Partners v. Salt Lake Cnty.
| Decision Date | 18 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 20090569.,20090569. |
| Citation | 693 Utah Adv. Rep. 7,266 P.3d 797,2011 UT 63 |
| Parties | L.C. CANYON PARTNERS, L.L.C., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James S. Lowrie, Anthony L. Rampton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Lohra L. Miller, Donald H. Hansen, Melanie F. Mitchell, Thomas L. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from a decision by the district court upholding Salt Lake County's zoning of property owned by L.C. Canyon Partners and affirming the County Council's authority to rescind an ordinance that would have rezoned that property. We agree with the district court and affirm its entry of summary judgment against L.C. Canyon. The County had a rational basis for its zoning decision and the Council had the authority to rescind its rezoning ordinance before it became effective. In light of the Council's rescission authority, moreover, L.C. Canyon had only a unilateral hope that the rezoning ordinance ultimately would take effect, and it accordingly has no viable takings claim. The County is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm the district court on all counts.
¶ 2 On May 4, 2004, L.C. Canyon entered into an agreement to purchase several parcels of land, among them a 15.359–acre parcel located near the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake County, Utah. The agreement was amended several times, and as a result the purchase of this parcel was not consummated until May 2006. The deed on the property was recorded on May 16, 2006.
¶ 3 L.C. Canyon intended to build a single-family residence on the property. At the time of the purchase, however, the property was zoned FR–20, which requires a minimum of twenty acres per residence. L.C. Canyon accordingly sought to rezone the property, beginning before its purchase became final. On June 17, 2005, L.C. Canyon filed an application with the County to rezone 3.543 acres of the property from FR–20 to FR–2.5, a change that would have allowed the construction of a residence on the property. The County Planning Commission subsequently considered the proposed rezoning, ultimately recommending its approval to the Salt Lake County Council.
¶ 4 On October 18, 2005, the Council voted to approve L.C. Canyon's rezoning application. By a vote of five to two, the Council “approved, passed, and adopted” an ordinance amending the zoning map to grant L.C. Canyon's requested rezoning of the 3.543–acre portion of the property to FR–2.5. The ordinance included instructions to comply with the steps that a county legislative body must take before an ordinance may take effect. See Utah Code Ann. § 17–53–208(2)–(3) (2009).1 Specifically, the ordinance noted that it would “take effect 15 days after its passage and upon at least one publication in a newspaper published in and having general circulation in Salt Lake County.” In addition, the ordinance was signed by the Council chair and attested to by the county clerk.
¶ 5 One week later, at the Council's October 25 hearing, one of the council members who had voted in favor of the rezoning ordinance sought its reconsideration. At that time, Council member Horiuchi suggested that some of the Council members had been “confused about the location of the site” and that they had recently discovered that it was closer to Little Cottonwood Canyon than they had initially believed. The Council agreed to reconsider the matter at its next meeting on November 1, the day before the ordinance was to take effect. At that meeting, Council member Wilson moved to rescind the October 18 rezoning ordinance. The motion was seconded by Council member Hatch and approved on the votes of five of the seven members participating in the matter. L.C. Canyon subsequently sought and was denied a variance from the County Board of Adjustment.
¶ 6 L.C. Canyon then filed the complaint in this action, asserting due process and takings claims and alleging that the FR–20 zone lacked a rational basis as applied to L.C. Canyon's property, that the Council had no authority to rescind the October 18 rezoning ordinance, and that the rescission of that ordinance effected a taking of L.C. Canyon's property. After discovery on these claims, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
¶ 7 The district court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and denied L.C. Canyon's motion for partial summary judgment. First, in rejecting the due process challenge to the rationality of the County's zoning standard, the court concluded that the FR–20 zone was “rationally related” to the “legitimate public objectives of protecting the foothills and canyon areas of the county and their natural and scenic resources” and deemed the application of the FR–20 zoning rule “neither arbitrary nor capricious ... because it is reasonably debatable that they will protect the general welfare of the public.” Second, the court upheld the Council's authority to rescind its October 18 rezoning ordinance, noting that the ordinance was rescinded within the 15–day statutory period before the ordinance could become effective, Id. § 17–53–207(3)(a). Finally, the court rejected L.C. Canyon's takings claim on the ground that it “never acquired a vested development right or other legally protected or protectable interest under the ‘takings' clauses of the federal and Utah constitutions.”
