Partney v. Russell
| Decision Date | 17 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | A164363 |
| Citation | 469 P.3d 756,304 Or.App. 679 |
| Parties | Joe PARTNEY and Carol Partney, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mike RUSSELL and Casey Humbert, Defendants-Respondents, and Scotty Fletcher and Tom Humbert, Defendants. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Wade P. Bettis filed the brief for appellants.
Patrick M. Gregg, Pendleton, argued the cause for respondents. Also on the brief was Corey, Byler & Rew, LLP.
Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.*
In this real property dispute, plaintiffs appeal a limited judgment disposing of their claims for adverse possession, declaratory relief, trespass, and property damage, all related to a purported easement permitting defendants to traverse plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs raise two assignments of error. In their first assignment, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for partial summary judgment, based on the court's conclusion that an easement appurtenant to defendant Russell's neighboring property permitted that use.1 In plaintiffs’ view, no valid easement for ingress to, and egress from, their property ever existed; even if one had existed at some time, they argue, it was later extinguished by merger or abandonment.
In plaintiffs’ second assignment of error, they contend that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, based on the court's conclusions that an easement existed and that plaintiffs had failed to raise any material issue of fact as to their trespass claim. Specific to that claim, plaintiffs argue that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether defendants exceeded the limits of any easement that may exist.2 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court erred both in denying plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and in granting defendants’ motion as to the existence of an easement across plaintiffs’ property; further, because the trial court's ruling as to plaintiffs’ trespass claim was premised on its erroneous conclusion that a valid easement existed, that ruling also was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On an appeal from cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court's ruling on each motion is reviewable. Morris v. Kanne , 295 Or. App. 726, 728, 436 P.3d 36, rev. den. , 365 Or. 195, 451 P.3d 977 (2019). "[W]e view the record for each motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing it to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." O'Kain v. Landress , 299 Or. App. 417, 419, 450 P.3d 508 (2019) (citing ORCP 47 C). "No genuine issue as to a material fact exists if, based on the record before the court viewed in a manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment." ORCP 47 C. We state the facts in accordance with those standards.
Plaintiffs and Russell own adjacent lots in Umatilla County. Plaintiffs own tax lot 1001 (TL 1001), which is legally known as the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of Section 27, the purported servient tenement through which the easement runs. Russell owns tax lot 1002 (TL 1002), legally known as the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 27, which is the purported dominant tenement. The following drawing depicts the lots and surrounding area, including tax lot 1000 (TL 1000), which is a larger lot that adjoins the lots at issue to the north and is also owned by plaintiffs.3
Plaintiffs and Russell are both successors in interest to Ronald and Ruby Haney, but neither lot was acquired directly from the Haneys. The Haneys’ own title history is less than clear, as are some of the transactions that followed the Haneys’ acquisition of the properties. We recount that history as best we can, relying on the exhibits in the record and the parties’ undisputed accounts.
In December 1980, an individual, Lang, conveyed property including the lots at issue to an entity called "Seven Springs Development Corp." (Seven Springs), which the deed described as the "assignee" of the Haneys, "husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety." On September 6, 1984, the Haneys prepared and signed a "Declaration of Easement" (the Haney declaration). The declaration describes the Haneys as owners of the property encompassing TLs 1000, 1001, and 1002, and it purports to create an "easement for ingress and egress to Skyline Road, over, along and across all of said described property over all roadways now established and commonly known as Spring Basin Lane, Alpine Loop, Upper Alpine Loop, Lower Alpine Loop, Crystal Lane and White Fir Lane." The declaration further describes the easement as "appurtenant to [TLs 1000, 1001, and 1002.]"4 It is undisputed that the Haneys prepared the declaration in anticipation of a subdivision and future road construction, but that, other than Skyline Road, which is depicted in the above diagram, the roadways it identifies never formally came into existence.5 The Haneys attempted to obtain approval for a subdivision on the land, but the Umatilla Planning Commission never approved their proposal.
In other words, the deed transferred only TLs 1001 and 1002 to the Haneys, but it purported to convey an easement permitting them to traverse all of Section 27 then owned by Seven Springs—that is, TLs 1000 , 1001, and 1002—for purposes of accessing Skyline Road.
That same day, the Haneys executed two warranty deeds, one each for TL 1001 and TL 1002, and sold each of those lots to separate buyers.6 The deed conveying TL 1001 did not reference the Haneys’ declaration purporting to create an easement or the easement described in the deed from Seven Springs to the Haneys. It did, however, purport to convey, along with TL 1001, "an easement for ingress and egress to Skyline Road * * * over, along and across" TLs 1000 and 1002. The conveyance of TL 1002 similarly purports to convey an easement for purposes of accessing Skyline Road, but "over, along and across" what is now plaintiffs’ property, TLs 1000 and 1001. The deed conveying TL 1002 also lacks any express reference to the Haney declaration or the Seven Springs deed to the Haneys, but, unlike the deed to TL 1001, it indicates that the conveyance is "[s]ubject to easements * * * of record."
On September 18, 1984, the Haney declaration, the deed from Seven Springs to the Haneys, and the deeds from the Haneys to the buyers of each of the Haneys’ lots were recorded. Russell eventually acquired TL 1002 in October 2014.7
In 2008, the Haneys’ grantees reconveyed TL 1001 to the Coppingers and Shamions by way of warranty deed. Unlike the Haneys’ 1984 conveyance of TL 1001, the 2008 warranty deed provided that the property was being conveyed "[s]ubject to and excepting * * * attached Exhibit ‘A,’ " which, in turn, referenced the Haney declaration recorded in 1984.
Plaintiffs ultimately acquired TLs 1000 and 1001 by warranty deed in May 2015. The conveyance to plaintiffs granted them "the following described real property free of encumbrances except as specifically set forth herein:"
The referenced "EXHIBIT ‘A’ " was recorded along with the deed and included a legal description of the property conveyed to plaintiffs as well as its encumbrances. In particular, the conveyance included:
In July 2015, shortly after acquiring TLs 1000 and 1001, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants, alleging adverse possession and trespass, and further seeking a declaration that no valid easement had ever encumbered TL 1001 or, if one had, that it had been extinguished.9 Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim asserted that defendants claimed a right to use plaintiffs’ property pursuant to the 1984 Haney declaration and contended that the declaration was "null and void." Among other things, plaintiffs alleged that the purported easement had been "given by a party who was not the legal owner and had no authority to grant an easement on [p]laintiffs’ property," that the asserted easement had been "terminated by merger of the servient and the dominant tenements," and that any easement had been "abandoned."
Plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim asserted that they and their predecessors had possessed TL 1001 for the requisite time under an honest belief that they owned the property "free and clear of any easements for ingress and egress and rights of way." Finally, plaintiffs’ trespass claim...
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