Parsons v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 14 September 1910
• Citation: 107 Me. 65,78 A. 347
• Parties: PARSONS v. STEVENS et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

78 A. 347

107 Me. 65

PARSONS

v. STEVENS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Sept. 14, 1910.

Syllabus by the Court.

Spear and Whitehouse, JJ., dissenting.

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Kennebec County.

Bill by one Parsons against Stevens and others.From the decree, plaintiff appeals, and brings exceptions.Exceptions sustained.

Bill in equity praying that a certain deed of warranty given by the plaintiff to the defendants"be rectified and reformed in accordance with the mutual intent of the parties thereof at the time said deed was made, executed, and delivered, by adding to the description thereof" certain words, so that the deed as reformed should except a certain right of way from the description and covenants.This cause grew out of an action at law brought by the defendants against the plaintiff upon the covenants of warranty in the aforesaid deed, in which said action at law the defendants claimed damages for breach of the covenants in said deed, and assigned as said breach the fact that the said premises so conveyed to them were subject to the aforesaid right of way.The defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff's bill, and the plaintiff filed a replication.The bill of exceptions further states the case as follows :

"This cause came on to be heard on the twenty-ninth day of October, 1909, and issues of fact were framed for a jury.

"After the cause was opened to a jury and a part of the evidence for the plaintiff introduced, court adjourned for the noon recess.At the time of adjournment the presiding justice stated that he should rule that a certain right of way conveyed by the plaintiff to one Jones would be confined to a right of way 'as used' at the time of such conveyance.The words 'as used' were actually employed by said justice to signify 'in the same location as.'

"Before the coming in of court in the afternoon in the presence of the presiding justice, the defendants' counsel proposed that a final decree by consent be entered sustaining the plaintiff's bill, and reforming the deed named therein as prayed for.Such final decree was drawn, signed by the presiding justice, filed in court, and consented to by both parties.

"The presiding justice then announced that the cause had been settled by the parties, and dismissed the jury from its consideration.

"On the fifth day of November, 1909, the defendants moved that said decree be set aside on the ground that they understood the words 'as used,' as employed by the presiding justice, to refer not to location, but as equivalent to the words 'for the same uses as.'The plaintiffs were in no wise responsible for such misunderstanding.The presiding justice found the foregoing facts, and also that the defendants did so misunderstand the meaning in which he employed the words 'as used' in such statement, and that such misunderstanding was the sole motive which induced them to propose the said decree to the plaintiff and to consent to its being entered, signed, and filed.

"The court thereupon ruled that it was within its discretion to withdraw the decree and allow the action to stand for trial."

The decree of the presiding justice granting the motion of the defendants to have the aforesaid final decree withdrawn is as follows: "Motion granted and final decree ordered to be withdrawn, said decree having been signed, entered, and agreed to because of a mistake of fact, and a misunderstanding between the sitting justice and counsel for defendants as to the scope of the proposed ruling, on the strength of which the defendants' counsel and his clients consented to the settlement and the final decree without completing the trial.This motion is granted hereon upon the payment by the defendants to the plaintiff of the sum of $40 to reimburse him towards expenses and costs."

Argued before EMERY, C. J., and SAVAGE, PEABODY, KING, and BIRD, JJ.

Williamson & Burleigh, for plaintiff.

L. T. Carieton, for defendants.

EMERY, C. J.The material allegations of fact in the bill of exceptions in this case may be summarized as follows: Stevens brought an action of covenant broken against Parsons for breach of his covenant of warranty against incumbrances in his deed of conveyance of certain land to Stevens.The breach alleged was the existence of a right of way in a third party across the land.Upon the bringing of that suit, Parsons brought this bill in equity against Stevens to procure a reformation of the deed he had given Stevens so that it should except the right of way from the description and covenants.In this equity suit an answer was filed and also the usual replication.

