Parsons v. State

• Decision Date: 17 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: 313 Ark. 224,853 S.W.2d 276
• Parties: Jeffrey O. PARSONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 93-35.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 276

853 S.W.2d 276

313 Ark. 224

Jeffrey O. PARSONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 93-35.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 17, 1993.

John Lloyd Johnson, Russellville, for appellant.

J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

BROWN, Justice.

This appeal concerns an interpretation and application of the implied consent statute of the Omnibus DWI Act. The appellant, Jeffrey O. Parsons, was charged with driving while intoxicated, running a red light, and violation of implied consent. The first two charges were dismissed. He appealed his conviction for violating the implied consent statute, and the circuit court affirmed that conviction in a bench trial. We affirm the result reached by the circuit court, but for different reasons.

On January 25, 1992, at about 4:30 a.m., appellant Parsons was stopped by Russellville Police Officer Ben Cross after running a red light and making a sudden turn. Officer Cross had him perform field sobriety tests which he was unable to complete. The police officer determined that Parsons was intoxicated, and he then directed him to submit to a test to determine his alcohol level. Parsons refused. As a result, the police officer ticketed Parsons for running a red light, DWI, and violating the implied consent statute.

On April 29, 1992, a guilty verdict was entered in Russellville Municipal Court on the charges of DWI first offense, the red-light violation, and implied consent. Parsons was fined, his driver's license was suspended for nine months, and he was sentenced to one day in jail which was suspended. The DWI and red-light matters were subsequently dismissed, and Parsons appealed his conviction for violating the implied consent statute to circuit court.

At the subsequent bench trial in circuit court, Officer Cross testified that when Parsons ran the red light and turned sharply, Cross had to take evasive action to avoid a collision with Parsons's pickup truck. Cross further testified that he assumed the appellant was drunk before he pulled him over. After the stop, he testified that he smelled alcohol when Parsons rolled down his window. He also noticed almost a case of beer in the bed of the truck. He noted that the appellant's eyes were extremely bloodshot and his speech was slurred. He ordered Parsons to get out of the cab and perform field sobriety tests, which he could not finish. Parsons exhibited all the signs of intoxication, according to Officer Cross. He concluded that Parsons was "extremely intoxicated."

On cross-examination, Cross testified that he did not have reason to believe that Parsons was drunk until the appellant rolled down the window, and he detected a strong odor of alcohol. He then added that he suspected Parsons of DWI when he was almost hit head-on early in the morning. He reiterated on re-direct that he suspected the appellant was intoxicated when the appellant ran the red light and turned in front of him. Parsons, in his testimony, denied that he ran the red light or that he was intoxicated.

Parsons moved to have the implied consent charge dismissed because the state failed to show that Officer Cross had reason to believe that Parsons was intoxicated before he pulled him over, as required by statute. The circuit court found that although it believed the statute did require the police officer to form a reasonable belief that the driver was intoxicated before he pulled the driver over, reasonable cause existed in this case due to Parsons's running a stop light at 4:30 in the morning. The court added that the case was "thin." The court concluded that Parsons was guilty of violating the implied consent statute, and it suspended his license for six months.

The relevant portion of the implied consent statute reads as follows:

(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provision of § 5-65-203, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content of his or her blood if:

....

(3) The person is stopped by a law enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person, while operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, is intoxicated or has one-tenth of one percent (0.10%) or more of alcohol in his or her blood.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-202(a)(3) (Supp.1991).

In support of his argument, Parsons adduces two decisions which he contends hold that a police officer must have reasonable cause to believe that a motorist is intoxicated before he stops that motorist. Roberts v. State, 287 Ark. 451, 701 S.W.2d 112 (1985); Gober v. State, 22 Ark.App. 121, 736 S.W.2d 18 (1987). He further argues that the circuit court was in error in finding that the requisite reasonable-cause belief was formed by Officer Cross before he stopped Parsons.

A finding of the trial court cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Ark.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Here, we cannot say the circuit court clearly erred in its finding. We disagree, however, with the circuit court's interpretation of § 5-65-202(a)(3...