Paschen Contractors, Inc. v. Burrell

• Decision Date: 25 September 1973
• Docket Number: No. 54422,54422
• Parties: , 6 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 887, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8989 PASCHEN CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The Rev. Curtis BURRELL et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 246

303 N.E.2d 246

14 Ill.App.3d 748, 6 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 887,

6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8989

PASCHEN CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The Rev. Curtis BURRELL et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 54422.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

Sept. 25, 1973.

Stanley Bass, Marshall Patner, William L. Foreman, Jr., Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

William W. Brackett and Paul E. Goldstein, Chicago, amicus curiae.

Warren C. Ingersoll, R. R. McMahan, Michael Davis, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellees.

LEIGHTON, Justice.

This is an interlocutory appeal by defendants to review an order that granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Four building construction corporations and two associations of persons engaged in the building construction industry filed a complaint that sought injunctive relief against 13 individuals and 11 voluntary associations. During this appeal, we granted American Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division, leave to file a brief Amicus curiae. The issues presented require us to decide whether the injunction order is invalid. We will first summarize the material facts.

I.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that from July 28 to August 13, 1969, the day it was filed, defendants and persons unknown had conspired, and by threats, intimidation, coercion, and violence, had endeavored to force plaintiffs to meet defendants' demands for increased employment of minorities in the construction industry. It was alleged that in furtherance of this conspiracy, defendants took steps to force members of the two plaintiff associations to violate, breach or rescind their collective bargaining agreements with various building trade unions in Cook County, Illinois, and thus force member-contractors to violate, breach or rescind existing subcontracts with white subcontractors and enter into subcontracts with unidentified and unknown black subcontractors.

As examples of defendants' overt acts, plaintiffs alleged that between July 28 and August 7, 1969, on five different dates and at eight locations, defendants caused large groups of male Negroes, numbering sometimes as many as 300, to go upon construction sites, cause disturbances and intimidate the employees of some of the plaintiffs in order to shut down construction projects. Plaintiffs alleged that the projects were of great monetary value; that as a result of defendants' conduct, they lost large sums of money in wages, they suffered great injury and the community in which the projects were located suffered great damage. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not have an adequate remedy at law. They prayed for an injunction and for '* * * other and further relief as is necessary and proper.' On the day the complaint was filed, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction without notice.

The trial court, however, ordered notice served on defendants. When, on Thursday, August 14 plaintiffs' motion was called, three lawyers appeared representing some of the defendants. Each requested an opportunity to study and answer the complaint. The lawyer for one defendant, the Woodlawn Organization, categorically denied that his client had done any of the things alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. After considering the requests, the trial judge ruled that plaintiffs' allegations were serious enough to warrant an immediate hearing. Plaintiffs then called ten witnesses and in the course of their testimony had 10 exhibits admitted into evidence. Defendants called one witness, Rev. Curtis Burrell, whose testimony closed the hearing. The trial court then granted plaintiffs' motion and issued the preliminary injunction. On Monday, August 18, 1969, defendants made a motion to vacate the injunction order. The motion was denied. Then, on plaintiffs' request, without any supporting evidence, the trial court amended the injunction order, making it applicable to defendants '* * * each of them, and their attorneys, agents, representatives and members, or any other person or groups of persons, or organizations, acting in concert with, acting in sympathy with, or seeking to further the aims of defendants, or any of them * * *.'

Neither defendants nor the Amicus questions the adequacy of the evidence on which the trial court relied for its grant of the preliminary injunction. They do, however, question the validity of the injunction order. They contend that both as to subject matter and persons, its terms are vague and overbroad. They argue that the order, because of its vagueness and overbreadth, infringes on their rights to freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, defendants conclude, the preliminary injunction order is invalid.

Plaintiffs defend the validity of the injunction order, contending that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. They argue that the injunction order is explicit and clear, both as to its terms and as to its breadth and is as adequate as was required by the evidence. Plaintiffs argue that because the evidence showed defendants were engaged in mass picketing, protests and demonstrations accompanied by violence, the preliminary injunction order is valid. We resolve the issues presented and settle the competing contentions by reference to settled principles of constitutional and statutory law.

II.

Picketing, marching, demonstrating and protesting involve elements of speech and conduct. (Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (1968), 391 U.S. 308, 313 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603; compare Edwards v. South Carolina (1963), 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697.) These forms of conduct constitute methods of expression, and if peaceful and orderly, fall well within the rights protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S. 147, 152, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162; Gregory v. City of Chicago (1969), 394 U.S. 111, 112, 89 S.Ct. 946, 22 L.Ed.2d 134. However, the rights protected by the first amendment are neither unlimited nor immune from control. See Kovacs v. Cooper, Judge (1949), 336 U.S. 77, 85, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608.

For example, the first amendment does not afford the same type of freedom to those who communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching and picketing on streets and highways as it affords to those who communicate ideas by pure speech. (Cox v. Louisiana (1965), 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471.) When expressive conduct takes the form of mass demonstrations, parades, or picketing on public streets and sidewalks, the prevention of public disorder becomes an important object of legitimate state concern. (Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967), 388 U.S. 307, 316, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210.) Such conduct can be controlled by the injunctive power of state courts. See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. (1941), 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200.

Mass picketing, protests and demonstrations accompanied by violence, obstruction of ingress and egress, threats, intimidation and coercion are restrainable. (Ossey v. Retail Clerks' Union, 326 Ill. 405, 158 N.E. 162; The Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. The Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago No. 753, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E.2d 308; General Electric v. Local 997 United Automobile Workers of America, 8 Ill.App.2d 154, 130 N.E.2d 758.) 'Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.' (Cox v. New Hampshire (1941), 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 133 A.L.R. 1396). Therefore, to the extent that defendants engaged in mass picketing, protests and demonstrations accompanied by violence, they could be enjoined. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc. (1957), 355 U.S. 131, 78 S.Ct. 206, 2 L.Ed.2d 151.

The injunction, however, must conform to standards of specificity. It should be so worded that the party enjoined may know from a reading of the order what he is restrained from doing. (Roesch Enamel Range Co. v. Carbine, 247 Ill.App. 248.) The order must be complete in the details of its prohibition or direction; it must be so clear that what the court intends is easily discernible. (D. W. Evans v. Alvanley Johnston, 300 Ill.App. 78, 20 N.E.2d 841, cert. denied 309 U.S. 662, 60 S.Ct. 582, 84 L.Ed. 1010; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 59 Ill.App.2d 459, 208 N.E.2d 579.) If it restrains the exercise of first amendment rights, it must be couched in terms that will accomplish constitutionally permitted objectives and those required by public order. A state may not employ...