Partney v. Dallas

• Decision Date: 01 July 1969
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 68--126
• Citation: 250 N.E.2d 166,111 Ill.App.2d 261
• Parties: Donald PARTNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William DALLAS et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 166

250 N.E.2d 166

111 Ill.App.2d 261

Donald PARTNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William DALLAS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Gen. No. 68--126.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

July 1, 1969.

Chapman, Strawn & Kinder, Granite City, Charles W. Chapman, Chicago, of counsel, for appellant.

Law Offices of William W. Schooley, Granite City, Robert P. Hennessey, William W. Schooley, Granite City, of counsel, for appellees.

GREEN, Justice.

This appeal is from a final order dismissing on motion a complaint for declaratory judgment brought by the Mayor of Granite City against all of the members of its City Council. The complaint alleged that the following created an 'actual controversy' within the Illinois provision for declaratory judgments. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, Ch. 110, § 57.1.) Ordinance 2181 of that City authorized the Mayor to appoint the members of Council committees, and pursuant thereto he made such appointments on May 20, 1968, for the 1968--1969 fiscal year; the Council then purported to make its own appointments and then enacted Ordinance 2550 repealing Ordinance 2181 and providing that Council committees should be appointed by the Council itself. They then, on June 24, 1968, approved their previous appointments. A declaration was sought that the Committees appointed by the Mayor were valid for the entire fiscal year.

Various contentions were made by the parties below and in their briefs here but both stated in oral argument that it was highly desirable that a determination be made here as to who the members of the Council committees were during the time in question and requested that this be done. In furtherance of this request the parties have stipulated that the allegations of the complaint are true.

We must first determine if there is anything which precludes us from doing this. One problem is that the fiscal year involved has ended and both sides agree that the Council has power to make appointments thereafter. The question in issue has become moot and under these circumstances an appeal is usually dismissed. In People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769, 30 A.L.R.2d 1132, however, the trial court pursuant to dependency petition had appointed a guardian for an eight days' old child with power to consent to having a blood transfusion administered to the child. The parents objected on religious grounds. The appeal was perfected after the transfusion had been given and the guardian discharged. In refusing to dismiss the appeal although it involved a moot question, the court stated:

'But when the issue presented is of substantial public interest, a well-recognized exception exists to the general rule that a case which has become moot will be dismissed upon appeal. (See cases collected in 132 A.L.R. 1185.) Among the criteria considered in determining the existence of the requisite degree of public interest are the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.' (People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769.)

The citation in 132 A.L.R. 1185 lists the foregoing criteria and other reasons why an appeal on a moot question should either be heard or dismissed. At page 1195 it lists as an additional ground for hearing the appeal, the mutual request of the parties for a decision.

The case under consideration involves a dispute between public officials in the conduct of their offices. Ordinances of various municipalities and the practices in relation thereto often follow similar patterns so that this dispute could well arise again in this or some other city. The officials would therefore be in need of guidance. For these reasons and because of the joint request of the parties, we choose to hear the appeal.

No other reason precludes us from proceeding. Appellee has admitted the allegations of the complaint including the statement that 'the acts of the defendants have created a case of actual controversy.' As we have stated, the dispute is, in fact, between officers of a public body as to the membership of its Council committees.

'The scope of the declaratory judgment remedy should be kept wide and liberal and not restricted by...