. In Parsons I, we stated in dictum:

It was within the discretion of the justice court to consider the constitutional sufficiency of the priors only in the context of making an evidentiary determination of whether or not probable cause existed to bind Parsons over on the felony charge. When the justice court determined that a prior conviction was infirm on constitutional grounds, and that the felony charge accordingly could not stand, the only order that the justice court was jurisdictionally empowered to enter was a dismissal of the felony charge.

110 Nev. at 1244, 885 P.2d at 1320. Upon further review and consideration, we have determined that this dicta in Parsons I is unsound to the extent that it suggests that the constitutional validity of the prior convictions is part of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 23 October 2012
    ...Cnty. of Nye [“ Parsons I ”], 110 Nev. 1239, 885 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Parsons v. State [“ Parsons II ”], 116 Nev. 928, 10 P.3d 836 (2000) (en banc). Once properly filed, the citation is “deemed to be a lawful complaint for the purpose of prosecution.” NRS § ......
  • Sheriff v. Witzenburg
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 9 November 2006
    ...(1986) (stating that Confrontation Clause violations are subject to a harmless error analysis). 17. NRS 171.206; Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 933, 10 P.3d 836, 839 (2000). 18. Whittley v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 614, 616, 491 P.2d 1282, 1283 19. As an additional point, although Crawford is not ......
  • Moultrie v. State
    • United States
    • Nevada Court of Appeals
    • 24 December 2015
    ...prejudice. Dressler v. State, 107 Nev. 686, 689, 819 P.2d 1288, 1290 (1991). Moreover, Moultrie's reliance on Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 934–36, 10 P.3d 836, 839–41 (2000), to assert that the State must substantiate the existence of prior convictions at preliminary examinations is inap......
  • Hobbs v. State
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 19 May 2011
    ...examination, the constitutional validity of the prior convictions is not for the justice court to determine. Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 936, 10 P.3d 836, 841 (2000). Rather, that issue “is for the trial court to determine at, or anytime before, sentencing.” Id.; see also Hudson v. Ward......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT