Particle Data Laboratories, Inc. v. Coulter Electronics, Inc.
Decision Date | 30 December 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 17442.,17442. |
Citation | 420 F.2d 1174 |
Parties | PARTICLE DATA LABORATORIES, INC., Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Appellee, v. COULTER ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant and Counterclaimant, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Myron C. Cass, I. Irving Silverman, Herbert J. Singer, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Anthony R. Chiara, Carlton Hill, Richard J. Schwarz, Chicago, Ill., for appellee; Hill, Sherman, Meroni, Gross & Simpson, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Before HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge, and DILLIN, District Judge.1
Particle Data Laboratories, Inc.2 brought this declaratory judgment action against Coulter Electronics, Inc.3 It sought a declaration of invalidity and non-infringement of a Coulter patent. Coulter filed three-counterclaims alleging patent infringement, trademark infringement and unfair competition. The district court dismissed Coulter's third counterclaim and denied its motion to join Robert H. Berg as a party counterclaim defendant to its three counterclaims. Coulter appeals. We affirm.
Plaintiff Particle Data is an Illinois corporation. Robert H. Berg is its sole executive and administrative officer and owns substantially all of its capital stock. Berg operates Particle Data and a sole proprietorship, Process Control Services, from his home in Elmhurst, Illinois.
Defendant Coulter Electronics is also an Illinois corporation. Two brothers, Joseph and Wallace Coulter, are its chief executive officers and now reside outside this jurisdiction in Florida.
In 1956, Berg approached the Coulter brothers who were making and selling a device for counting blood cells known as the "Coulter Counter." He proposed an arrangement whereby he would make a study of design improvements to make the Coulter Counter more suitable for counting particles in industrial applications and would develop industrial markets for the device.
On April 1, 1957, Berg and the Coulters entered into a Sales Franchise Agreement providing for the formation of a corporation, Coulter Industrial Sales, Inc., through which Berg was to develop industrial markets for the Coulter Counter. Berg was to finance such development and was to be compensated from the sales of Coulter Counters for industrial uses. Berg was the sole administrative officer and controlling stockholder of Coulter Industrial Sales, Inc.
The Sales Franchise Agreement provided for termination at will by either party. Coulter exercised this privilege several times. On each of these occasions a new agreement was substituted for the terminated one until September 8, 1960, when Coulter terminated the agreement finally. Coulter Industrial Sales, Inc., was then dissolved.
Coulter alleges in its third counterclaim that in its final form the Sales Franchise Agreement required Berg so to perform that all good will arising from his activities would inure to the benefit of Coulter upon termination of the agreement.
Following the final termination of the Sales Franchise Agreement, each party accused the other of breaches of such contract. Coulter charged that Berg had appropriated its good will by operating Coulter Industrial Sales, Particle Data, and Process Control Services during the life of the Sales Franchise Agreements in such a way as to confuse customers concerning whether they were dealing with the Coulter corporation or with Berg's corporation and proprietorship. Berg charged Coulter with fraud and with failure to pay for assets transferred to it upon the dissolution of Coulter Industrial Sales, Inc.
This strife culminated in filing in the Circuit Court of Du Page County, Illinois, of Civil Action No. 1-61-141, entitled Coulter Electronics, Inc. v. Robert H. Berg, individually and doing business as Process Control Service Company; Particle Data Laboratories, Inc.; and Coulter Industrial Sales Co. Berg filed a counterclaim in that action against Wallace H. Coulter, Joseph H. Coulter, Jr., and Coulter Electronics, Inc. This suit remains pending in the state court.
After the state court suit was filed, Particle Data began purchasing used Coulter Counters which it reconditioned and sold. Due to alleged harassment by Coulter of Particle Data's customers and suppliers, Particle Data commenced the present declaratory judgment action in the federal district court against Coulter seeking a declaration of invalidity and non-infringement of the Coulter patent No. 2,656,508 covering the Coulter Counter.
Coulter filed three counterclaims in the district court: 1, for infringement of three of its patents;4 2, for infringement of its registered trademark "Coulter Counter"; and 3, for unfair competition by reason of breaches of the Sales Franchise Agreements discussed above.
Particle Data's answer to the counterclaims included a motion to dismiss the third counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the state cause of action for breach of contract. This motion was not brought on for hearing for nearly 3½ years. In the meantime, considerable discovery took place, some of it with reference to the third counterclaim.
The district court initially denied the motion to dismiss on September 20, 1968. On September 27, 1968, Coulter moved to join Berg as a counterclaim defendant and Particle Data orally moved the court to reconsider its motion to dismiss the third counterclaim. On November 21, 1968, the trial court entered a Memorandum of Decision denying Coulter's motion to join Berg and granting Particle Data's motion to dismiss the third counterclaim.
Coulter contends that the district court had jurisdiction of the third counterclaim under Title 28, U.S.C.A. § 1338(b) and abused its discretion in dismissing such counterclaim.
Section 1338(b) is the statutory codification of the judicially developed doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 80th Congress House Report No. 308 (1947). It provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark laws." This case, like many before it, involves the double question of whether the instant claim is a "claim of unfair competition" and whether, if it is, it is "related" to the patent and trademark claims in suit.
Because of our disposition of this appeal, we may assume, without deciding, that Coulter has properly denominated its third counterclaim as one of "unfair competition" rather than one merely of breach of contract, as Particle Data contends.
Coulter urges that its counterclaim is "related" within the meaning of Section 1338(b). The first case to bring pendent jurisdiction into prominence was Hurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1933), wherein the Supreme Court distinguished proper from improper exercises of federal pendent jurisdiction over state law claims by contrasting 289 U.S. at 246, 53 S.Ct. at 589.
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L. Ed.2d 218 (1965), the Court found this "limited approach * * * unnecessarily grudging." The Court held Id. (Footnotes omitted.)
Coulter contends that a majority of courts now support the "more liberal viewpoint" which holds two claims "related" for purposes of Section 1338(b) if they have a so-called "factual nucleus."5
In two pre-Gibbs cases, we held that to be related within the meaning of Section 1338(b) two claims must "rest upon substantially identical facts." Powder Power Tool Corp. v. Powder Actuated Tool Co., 7 Cir., 230 F.2d 409, 413 (1956); Strey v. Devine's, Inc., 7 Cir., 217 F.2d 187, 189 (1954). Both of these cases rely upon Hurn v. Ousler, supra.
Coulter now urges this court to adopt the "more liberal" approach followed in some other circuits. It cites our decision in Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 7 Cir., 371 F.2d 154 (1967), involving ancillary jurisdiction as pointing the way to such a result.
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