¶ 8 L.C. Canyon filed this timely appeal from the district court's summary judgment decision, which we consider under a de novo standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's analysis. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶¶ 12–18, 250 P.3d 56.
¶ 9 L.C. Canyon challenges all three of the principal grounds for the district court's summary judgment in the County's favor. We find L.C. Canyon's arguments unpersuasive and accordingly affirm.
¶ 10 L.C. Canyon first contends that the district court erred in upholding the rationality of the FR–20 zone against a due process claim. Specifically, L.C. Canyon asserts that the court improperly limited its due process analysis to the general question whether the County had a “reasonably debatable” basis for adopting the FR–20 zone in the abstract, without considering the more specific question of the rationality of the application of that zone to L.C. Canyon's property in particular. On that latter question, L.C. Canyon insists that there is no reasonable, non-arbitrary basis for subjecting its property to the FR–20 zone. Although the 15–acre parcel in question is smaller than the 20 acres ordinarily required for construction in an FR–20 zone, L.C. Canyon asserts that this parcel is surrounded by property that is otherwise unavailable for development. In light of that fact, L.C. Canyon insists that the FR–20 zone as applied here does not rationally advance the public purposes ordinarily underlying such a zone.
¶ 11 We affirm the district court and uphold the rationality of the County's application of the FR–20 zone to L.C. Canyon's 15–acre parcel. See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 658–59 (10th Cir.2006) (). Local governments historically and understandably have adopted general zoning rules that apply to broadly defined categories of property. The FR–20 zone is just such a general rule. As the district court explained, this zoning rule is rationally related to advancing the “legitimate government objectives of protecting the foothills and canyon areas of the county and their natural and scenic resources.” In defining the FR–20 zoning rule, the County concluded that this objective generally would be advanced by prohibiting residential construction on parcels smaller than 20 acres. That was a rational judgment, and it is one that easily survives a constitutional due process challenge.
¶ 12 Like any general rule, the zoning rule at issue here could be said to be imperfectly drawn. The FR–20 zoning rule may be seen as overinclusive (as L.C. Canyon suggests) in that there may be parcels smaller than 20 acres on which construction would not impact the natural, open scenery any more than would construction on a 20–acre lot. But that does not render the application of the general rule unconstitutionally arbitrary. Zoning regulations are neither designed nor required to advance their public purposes with perfect precision. When the local zoning authority applies general zoning rules to broad categories of property, it is opting for a more efficient, less discretionary regime. That is the rational basis for the County's decision to subject L.C. Canyon to the FR–20 zone and to refuse to engage in a more particularized, parcel-by-parcel review of the appropriate zoning standard to apply to L.C. Canyon's property. A particularized zoning standard for each individual parcel of property might arguably be more fairly tailored to the specifics of each parcel, but it would also be less efficient and more subject to individual discretion. The zoning authority acts well within the limits of its constitutional discretion when it opts for general zoning rules and eschews discretionary zoning standards.2
¶ 13 Salt Lake County, moreover, has adopted elements of both general rules and discretionary standards in its zoning regime. Like many local governments, the County has adopted procedures that allow aggrieved property owners to seek a variance from the application of general zoning rules from the Board of Adjustment. Salt Lake County, Utah, Code of Ordinances § 19.92.040 (2011). Thus, L.C. Canyon was entitled to file—and ultimately did file—for a variance with respect to the application of the FR–20 zoning rule to its 15–acre parcel. In seeking that variance, L.C. Canyon...
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