Partlow v. State, 24156.

• Decision Date: 07 December 1923
• Docket Number: No. 24156.,24156.
• Parties: PARTLOW v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

194 Ind. 172

141 N.E. 513

PARTLOW

v.STATE.

No. 24156.^*

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 7, 1923.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; James A. Collins, Judge.

John L. Partlow was convicted of receiving stolen goods, which was affirmed (128 N. E. 436). From a judgment denying a writ of error coram nobis, he appeals. Appeal dismissed.

See, also, 134 N. E. 483.

Floyd G. Christian, of Noblesville, and Ed. V. Fitzpatrick and W. D. Fitzpatrick, both of Indianapolis, for appellant.

U. S. Lesh, Atty. Gen., and Mrs. Edward F. White, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

TRAVIS, J.

This action, based upon petition, is for writ of error coram nobis, which was the common-law remedy for review of judgments based upon error of fact.

Appellant Partlow was found guilty by a jury November 20, 1919, with having received stolen goods as charged in an indictment, which was followed by a judgment of fine and imprisonment. His appeal to the Supreme Court, based upon alleged error of the trial court in overruling his motion for a new trial, was affirmed by the Supreme Court October 14, 1920 (128 N. E. 436), and upon the overruling of the petition for rehearing the cause was remanded to the Marion criminal court, March 10, 1922, for the execution of the judgment of this court, affirming the judgment of the trial court. Thereafter appellant filed his petition with the Marion criminal court for writ of error coram nobis based upon error of fact, alleging therein that one of the witnesses, who testified in behalf of the state in the trial of the accused upon the indictment, had, after the time had elapsed for filing a motion for a new trial, and after appeal to this court, made an affidavit that the evidence given by himself and one other witness, who, with himself, was charged with having stolen the goods which the appellant herein had been convicted of having feloniously received, was perjured. From the denial of the petition by the trial court after a trial, he brings this appeal.

[1] Although courts, as an indispensable arm of government, have existed, since the beginning of recorded history, for the administration of justice, through and by established rules of jurisprudence, in the administration of which was the outgrowth of the maxim, “Ubi jus ibi remedium” (there is no wrong without a remedy), the rule has long prevailed that there must be an end to the litigation of a particular cause, and that an alleged injured litigant, in order to establish what he may deem the justice of the cause, may not have de novo trial after trial, ad infinitum. The establishment of courts of justice was not, and is not now, for the purpose of promoting, but rather to end, litigation. Especially has the rule long prevailed that an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court by a court of review estops the litigant from thereafter claiming a review under writ of error coram nobis in the court of original jurisdiction.

[2] The maxim quoted was not so broad as to license a litigant to run the gamut of the courts to his satisfaction, for public interest requires that litigation shall come to an end speedily, so that when a cause shall have been tried to judgment, and the merits of the trial determined upon appeal, the trial court, upon remittitur, shall have no power but to obey the judgment of the Appellate Court; “otherwise, litigation would never be ended, and the supreme tribunal of the state would be shorn of the authority over inferior tribunals with which it is invested by our fundamental law.” Galbreath v. Wallrich (1910) 48 Colo....