At the next term of this court in the county the parties appeared, and both suits were set for trial together before the same jury, issues of fact in the equity suit having been framed for the jury.After some evidence had been introduced by Parsons, the plaintiff in the equity suit, the court adjourned for the noon recess.At the time of such adjournment the presiding justice stated that "he should rule that a certain right of way conveyed by Parsons to one Jones would be confined to a right of way 'as used' at the time of such conveyance."During the recess, Stevens' counsel in the presence of the presiding justice proposed that the entry "Neither party, no further action for the same cause," be made in the action at law, and that a final decree by consent be entered in the equity suit sustaining the bill and reforming the deed as prayed for.Counsel for Parsons accepted the proposition, and the entry agreed upon was made in open court in the action at law, and in the equity suit the decree agreed upon was drawn, signed by the presiding justice, filed and entered.The presiding justice thereupon announced that the cases had been settled, and dismissed the jury from further consideration of them.

The decree was as follows, viz.: "That the deed dated May 19, 1906, from said plaintiff to said defendants be reformed by adding thereto after the words 'well situated on said premises' the words 'also excepting and reserving to said Maude M. Jones, her heirs and assigns, a right of way over and across the west side of said Wing lot from Main street to the fence first mentioned herein as the second bound of the land herein conveyed, as reserved to said Maude M. Jones in deed from said grantor to said Maude M. Jones, dated May 17, 1906, and recorded in Kennebec County Registry of Deeds, book 470, page 399.'"

Seven days afterward, but during the same term, Stevens' counsel instead of taking an appeal, moved the single justice to withdraw and set aside the decree in equity, on the ground that be understood the words "as used" in the statement by the presiding justice as to what his ruling would be to refer, not to location, but as equivalent to the words "for the same uses as."The justice intended to convey the former idea, viz., "in the same location as," and employed the words "as used" for that purpose, and he found as facts that Stevens' counsel understood the words to signify "for the same uses as," and but for such understanding would not have agreed to the entry and decree.Neither Parsons nor his counsel was in any way responsible for such misunderstanding.

The presiding justice against the objection of Parsons' counsel in the case withdrew the decree filed in the equity suit, and ordered the case to stand upon the docket for trial.Parsons' counsel thereupon excepted to this ruling.The question presented is important, being whether, upon the facts stated, the case was so finally disposed of and ended that the single justice should not have undertaken upon mere motion of counsel summarily to adjudicate upon the questions of law and fact involved, but should have remitted the complaining party to his right of appeal or to the usual and more deliberate procedure of review provided for obtaining relief from alleged mistakes in judgments and agreements.

There must of course be some point or stage in every court procedure, legal or equitable, when the particular cause is finally disposed of, its thread cut, and the parties are out of court, to be brought in again only by some new process duly served upon them.Where the court is open during regular terms only, it is common learning that the final adjournment of the term ends the power of the court over final judgments and decrees passed at the term.Its orders, decrees, and judgments then existing, made as intended at the time, must stand until corrected or reversed upon some new proceeding by way of review.Bank of U. S. v. Moss, 6 How. 31, at page 38, 12 L;Ed. 331;Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 26 L. Ed. 797.This rule, or principle, applies to suits in equity as well as to actions at law.Brooks v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 107, 26 L. Ed. 91 was a suit in equity (see same case, 101 U. S. 443, 25 L. Ed. 1057) in which it was decided that a petition for rehearing presented after the term at which the decree was made could not be entertained.The court said: "At the end of the term parties are discharged from further attendance on all cases decided, and we have no power to bring them back.After that we can do no more than correct any clerical errors that may be found in the record of what we have done."In Mummys v. Morgan's Heirs, 3 Litt.(Ky.) 295, it is said: "Where a final decree is once given and enrolled, and the term has passed at which it was done, the decree, if defective or erroneous, can only be altered or reversed by the same court on a bill of review filed for that purpose."See, also, Lilly v. Shaw, 59 Ill. 72;Sturdevant v. Stanton, 47 Conn. 579;Battaile v. Hospital, 76 Va. 63;Jones v. Turner, 81 Va. 709.In Ernst Tosetti Brewing Co. v. Koehler, 200 Ill. 309, 65 N. E. 636, the court held that a motion to vacate a decree, filed after the term, was too late, saying, "The decree was regularly signed and filed, and was entered of record, and the...